Fisher v. Woods, Case No. 2:11-cv-209

• Decision Date: 18 April 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:11-cv-209
• Parties: MICHAEL FISHER, Petitioner, v. JEFFREY WOODS, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

MICHAEL FISHER, Petitioner, v. JEFFREY WOODS, Respondent.

Case No. 2:11-cv-209

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION

Dated: April 18, 2014

Honorable R. ALLAN EDGAR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Petitioner Michael Fisher, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his first degree murder, felony firearm and carrying a concealed weapon convictions. Petitioner is serving two terms of life imprisonment without parole on the first degree murder convictions, two years for each of his two felony fire arms convictions and 23 months to 5 years for his concealed weapon conviction. Petitioner argues that:

I. Petitioner was denied due process and a fair trial where he was tried on the basis of irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial similar acts evidence.

II. The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to suppress statements obtained in violation of the psychologist-patient privilege and in refusing to suppress Petitioner's incriminating statements to the police obtained without Miranda warnings.

In April of 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) became effective. Because this petition was filed after the effective date of the AEDPA, this Court must follow the standard of review established in that statute. Pursuant to the AEDPA, an application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a state conviction cannot be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonableapplication of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The AEDPA limits the source of law to cases decided by the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This provision marks a "significant change" and prevents the district court from looking to lower federal court decisions in determining whether the state decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1998). To justify a grant of habeas corpus relief under this provision of the AEDPA, a federal court must find a violation of law "clearly established" by holdings of the Supreme Court, as opposed to its dicta, as of the time of the relevant state court decision. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). Recently, the Supreme Court held that a decision of the state court is "contrary to" such clearly established federal law "if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Id. A state court decision will be deemed an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. A federal habeas court may not find a state adjudication to be "unreasonable" "simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 412. Rather, the application must also be "unreasonable." Id. Further, the habeas court should not transform the inquiry into a subjective one by inquiring whether all reasonable jurists would agree that the application by the state court was unreasonable. Id. at 410 (disavowing Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir. 1996)). Rather, the issue is whether the state court'sapplication of clearly established federal law is "objectively unreasonable." Williams, 529 U.S. at 409.

The AEDPA requires heightened respect for state factual findings. Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1998). The habeas corpus statute has long provided that the factual findings of the state courts, made after a hearing, are entitled to a presumption of correctness. This presumption has always been accorded to findings of state appellate courts, as well as the trial court. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546 (1981); Smith v. Jago, 888 F.2d 399, 407 n.4 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 961 (1990). Under the AEDPA, a determination of a factual issue made by a state court is presumed to be correct. The petitioner has the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1040 (1999).

In his first claim, petitioner contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence where the probative value was outweighed by the prejudicial effect contrary to Michigan state law. However, "such an inquiry . . . is no part of a federal court's habeas review of a state conviction." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). In Estelle v. McGuire, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the admission of evidence in violation of California state law entitled a petitioner to habeas corpus relief.

We have stated many times that "federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law." Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780, 110 S. Ct. 3092, 3102, 111 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1990); see also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41, 104 S. Ct. 871, 874-75, 79 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1984). Today, we reemphasize that it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21, 96 S. Ct. 175, 177, 46 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1975) (per curiam).

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67-8.

The appropriate inquiry is whether the allegedly improper admission of evidence violated the petitioner's constitutional rights. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 68. A federal court will grant habeas corpus relief only where a violation of the state's evidentiary rule results in the denial of fundamental fairness, and therefore, a violation of due process. Brown, III v. O'Dea, 187 F.3d 572, 578 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Cooper v. Sowders, 837 F.2d 284, 287 (6th Cir. 1988)).

"The standard in determining whether the admission of prejudicial evidence constitutes a denial of fundamental fairness is whether the evidence is 'material in the sense of a crucial, critical highly significant factor.'" Leverett v. Spears, 877 F.2d 921, 925 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting Redman v. Dugger, 866 F.2d 387, 390 (11th Cir. 1989)).

Brown, III v. O'Dea, 187 F.3d at 578. Petitioner cannot establish that the admission of this testimony violated his due process rights. The Michigan Court of Appeals explained:

First, defendant argues that MRE 404(b) barred testimony from defendant's former wife, Annette Daley, and defendant's stepdaughter, Nicole Burgdorf, because their testimony was irrelevant and the prejudicial effect substantially outweighed the probative value of the testimony. At trial, Daley testified that defendant physically assaulted her during their relationship and threatened to kill her on multiple occasions. According to Daley, when defendant threatened to kill her, he told her that he would avoid criminal responsibility for the murder by pleading insanity. Additionally, Burgdorf testified that defendant talked of robbing banks and he stated that he would plead insanity to avoid any criminal responsibility for committing any crimes.

Generally, a trial court's decision to admit evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Taylor, 252 Mich.App. 519, 521-522, 652 N.W.2d 526 (2002). "A trial court may be said to have abused its discretion only when its decision falls outside the principled range of outcomes." People v. Blackston, 481 Mich. 451, 460, 751 N.W.2d 408 (2008). The decision to admit evidence "frequently involves a

preliminary question of law, such as whether a rule of evidence or statute precludes the admission of the evidence. We review questions of law de novo. Therefore, when such preliminary questions are at issue, we will find an abuse of discretion when a trial court admits evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of law." People v. Katt, 468 Mich. 272, 278, 662 N.W.2d 12 (2003).

MRE 404(b)(1) provides:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the conduct at issue in the case.

Pursuant to MRE 404(b), evidence of other acts committed by a defendant is inadmissible "if the proponent's only theory of relevance is that the other acts shows defendant's inclination to wrongdoing in general to prove that the defendant committed the conduct in question." People v. VanderVliet, 444 Mich. 52, 63, 508 N.W.2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich. 1205, 520 N.W.2d 338 (1994). Evidence is admissible under MRE 404(b) if the evidence is offered for a proper purpose, the evidence is relevant, and the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs the potential of unfair prejudice. Id. at 74-75, 508 N.W.2d 114.

This Court must initially consider whether this evidence was admitted for a proper purpose. The plain language of MRE 404(b)(1) considers premeditation, intent and

...