People v. VanderVliet
| Decision Date | 01 December 1992 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 93260 |
| Citation | 444 Mich. 52,508 N.W.2d 114 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Daniel VANDERVLIET, Defendant-Appellee. , |
In this interlocutory appeal, we consider the Court of Appeals affirmance of a circuit court's order prohibiting the introduction of evidence of other crimes or wrongs in two second-degree criminal sexual conduct trials involving the defendant, Daniel VanderVliet. The prosecutor asserts that the testimony of the defendant's alleged victims, Todd F, Steven C, and John J, is admissible in each of the pending cases 1 because it was not offered "to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith," in violation of MRE 404(b). We evaluate this claim in light of the clarified standard articulated today: First, that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b); second, that it be relevant under Rule 402 as enforced through Rule 104(b); third, that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice; fourth, that the trial court may, upon request, provide a limiting instruction to the jury. 2 Consequently, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals in each case and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The evidentiary record consists of testimony given during the preliminary examination and two subsequent pretrial hearings held to determine the admissibility of the other acts evidence.
The defendant was employed by Kent Client Services as a case manager, working with developmentally disabled young men. In October, 1987, as part of his employment, the defendant became the case manager for a mildly retarded male in his mid-twenties named Steven C.
Steven C testified that on more than one occasion he accompanied the defendant to a house in the country belonging to the defendant's brother. On October 4, 1988, at the house, the defendant asked Steven to take a shower. Following the shower, Steven said the defendant proceeded to masturbate him. After Steven ejaculated, the defendant asked Steven to rub lotion on the defendant's back. Steven said he complied because he saw that the defendant's pants were unzipped and was afraid of what the defendant might do.
On October 5, 1988, Steven complained about defendant's conduct to an employee at Southwest Center, a sheltered workshop. This complaint was communicated to a recipient rights investigator and, eventually, to the defendant's supervisor, Fred Ward.
Mr. Ward testified that, following the complaint, he started to closely supervise the defendant. The defendant was specifically informed that future client contact should occur in essentially public places, including the sheltered workshop or licensed adult foster care homes. Mr. Ward stressed that, if client contact did occur at an individual's residence, it had to be documented closely on a timely basis and occur pursuant to the prearranged treatment plan. These instructions were documented in a letter in March 1989, which explicitly directed the defendant to inform his supervisor of any client activities that took place outside a workshop setting or an adult foster care home.
The defendant was allowed to continue client contact under these restrictions, and, in May 1989, he became the case manager for a developmentally disabled male in his mid-twenties named Todd F.
Todd testified that on several occasions between May 1989 and August 1989, he accompanied the defendant to the same house. There, the defendant watched Todd urinate and shower. Todd testified that defendant touched Todd's testicles on three occasions. He also testified that the defendant would wrestle with him and sit on his genitals for long periods of time. Todd said he objected to all these alleged activities.
In August 1989, Todd informed the service coordinator of Southwest Center, Grant Sutton, that he had been to the defendant's brother's house and had wrestled with the defendant there. Mr. Sutton immediately contacted his supervisor and informed recipient rights of this conversation.
Mr. Sutton testified that his concern was aroused for three reasons. First, he was aware of Steven C's accusations against the defendant. Second, Mr. Sutton believed it was questionable conduct for a case worker to wrestle with a client. Finally, he asserted that taking a client either to a case manager's own home or a relative's home was unacceptable and unprofessional conduct. 3
Following the second accusation, the defendant was suspended from client contact. Mr. Ward testified that during ensuing conversations, the defendant admitted he took Todd to his brother's house in violation of the conditions set forth in the memo.
A police investigation was begun in the fall of 1989. Detective Bruce Fogerty testified that the defendant voluntarily came to the Wyoming Police Department where he was informed of his rights. Defendant waived those rights.
Regarding Steven C, the defendant admitted taking Steven to his brother's house. He also admitted that he told Steven to take a shower on one occasion because Steven had a dental appointment and Steven smelled. Defendant denied that any sexual contact occurred.
Regarding Todd F, the defendant admitted taking Todd to his brother's house. The defendant claimed that Todd had had out-patient surgery and that he was directed by Todd's doctor to look for blood in Todd's urine. Pursuant to those instructions, the defendant told Fogerty that he checked the toilet for blood after Todd urinated. The defendant admitted to tickling Todd under his arms, and on one occasion physically sitting on him. However, the defendant denied sitting on Todd's intimate areas. He asserted that any contact occurring with those areas was inadvertent or accidental. The defendant denied he ever touched Todd's testicles.
During his investigation, Detective Fogerty uncovered another allegation of sexual misconduct involving the defendant and another of his clients, John J. This third case is uncharged at this time. Because this allegation came to light after Detective Fogerty's conversation with the defendant, he was not questioned about it.
John J testified that the defendant was his caseworker. Although not identifying a specific time, John said that on one occasion the defendant told him to take a shower while both were at John's residence. Following the shower, the defendant touched John's penis, masturbating him. In response, John slapped the defendant's hand and told him to leave. The defendant then pulled his pants down a little bit and asked John to put cologne on the defendant's back. On another occasion, while the defendant and John were in the defendant's car, the defendant told John that they were going to his brother's house. The defendant then reached for John's penis. John slapped the defendant's hand before contact was made. John also testified that he was acquainted with Steven C, who had warned him about the defendant.
After the defendant was bound over on the charge of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, 4 the prosecutor filed a memorandum concerning the admissibility of evidence under MRE 404(b). Relying on People v. Engelman, 434 Mich. 204, 453 N.W.2d 656 (1990), the prosecutor argued that the defendant's conduct toward each of the three alleged victims was admissible in each of the pending cases because it did not violate MRE 404(b). The trial court held that the prosecutor could not introduce evidence of other misconduct in either Todd's or Steven's case. The prosecutor appealed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court in an unpublished opinion per curiam, decided January 23, 1992 (Docket No. 138141). A divided panel held that, because the misconduct evidence was not "probative of a matter 'in issue,' " id. at 2, it was inadmissible under the test enunciated in People v. Golochowicz, 413 Mich. 298, 308, 319 N.W.2d 518 (1982). "Consequently, allowing the evidence would frustrate the policy underlying the general exclusion of similar acts evidence...." VanderVliet, supra at 3. The Court of Appeals also held that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Id. 5
Presiding Judge Doctoroff dissented. Relying on People v. Engelman, supra, Judge Doctoroff concluded that "[t]he similar acts evidence in this case clearly establishes defendant's scheme, plan or system, and is material as proof that the charged act was committed," 6 id. at 1.
We granted leave to appeal, 440 Mich. 872, 486 N.W.2d 743 (1992).
We begin the substantive portion of this opinion with a general discussion of the law regarding other acts evidence.
Logical relevance is determined by the application of Rules 401 and 402. 7
MRE 401 provides:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 8
MRE 402 provides:
All relevant evidence is admissable, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Michigan, these rules, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Rules 401 and 402 define the universe of evidence that is logically relevant:
[I]f the item of evidence satisfies the normal standards for logical relevance, most courts resist defense attempts to impose additional spurious requirements purportedly based on "logical...
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