Fishman v. Fishman
Decision Date | 09 April 1981 |
Citation | 173 Cal.Rptr. 59,117 Cal.App.3d 815 |
Parties | Helaine E. FISHMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Alvin FISHMAN, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 60162. |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Gary S. Wishik, Geoffrey S. Sindon, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant.
Jack Edzant, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent.
A "JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO 1710.25 CCP" was entered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant in the superior court. Defendant's motion to vacate that judgment was granted by the trial court and the action was dismissed. Thereafter a motion to reconsider was filed by the plaintiff and that motion was denied. It is from the order vacating the judgment and from the denial of the motion for reconsideration that plaintiff has perfected his appeal to this court.
The parties to this litigation who were once husband and wife have over the course of almost ten years engaged in litigation concerning the dissolution of their marriage both in the State of California and in the State of New York. The latter state is where the parties were previously domiciled. Both the New York and the California actions have been pursued to final judgment. The action in New York was in the appellate courts of that state for several years and finally, after remand to the trial court, a judgment was entered awarding to the plaintiff, inter alia, $14,411.07 for attorney's fees and costs. On August 21, 1979, plaintiff instituted the within action by filing an application for entry of judgment on sister state judgment. On September 27, 1979, plaintiff filed an amended application. These applications were made pursuant to section 1710.10 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Hereafter all references to statutes shall be to the California Code of Civil Procedure.
On September 27, 1979, a clerk of the trial court, pursuant to section 1710.25, entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant for the amount prayed together with interest and costs. On December 14, 1979, defendant noticed a motion to vacate the judgment based upon the provisions of section 1710.40. Both sides presented points and authorities, declarations, argument and many exhibits. The matter came on for hearing on February 20, 1980, whereupon the motion was granted. The minute order reflecting the action taken states that the motion was granted pursuant to section 1710.10, subdivision (c). The minute order further recites that the case was dismissed without prejudice to filing a complaint to establish a foreign judgment and that the order of dismissal was prepared that same day.
1. Were the orders of the trial court appealable?
2. Did the trial court err in vacating the judgment based upon the provisions of section 1710.10, subdivision (c)?
Respondent contends that the orders of the superior court vacating the judgment are not appealable. Although our research does not disclose that the issue of appealability of orders made under the act in question has ever been litigated, there are many reported cases disposing of such appeals, e. g., Epps v. Russell (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 201, 133 Cal.Rptr. 30; Tom Thumb Glove Co. v. Han (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 1, 144 Cal.Rptr. 30; Terzich v. Medak (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 636, 144 Cal.Rptr. 323.
Section 1710.40, subdivision (c) provides as follows:
Section 632 makes provision, inter alia, for parties to require findings of fact and conclusions of law to be made by the court upon the trial of a question of fact.
Section 634 makes provision for a party to call to the court's attention any objection such party might have to the findings. It further provides: "When ... the record shows that such omission, ambiguity or conflict was brought to the attention of the trial court either prior to entry of judgment or in conjunction with a motion under Section 657 or 663, it shall not be inferred on appeal ... that the trial court found in favor of the prevailing party as to such facts or on such issue."
It is manifest from the provisions set forth above that the Legislature intended that the order on the motion to vacate should be appealable. We so hold.
We now turn to appellant's contention that the granting of the motion to vacate and the order of dismissal of the action by the trial court constituted error. Preliminarily it should be pointed out that the power of the trial court to vacate the judgment is limited to those grounds set forth in section 1710.40, subdivision (a). 1 As the reason assigned by the trial court was not a ground specified in said subdivision (a), the order granting the motion to vacate may not be sustained.
As noted, the court below not only granted the motion to vacate but also filed an order of dismissal of the action. If indeed the court's interpretation of section 1710.10, subdivision (c) is correct then its order of dismissal was correct. Although appellant noticed her appeal to be from the order granting the motion to vacate the judgment and from the order denying reconsideration thereof, we construe the appeal to also be from the judgment of dismissal.
Subdivision (c) of section 1710.10 provides as follows: " 'Sister state judgment' means that part of any judgment, decree, or order of a court of a state of the United States, other than California, which requires the payment of money, but does not include a support order as defined in subdivision (k) of Section 1653."
Section 1653 is a section providing definitions in the revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act of 1968. (Hereafter URESA.) Subdivision (k) thereof provides as follows: " 'Support order' means any judgment, decree, or order of support in favor of an obligee whether temporary or final, or subject to modification, revocation, or remission, regardless of the kind of action or proceeding in which it is entered."
The trial court apparently concluded that that portion of the New York State decree which awarded attorney's fees and costs to appellant constituted a support order as defined in section 1653, subdivision (k). There is a paucity of authority to assist this court in interpreting those sections of the acts which are in question. The only case which either the court or counsel have been able to locate bearing on the issue is that of Mehrstein v. Mehrstein (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 646, 54 Cal.Rptr. 65. In referring to subdivision (k) of section 1653, the Mehrstein court, at page 649, 54 Cal.Rptr. 65, stated: "The term 'support' is used in a general sense and includes necessaries during marriage (citation), separate maintenance during the legal separation (citation), and alimony or child support after divorce (citation)." This observation by the court, while being uncontrovertably correct, is not definitive. It does not answer the question here presented, namely, whether attorney's fees and costs are also included within the term "support." We must ascertain if the Legislature intended to exclude the enforcement of orders for attorney's fees and costs from either the sister state money judgment act or URESA or perhaps both.
In Tripp v. Swoap (1976) 17 Cal.3d 671, 679, 131 Cal.Rptr. 789, 552 P.2d 749, the court stated: ' ' " '
Appellant asserts in her brief that that portion of her judgment for the payment of attorney's fees and costs is not enforceable under URESA. At oral argument respondent agreed with that assertion. Both parties assured this court that applications under URESA for the purpose of enforcing such a judgment will not be accepted by the trial court. Other than those statements of counsel this court has no information concerning whether the judgment in question could be enforced under URESA and makes no decision thereon. Assuming nevertheless that it could be so enforced, this would not prevent enforcement under the sister state judgment act. Section 1654 declares "The remedies provided in this title are in addition to and not in substitution for any other remedies."
(Smith v. Smith (1954) 125 Cal.App.2d 154, 156, 270 P.2d 613.)
The purpose of the sister state money judgment act is to provide a summary method of enforcing a foreign judgment. ...
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