Fitch v. Justice Court
| Decision Date | 29 March 1972 |
| Citation | 24 Cal.App.3d 492,101 Cal.Rptr. 227 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Samuel Ernest FITCH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JUSTICE COURT OF ANDERSON VALLEY JUDICIAL DISTRICT et al., Respondents. Civ. 29299. |
Leo M. Cook, Ukiah, for appellant.
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., of State of California, Victor D. Sonenberg, Deputy Atty. Gen, San Francisco, for respondents.
Samuel Ernest Fitch, the appellant herein, was convicted of drunk driving by the Justice Court of Anderson Judicial District, County of Mendocino, on two occasions within seven years, the first conviction being on July 19, 1968, and the second on October 27, 1969. Upon receipt of court abstracts of those convictions, the Department of Motor Vehicles issued an order suspending his driver's license for one year, pursuant to the provisions of Vehicle Code section 13352(c).
On March 4, 1970, the appellant filed a Petition for Writ of Mandate in the Superior Court of Mendocino County, naming the justice court and the Department of Motor Vehicles as respondents. By this petition the appellant sought a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the justice court to vacate and set aside the aforementioned convictions, and commanding the Department of Motor Vehicles 'to set aside and revoke its order of suspension, upon the setting aside and revoking' of the convictions in the justice court. The petition was denied and we now have before us an appeal from that order.
The relief sought in the petition was based upon an allegation that appellant had not been advised of, and had not knowingly and expressly waived, his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to a trial by jury, his right to confront his accusers, and his right to be advised of the nature of the charges and consequences of a guilty plea, in accordance with the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 and In re Tahl, 1 Cal.3d 122, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449. In an order denying the petition the court stated that it had no doubt that the Boykin and Tahl standards applied to felonies, but it did not believe they applied to misdemeanors and situations such as presented in this case.
On this appeal the only conviction challenged by appellant is the one on October 27, 1969 in which he entered a plea of guilty to misdemeanor drunk driving in violation of Vehicle Code section 23102(a). Respondents concede in their brief that Boykin and Tahl standards apply to misdemeanors, but they argue appellant was fully aware of his rights, and that his plea of guilty was the expression of his 'well-informed rational consideration of the alternatives and consequences.'
If we were to reach the merits of the issues raised on this appeal, we would be inclined to hold that the rules established by Boykin and Tahl also apply to misdemeanor cases, and that, on the bais of the record before us, the challenged conviction should be vacated because the records of the justice court do not show an express waiver of constitutional rights by the appellant. (See In re Smiley, 66 Cal.2d 606, 58 Cal.Rptr. 579.) But we find ourselves unable to reach those issues.
A mandate proceeding for the purpose of determining the validity of a conviction will not lie against the Department of Motor Vehicles because that agency is not empowered to make such a judicial determination. (Thomas v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 3 Cal.3d 335, 90 Cal.Rptr. 586, 475 P.2d 858.) Nor will mandate lie to perform a future duty if no present duty to perform exists. (Treber v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.2d 128, 134, 65 Cal.Rptr. 330, 436 P.2d 330.) The denial of the petition for a writ of mandate insofar as it was directed against the Department of Motor Vehicles was therefore proper.
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