Fite v. State, Bd. of Paroles

• Decision Date: 28 February 1996
• Citation: 925 S.W.2d 543
• Parties: James T. FITE, Petitioner/Appellant, v. STATE of Tennessee, BOARD OF PAROLES, et al., Respondents/Appellees.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

Page 543

925 S.W.2d 543

James T. FITE, Petitioner/Appellant, v. STATE of Tennessee, BOARD OF PAROLES, et al., Respondents/Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee,

Middle Section, at Nashville.

Feb. 28, 1996.

Permission to Appeal Denied by

Supreme Court May 28, 1996.

Charles W. Burson, Attorney General and Reporter, Eugene J. Honea, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, for respondents/appellees.

OPINION

CANTRELL, Judge.

James T. Fite, an inmate in the Tennessee State Correctional System, petitioned the Chancery Court of Davidson County for a Writ of Certiorari. Mr. Fite asked that the court review the refusal of the Board of Paroles to release him on parole. The court dismissed his petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, because it had been filed more than sixty days after the Board's decision. We affirm the trial court, but base our decision on the ground that Mr. Fite has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Tenn.R.Civ.P. 12.02(6).

I.

Mr. Fite was involved in two automobile accidents in rapid succession, the first of which resulted in the death and decapitation of a twenty-one month old child, and the second in serious injury to the other driver. Mr. Fite had apparently been drinking on the day of the accidents, because his blood alcohol level registered 0.26 percent. He was taken into custody, and was released on bond. He subsequently fled the state, but was captured by a bondsman and returned to Tennessee. Pursuant to a plea agreement he pled guilty to vehicular homicide, aggravated assault and jumping bail, and was sentenced to seventeen years in prison.

In due course, Mr. Fite became eligible for parole consideration. The hearing that is the subject of the present appeal was held on March 15, 1994. The hearing officer recommended that the prisoner be declined parole, and the other members of the Board concurred by the casting of a final vote on March 25, 1994. In its notice, the Board listed the reasons for declining parole as High Risk and Seriousness of Offense. The Board voted to review Mr. Fite's status again in March of 1996.

In accordance with his rights under Rule 1100-1-1-.07(3)(c) of the Rules and Regulations of the Board of Paroles, Mr. Fite requested an appeal hearing within twenty-one days of the Board's decision. The hearing officer reviewed the documents submitted by Mr. Fite, his board file, and the tape recording of his hearing, and the Board denied his request. The letter of denial was dated August 1, 1994.

Mr. Fite filed his Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on August 23, 1994. The Attorney General filed a Motion to Dismiss on two grounds: (1) that the Petition had not been filed within sixty days of the action complained of, as is required by Tenn.Code Ann. § 27-9-102, and (2) that the petition failed to state a cause of action for which relief could be granted. The petitioner's memorandum in opposition to the Motion contained an argument that Tenn.Code Ann. § 27-9-102 did not bar his Petition, because the Petition had been filed within sixty days of the Board's refusal to grant him an appeal hearing. The trial court agreed with the State's argument on the untimeliness of the appeal, and accordingly granted the Motion to Dismiss.

II.

A Writ of Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy, which allows a superior court to review the proceedings of an inferior tribunal where the inferior tribunal "is acting illegally, has exceeded its jurisdiction, or where there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy." Foster v. First National Bank, 221 Tenn. 688, 691, 430 S.W.2d 450, 451 (1968). See also Tenn.Code Ann. § 27-8-101.

Passing over the jurisdictional question, which we have some difficulty addressing, ¹ we do not believe that Mr. Fite has alleged a cause of action for the common law writ of certiorari. As this court has written in the case of Powell v. Parole Eligibility Review Board, 879 S.W.2d 871 (1994),

"The scope of review under the common law writ [of certiorari] is very narrow. It covers only an inquiry into whether the Board has exceeded its jurisdiction or is acting illegally, fraudulently, or arbitrarily.... At the risk of oversimplification, one may say that it is not the correctness of the decision that is subject to judicial review, but the manner in which the decision is reached. If the agency or board has reached its decision in a constitutional or lawful manner, then the decision would not be subject to judicial review."

While Mr. Fite complains bitterly about the manner in which the parole hearing was conducted, and liberally sprinkles his brief with references to such constitutional concepts as "the law of the land," "illegal double...