Willis v. Dept. of Corrections
| Decision Date | 05 June 2002 |
| Docket Number | M2000-01397-COA-R3-CV |
| Parties | TONY WILLIS, ET AL. v. TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE Assigned on Briefs |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County No. 99-3332-III Ellen Hobbs Lyle, Chancellor
Petitioners, state inmates, filed the underlying pro se petition for common-law writ of certiorari to seek review of disciplinary sanctions imposed on them by the Tennessee Department of Correction for attempted escape. Petitioners alleged that their due process rights were violated because: (1) they were not given sufficient notice of the hearing; (2) their convictions were based upon information from a confidential informant; (3) they were denied the right to call witnesses, and; (4) they were denied access to exculpatory evidence. The trial court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. Because the petition failed to allege sanctions that imposed atypical and significant hardships beyond those ordinarily incident to prison life, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
Edward Tharpe, Nashville, Tennessee, Pro Se.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Terri L. Bernal, Assistant Attorney General; for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Correction.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed and Remanded
WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., J., filed a dissenting opinion.
OPINIONEdward Tharpe and Tony Willis are prisoners incarcerated by the Tennessee Department of Correction. Mr. Tharpe and Mr. Willis were convicted by the Turney Center Industrial Prison and Farm's prison disciplinary board for the disciplinary infraction of "attempted escape" after a pair of pliers was discovered taped to the bottom of a fan in the cell they shared. Each inmate was punished with punitive segregation, involuntary administrative segregation, and a five dollar ($5.00) fine.
After exhausting their administrative remedies by appealing the disciplinary board's decision to both the warden and the Commissioner of the Department of Correction, Mr. Willis and Mr. Tharpe filed a petition for common-law writ of certiorari seeking review of the decision of the disciplinary board. The Tennessee Department of Correction filed a motion to dismiss the suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). The trial court granted the motion, on the grounds that the process provided to the petitioners to contest and defend against disciplinary sanctions was commensurate with the sanctions imposed upon them and, therefore, there was no violation of due process. Relying on Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-85, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2299-301, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418, 428-31 (1995), the trial court determined that Mr. Tharpe and Mr. Willis had no protected liberty interests and, therefore, their due process claims were dismissed.
Mr. Tharpe and Mr. Willis timely filed a notice of appeal with this court.1 On appeal, Mr. Tharpe alleges that his due process rights were violated by the procedures used in the disciplinary board proceedings. Because the petition failed to allege sanctions which were atypical or unexpected in the context of incarceration after criminal conviction, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
Mr. Tharpe and Mr. Willis filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Davidson County Chancery Court alleging, inter alia, due process violations in that they were not provided with adequate notice of the charges against them, prohibited from calling witnesses at their disciplinary board hearing, denied access to exculpatory evidence, and charged based on information from a confidential informant.
The common-law writ of certiorari is the proper procedural vehicle for a prisoner seeking review of a disciplinary board's action. Rhoden v. State Dep't of Corr., 984 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Bishop v. Conley, 894 S.W.2d 294 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994)). Under such a petition, a court's review of an administrative board's decision is limited to a determination of whether the board has exceeded its jurisdiction or has acted illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently.
A common-law writ of certiorari is an extraordinary judicial remedy. Robinson v. Traughber, 13 S.W.3d 361, 364 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Fite v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles, 925 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). It is not available as a matter of right, Boyce v. Williams, 215 Tenn. 704, 713-14, 389 S.W.2d 272, 277 (1965); Yokley v. State of Tenn., 632 S.W.2d 123, 127 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981), but rather is addressed to the trial court's discretion. Blackmon v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles, 29 S.W.3d 875, 878 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Accordingly, decisions to grant or deny a common-law writ of certiorari are reviewed using the familiar "abuse of discretion" standard. Robinson, 13 S.W.3d at 364. Under this standard, a reviewing court should not reverse a trial court's discretionary decision unless it is based on a misapplication of controlling legal principles or a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, Overstreet v. Shoney's, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 709 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), or unless it affirmatively appears that the trial court's decision was against logic or reasoning, and caused an injustice or injury to the complaining party. Marcus v. Marcus, 993 S.W.2d 596, 601 (Tenn. 1999); Douglas v. Estate of Robertson, 876 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Tenn. 1994).
The scope of review under a common-law writ of certiorari is extremely limited. Courts may not (1) inquire into the intrinsic correctness of the lower tribunal's decision, Arnold v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles, 956 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tenn. 1997); Powell v. Parole Eligibility Rev. Bd., 879 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994), (2) reweigh the evidence, Watts v. Civil Serv. Bd. for Colum., 606 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tenn. 1980); Hoover, Inc. v. Metro Bd. of Zoning App., 924 S.W.2d 900, 904 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996), or (3) substitute their judgment for that of the lower tribunal. 421 Corp. v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville, 36 S.W.3d 469, 474 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Rather, the writ permits the courts to examine the lower tribunal's decision to determine whether the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally, fraudulently, or arbitrarily. Turner v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles, 993 S.W.2d 78, 80 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Daniels v. Traughber, 984 S.W.2d 918, 924 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).
The writ itself is an order issued by a superior court to compel an inferior tribunal to send up its record for review. In order to warrant issuance of the writ, the petition must sufficiently allege that the inferior tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction, illegally, fraudulently, or arbitrarily. Because the petition merely seeks the filing of the record and judicial review of the proceedings and decision, a motion to dismiss the writ at this stage can only be granted if the petition fails to make any allegations which justify review of the record under the common-law writ of certiorari standards. In determining the sufficiency of the allegations, conclusory allegations will not entitle a petitioner to the writ, and "if the agency or board has reached its decision in a constitutional or lawful manner, then the decision would not be subject to judicial review." Powell, 879 S.W.2d at 873.
Because the Department chose to respond to the petition by filing a motion to dismiss, and because the motion was granted before the writ was issued, the Department did not file the record of the disciplinary proceedings. We must review the dismissal of the petition under the standards applicable to dismissal under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). Such a motion tests only the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the strength of the petitioner's proof. Cook v. Spinnaker's of Rivergate, Inc., 878 S.W.2d 934, 938 (Tenn. 1994). The basis for the motion is that the allegations contained in the complaint, considered alone and taken as true, are insufficient to constitute a cause of action. Id. In resolving the issues in this appeal, we are required to construe the complaint liberally in the plaintiff's favor and take the allegations of the complaint as true. Bell v. Icard, Merrill, Cullins, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A., 986 S.W.2d 550, 554 (Tenn. 1999). Our standard of review on appeal from a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss is de novo, with no presumption of correctness as to the trial court's legal conclusions. Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tenn. 1997).
The petition does not allege that Mr. Willis and Mr. Tharpe were denied a hearing on the charges. To the contrary, in their petition, Mr. Willis and Mr. Tharpe alleged that they were given hearings before the disciplinary board on the charge of attempted escape. They alleged that "the facts at the hearing showed that a pair of 'pliers' were discovered in a fan in a cell that Willis shared with Tharpe." The reporting officer testified at the hearing as did the maintenance employee in whose tool belt the pliers were last seen. Mr. Tharpe also testified. The petition alleged that the petitioners were given a statement of the evidence and reasons for the board's decision, in a "Disciplinary Hearing Summary," which is not included in the record. Although they acknowledged receipt of the summary, they argued that the summary demonstrates that the finding of guilt was based on no actual evidence.
The petition also alleged that the notice given them of the charges was inadequate because it did not cite a specific provision of statute or departmental rule that they allegedly violated:
Although Petitioners were charged for 'Attempted escape,' there was no specific statutory provision of Tennessee law or Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) Policy...
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