Fite v. State ex rel. Snider

• Decision Date: 22 May 1905
• Citation: 88 S.W. 941,114 Tenn. 646
• Parties: FITE, Superintendent of County Workhouse, v. STATE ex rel. SNIDER.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

88 S.W. 941

114 Tenn. 646

FITE, Superintendent of County Workhouse, v. STATE ex rel. SNIDER.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

May 22, 1905

Appeal from Criminal Court, Shelby County; John T. Moss, Judge.

Habeas corpus proceedings by the state, on the relation of Nick Snider, against J. S. Fite, superintendent of county workhouse of Shelby county. From a judgment of discharge defendant appeals. Reversed.

L. T M. Canada, for appellant.

The Attorney General, for appellee.

McALISTER J.

The question involved in this case is in respect to the constitutionality of a certain provision of the workhouse law embodied in Shannon's Code, § 7423, namely: "The board of commissioners may on recommendation of the superintendent, deduct, for good conduct, a portion of the time for which any person has been sentenced, or a portion of the fine, if he or she be working out a fine."

The subject-matter of the inquiry arises on the petition of one Nick Snider, prisoner in the county workhouse of Shelby county, for the writ of habeas corpus to be discharged from said confinement upon the ground that a proper credit and allowance for good time under said act would entitle him to his liberty. The record reveals that the prisoner was under confinement in said workhouse under the judgment of the criminal court of Shelby county, on the 17th day of November 1903, upon a conviction of unlawfully carrying a pistol, and the assessment of a fine of $50 and confinement in said workhouse for a period of 11 months and 29 days. On the 14th of March, 1904, in accordance with the recommendation of the superintendent of said workhouse, the board of workhouse commissioners directed that the relator, Snider, be relieved of eight months of his term of imprisonment on account of his good conduct.

It further appears that on March 28, 1904, said board of workhouse commissioners directed that the sum of $45 of the fine of $50 imposed upon the relator by judgment of the criminal court be remitted. Thereafter, on the 1st of April 1904, said board of workhouse commissioners, in view of the credits allowed on fine and sentence of said Nick Snider, relator, ordered his discharge from the county workhouse upon payment of all costs, which was accordingly done.

It appears, however, that the judge presiding over the criminal court of Shelby county, conceiving that the action taken by the board of workhouse commissioners was beyond their authority, issued an order directing the superintendent of the workhouse to hold relator in custody until he had served out his term of imprisonment and paid the fine imposed, or had secured or worked out said fine in the manner directed by law. Thereupon the relator filed his petition for the writ of habeas corpus, which being heard by the judge of the Second Circuit court of Shelby county, it was adjudged that the relator was illegally restrained of his liberty, and he was ordered to be discharged, and the defendant, Fite, as superintendent of the Shelby county workhouse, was taxed with all costs of proceeding.

The said Fite, superintendent, aforesaid, appealed, and has assigned the following error: "The orders of the board of workhouse commissioners of Shelby county relieving relator of $45 of the fine of $50 imposed upon him, and reducing jail sentence from 11 months 29 days to 3 months and 29 days, were beyond the authority vested in said board of workhouse commissioners, and were null and void, because:

"(1) The statute under which said board claimed authority to make said orders is unconstitutional, in that it attempts to confer the pardoning power upon said board, in violation of section 6 of article 3 of the Constitution of the state; and,

"(2) It is also violative of section 1 of article 6 of the Constitution of the state in that it attempts to confer upon said board judicial power to review, revise, and modify valid judgments of criminal and circuit courts of this state."

The provisions of the workhouse law material to be mentioned in this investigation are embodied in section 18, c. 123, p. 271, of the act of 1891, compiled in Shannon's Code in section 7423, namely: "The board of commissioners may on recommendation of the superintendent deduct, for good conduct, a portion of the time for which any person has been sentenced, or a portion of the fine, if he or she be working out a fine. Should any prisoner escape, he or she shall forfeit all deductions that have been allowed and when recaptured, should be made to work out the costs of same in addition to other costs in the case. The commissioners may discharge any prisoner when satisfied from the certificate of physician in charge that he or she is physically unable to do labor or for any cause when they may deem it best for the institution and the public good."

The argument of the Attorney General is that the exercise of the power conferred upon said board of workhouse commissioners is both violative of section 6 of article 3 of the Constitution of the state, vesting in the Governor the pardoning power, and is also in contravention of section 1, art. 6, of the Constitution, vesting all judicial power in the courts of this state, because the necessary effect of the exercise of said power by the board of workhouse commissioners is to constitute said board a judicial tribunal for the purpose of reviewing, modifying, and reversing the judgment of courts of competent jurisdiction acting under the power vested in them by the Constitution of the state.

We have several cases in this state in which intimations were thrown out touching the constitutionality of such acts, but no case in which the precise point now presented was involved. In State v. Dalton, 109 Tenn. 544, 72 S.W. 456, the court was dealing with the power of the circuit judge to relieve a convict of imprisonment imposed by a valid judgment rendered at a former term. In its opinion this court said: "The vestiture of the power to grant reprieves and pardons in the chief executive is exclusive of all other departments of the state, and the Legislature cannot, directly or indirectly, take it from his control, and vest it in others, or authorize or require it to be exercised by any other officer or authority. It is a power and a duty intrusted to his judgment and discretion, which cannot be interfered with, and of which he cannot be relieved. The circuit judge's action in remitting the imprisonment and releasing the costs adjudged against the defendant cannot be sustained under section 7226 of Shannon's Edition of the Code, or Act 1891, p. 271, c. 123, § 18 (Shannon's Code, § 7423), authorizing the discharge of convicts confined in workhouses under certain circumstances."

In The State ex rel. v. McClellan, 87 Tenn. 52-55, 9 S.W. 233, the act of 1885 (Acts 1885, p. 87, c. 15) allowing to convicts certain specific credits on their terms of imprisonment in consideration of good conduct was involved, but it appeared in that case that the judgment under which the prisoner was serving had been rendered prior to the passage of the act of 1885, and for that reason the court expressed no opinion touching its constitutionality. In that case, however, the court said as follows:

"The act of 1885 (passed at the extra session June 12th) *** is also referred to, and it is insisted that the relator was and is entitled to the benefit of that act; but such cannot be its effect, though it purports to be for the benefit of those then as well as thereafter confined in the penitentiary, because to the extent of provision for those then confined it is an attempted exercise of the pardoning power, which is vested alone in the Governor under the Constitution, and is void."

Again, in the case of Rogers v. State, 101 Tenn. 425, 47 S.W. 697, the question as to the constitutionality of this section of the workhouse law was raised, but not decided, as the case went off on another point.

There seems to be much authority on this subject in other states of the Union, which we find upon examination is not altogether harmonious.

The Supreme Court of Michigan in People v. Daniel Cummings, 88 Mich. 249, 50 N.W. 310, 14 L. R. A. 285, in passing upon the constitutionality of a statute of that state providing for indeterminate sentences and the disposition management, and release of criminals under such sentences, says as follows: "It is not clear from the reading of this statute whether the board of control is given power of absolute discharge from imprisonment or not. If so, it would be clearly unconstitutional, as an exercise of such power would certainly involve one of two things, and perhaps both. It would be an exercise of judicial power in determining the term of imprisonment of a citizen or an act of grace, to wit, the bestowing of a pardon and release of the prisoner before his term of imprisonment has expired. The judicial...