State ex rel. Rhodes v. Public Service Commission And Chicago & Alton Railroad Company
| Decision Date | 09 April 1917 |
| Parties | THE STATE ex rel. M. E. RHODES v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION and CHICAGO & ALTON RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellants |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Cole Circuit Court. -- Hon. J. G. Slate, Judge.
Reversed and remanded (with directions).
Alex. Z. Patterson and James D. Lindsay for appellant Public Service Commission.
(1) Section 14 of article 12 of the Constitution was appropriated by our Constitutional Convention of 1875 from the Illinois Constitution, adopted in 1870. Sec. 12, art. 11, Constitution of Illinois; McGrew v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 230 Mo 518. (2) Prior to the adoption of section 14 of article 12 the Legislature of the State of Illinois had directly and explicitly, by enactment, delegated to the Board of Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners of that State the power to establish "schedules of reasonable maximum rates of charges" for railroad transportation. Such enactment was subsequent to the adoption of the Illinois constitutional provision, and must be regarded as the legislative construction of the State of Illinois of her Constitutional provision. Act of May 2, 1873, R. S. Ill., chap. 114, p. 951 secs. 124, 133; C., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Jones, 149 Ill. 361. (3) Legislative construction of a constitutional provision that is subsequently adopted by another State is regarded as high and convincing authority by the adopting State. Langdon v. Applegate, 5 Ind. 327; McGrew v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 230 Mo. 496. (4) The rule in adopting, with borrowed constitutional provisions and statutes, their constructions, is manifestly just and right; for if it were intended to exclude any known constructions of such provisions or statutes, the necessary presumption is that their terms would be so changed when they are adopted as to effect that intention. McGrew v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 230 Mo. 519; Myrick v. Hasey, 27 Mo. 9; Com. v. Hartnett, 3 Gray (Mass.), 450; Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. (U.S.) 1; Hogg v. Emerson, 6 How. (U.S.) 483. (5) The court of last resort of the State of Illinois has held, subsequent to our adoption of its constitutional provision of 1870, that the Act of the Legislature of 1873 of that State delegating the rate-making function to the Railroad and Warehouse Commission, was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. And such decision was rendered after a definite and particular consideration of section 12 of article 11 of the Illinois Constitution, corresponding to our constitutional provision. Such holding, though subsequent to our adoption of the Illinois constitutional provision is entitled to great weight as persuasive authority. C., B. & Q. R. Co. v. Jones, 149 Ill. 361. (6) Delegation of rate-making power by the Legislature to proper administrative boards or commissions is approved by the courts as the most equitable, suitable and fair means of regulating the charges of railroad corporations. Reagen v. Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362; R. R. Commission Cases, 116 U.S. 307; Tilley v. Railroad Co., 5 F. 641; Railroad v. Dey, 35 F. 866; Railroad v. Smith, 70 Ga. 694; Express Co. v. Railroad, 111 N.C. 472; McWhirter v. Railroad, 24 Fla. 471; Noyles on American R. R. Rates, pp. 206, 207; State ex rel. v. Public Service Comm., 259 Mo. 726.
Scarritt, Scarritt, Jones & Miller for appellant Chicago & Alton Railroad Company.
(1) The issue in this case has been previously ruled by this court. State ex rel. v. Public Service Commission, 259 Mo. 704. (2) There is no merit in relator's contention that section 14, article 12, of the Constitution of Missouri was not called to the attention of this court, or considered by this court in reaching their judgment in the case of State ex rel. v. Public Service Commission. (3) The claim of relator that section 14 of article 12 of the Constitution restricts and incapacitates the Legislature from establishing reasonable maximum rates for railroads by and through such a public service commission as ours, and that the rates when so established will not supersede prior maximum rates fixed by the Legislature, is not supported by reason or precedent. The evident purpose of the people of Missouri through these constitutional provisions was to have laws enacted which should prevent unjust discriminations and extortions in the rates of railroads, and to correct abuses in the operation of railroads, and to allow reasonable rates to be charged and collected by railroads, and to prevent special and exclusive privileges either through unauthorized customs or through special laws, and to prevent discriminations or preferences in the rates charged or facilities furnished, and to prevent railroads from showing favoritism by charging more for a shorter than for a longer haul. The main purpose appears to be to bring about the enactment of such laws as are here indicated -- to stir the legislative body into action -- and not to limit the grant of legislative authority expressed in article 3 and section 1 of article 4 of the same document. This Public Service Commission law declares that rates shall be just and reasonable and not discriminatory, and reasonably leaves to a duly constituted commission the province of investigating and determining what are unreasonable charges and what are discriminatory practices and what this or that railroad should do reasonably to accommodate traffic. And so the Legislature has established that law and has wisely committed to an administrative body the functions of enforcing it. This statute canot be said to be a delegation of a law-making power vested in the Legislature. It is more properly referred to as one referring the matter of administration duly established by a valid statute to an administrative commission to carry its wise provisions into effect. State ex inf. v. Gas Co., 254 Mo. 515; State ex rel. v. Public Service Comm., 259 Mo. 704. (4) That the State of Missouri by a duly enacted statute may delegate to the Public Service Commission the power to regulate and control railroads and other public utilities within the State is settled beyond all question in this State. State ex inf. v. Gas Co., 254 Mo. 515; State ex rel. v. Public Service Comm., 259 Mo. 704. A State in the exercise of its police power can, as an attribute of sovereignty, without any constitutional provision granting that power, regulate the business and fix the rates of its domestic utilities, either directly through an act of its Legislature or through such a commission as the Public Service Commission, unless there be an express restriction of general legislative authority so to do in the State Constitution. Non-action of the Legislature cannot confer power to delegate. It seems to be generally conceded even by our opponents, that if the Legislature had not established a maximum statutory rate, then the Commission could do so. If the power cannot be delegated by the Legislature, how can a failure of the Legislature to establish maximum statutory rates confer the power on the Legislature to delegate to the Commission? Can such a position be logical? The question answers itself in the negative. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Cutts, 94 U.S. 155; State ex rel. Public Service Commission v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 85 S.E. 714; State ex rel. Great Northern R. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 52 Wash. 33; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Jones, 149 Ill. 361; Georgia Railroad Co. v. Smith, 70 Ga. 694; Tilley v. Savannah R. Co. et al., 5 F. 641; Railroad Commission v. Central of Georgia, 170 F. 225.
M. E. Rhodes for respondent.
(1) Section 1, article 4, of the Constitution provides: "The legislative power, subject to the limitations herein contained, shall be vested in a Senate and House of Representatives, to be styled the General Assembly of the State of Missouri." Respondent contends the power thus conferred must be exercised by the General Assembly alone and that the General Assembly cannot delegate such power to any other body or branch of government. State v. Field, 17 Mo. 529; Owen v. Baer, 154 Mo. 505; Merchants' Exchange v. Knott, 212 Mo. 641; State ex inf. v. Carlisle, 235 Mo. 259; State to use v. Cochrane, 264 Mo. 591. That a legislative power cannot be exercised by any other authority than the legislative department of the government is fully sustained by the following authorities from other jurisdictions: State v. Railway Co., 100 Minn. 445; Valley v. Park Comrs., 16 N.D. 25; People v. Election Comrs., 221 Ill. 9; Noell v. People, 187 Ill. 587; Mitchell v. State, 134 Ala. 392; Fite v. State, 114 Tenn. 646; In re Incorporation of Milwaukee, 93 Wis. 616; Hovey v. Comrs., 56 Kan. 577; State v. Johnson, 61 Kan. 603; Harbor Comrs. v. Railroad, 88 Cal. 491; Ex parte Cox, 63 Cal. 21; Boyd v. Bryant, 39 Ark. 69; Nall v. Kelly, 179 S.W. 486; Commonwealth v. Adams, 95 Ky. 586; Trustees v. Webb, 71 S.E. 520; Marryman v. Banking Board, 111 P. 295; 2 Wyman on Pub. Service Corp., sec. 1404; Reeder, Rate Regulations, sec. 38; Cooley, Const. Lim. (6 Ed.), 137; 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), p. 1020; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506; Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523; Interstate Com. Comm. v. Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194. (2) Section 47 of the Pubilc Service Commission Act provided: "Whenever the Commission shall be of opinion . . . that the maximum rates, fares or charges, chargeable by any such common carrier, railroad corporation or street railroad corporation are insufficient to yield reasonable compensation for the service rendered and are unjust and unreasonable, the Commission shall, with due regard among other things to a reasonable average return upon the value of the property actually used in the public service and to the necessity of making reservation out of income for surplus and contingencies, determine the just and reasonable rates, fares and...
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