Fitzer v. Bloom
| Decision Date | 29 April 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 46482,46482 |
| Citation | 253 N.W.2d 395 |
| Parties | Lillian FITZER, as Trustee for the Next of Kin of William Fitzer, Decedent, Respondent, v. Norman BLOOM, et al., defendants and third party plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Linda Rae DZURIS, Third Party Defendant, Bradley Taylor, third party defendant, Respondent, Harold Lynch, Individually and d.b.a. Boulevard Liquor Store, third party defendant, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The measure of damages under the Wrongful Death Act (Minn.St. 573.02) and that under the Civil Damage Act (Minn.St. 340.95) are not coextensive.
2. Civil Damage Act liability preempts a common-law action for negligence arising out of the illegal sale of intoxicating liquor.
Cousineau, McGuire, Shaughnessy & Anderson, Henry A. Cousineau, Jr., Minneapolis, for appellants.
DeParcq, Anderson, Perl & Hunegs and Richard G. Hunegs, Minneapolis, for Fitzer.
Richards, Montgomery, Cobb & Bassford and Jerome C. Briggs and Robert Merrill Rosenberg, Minneapolis, for Taylor.
Meagher, Geer, Markham, Anderson, Adamson, Flaskamp & Brennan, J. Richard Bland and O. C. Adamson II, Minneapolis, for Lynch.
Considered and decided by the court en banc.
This wrongful death action was brought by plaintiff-trustee for the next of kin of William Fitzer, who was killed in an automobile accident caused by a minor driver who had been drinking intoxicating liquor. Fitzer was a passenger in his own automobile driven by Linda Rae Dzuris, when it collided with an automobile driven by Linda Bloom and owned by her father, Norman Bloom. Bradley Taylor, a minor, purchased the liquor consumed by Linda Bloom at a liquor store owned by Harold Lynch. Plaintiff's original Wrongful death action was supplemented by a civil damage action against the persons allegedly supplying that liquor. The civil damage action was dismissed prior to trial. Taylor and Lynch became third-party defendants because of the cross-claims originally filed against them by the Bloom defendants in the wrongful death case. From a jury verdict of $150,000 for pecuniary loss and an order of the district court limiting the contribution from Taylor and Lynch to special damages, the Blooms appeal. We affirm.
This appeal presents two principal issues:
(1) Whether this court should hold the measure of damages under the Civil Damage Act and the wrongful Death Act to be coextensive and thus overrule the cases of Bundy v. City of Fridley, 265 Minn. 549, 122 N.W.2d 585 (1963), and Herbes v. Village of Holdingford, 267 Minn. 75, 125 N.W.2d 426 (1963).
(2) Whether the Civil Damage Act preempts a common-law action for negligence arising out of the illegal sale of intoxicating liquor to persons whose subsequent tortious acts cause injury to an innocent third party not a patron of the vendor.
Numerous errors in the conduct of the trial are also argued.
On July 26, 1973, Bradley Taylor, a minor, purchased a case of strong beer from the Boulevard Liquor Store. Later that same night Taylor and his girlfriend went with a second couple, Linda Bloom and her boyfriend Matt Ganglehoff, to a drive-in movie. While at the movie the group consumed about 10 beers. Linda Bloom testified she drank three beers. There was also testimony that Linda Bloom had indicated she had been drinking earlier.
The group left the movie at about 11:30 p. m. Bradley Taylor dropped off Linda Bloom and Ganglehoff at Ganglehoff's home. Three hours later Linda Bloom left Ganglehoff's house after an argument and drove away in her father's car. Less than a mile from the Ganglehoff home she was involved in a head-on collision with a car driven by Linda Dzuris in which William Fitzer was a passenger. William Fitzer died as a result of the injuries sustained in the accident.
Plaintiff brought an action for wrongful death against Linda Bloom and her father. The Blooms impleaded Linda Dzuris as third-party defendant. Plaintiff then amended the complaint to assert civil damage liability against the owner of the liquor store, Harold Lynch, and against Bradley Taylor and Matt Ganglehoff. The Blooms thereafter cross-claimed against Taylor and Lynch. Plaintiff then dismissed the claims against Taylor, Ganglehoff, and Lynch. The cross-claims against Ganglehoff were also dismissed. This left Dzuris, Taylor, and Lynch as third-party defendants.
The ensuing jury trial was held in district court. Prior to the submission of the case to the jury the trial court made three rulings: (1) Linda Bloom was causally negligent as a matter of law; (2) the Blooms' claim for contribution from Taylor and Lynch was limited to one-third of the special damages; and (3) based on stipulations the special damages sustained by reason of the death of William Fitzer were $5,093.17. Submitted to the jury were the questions of Linda Dzuris' negligence, allocation of negligence between Linda Dzuris and Linda Bloom, whether the furnishing of alcoholic beverages to Linda Bloom contributed to the accident, and, finally, the amount of pecuniary loss. The jury found Linda Dzuris was not negligent, the alcoholic beverages contributed to the accident, and the amount of pecuniary loss was $150,000.
Following the denial of the Blooms' motion for a new trial, and Taylor's and Lynch's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, judgment was entered on December 11, 1975. The Blooms appeal from the denial of their motion and the judgment. 1 Notices of review were also filed by Taylor and Lynch.
The trial court ruled Linda Bloom was causally negligent as a matter of law. The jury in their special interrogatory found a causal connection between the violation of the Civil Damage Act and the accident that caused William Fitzer's death. Prior to the submission of the case to the jury, however, the trial court ruled the amount of contribution from Taylor and Lynch was limited only to special damages. Appellants contend this constituted error and specifically request this court to overrule its previous decisions which support the rulings of the trial court.
The controversy lies in the scope of the respective damage provisions of the Civil Damage Act and the Wrongful Death Act.
The operative damage terms in the Civil Damage Act, Minn.St. 340.95, are "person," "property," or "means of support." Minn.St. 340.95 provides:
"Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who is injured in person or property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person, or by the intoxication of any person, has a right of action, in his own name, against any person who, by illegally selling, bartering or giving intoxicating liquors, caused the intoxication of such person, for all damages, sustained; and all damages recovered by a minor under this section shall be paid either to such minor or to his parent, guardian, or next friend, as the court directs; and all suits for damages under this section shall be by civil action in any court of this state having jurisdiction thereof." (Italics supplied.)
In contrast, the operative damage term in the Wrongful Death Act, Minn.St. 573.02, is "pecuniary loss." Minn.St. 573.02, subd. 1, provides "When death is caused by the wrongful act or omission of any person or corporation, the trustee * * * may maintain an action therefor if the decedent might have maintained an action, had he lived, for an injury caused by such wrongful act or omission. The action may be commenced within three years after the act or omission. The recovery in such action is such an amount as the jury deems fair and just in reference to the pecuniary loss resulting from such death, and shall be for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin, proportionate to the pecuniary loss severally suffered by the death. The court then determines the proportionate pecuniary loss of the persons entitled to the recovery and orders distribution accordingly. Funeral expenses and any demand for the support of the decedent allowed by the court having jurisdiction of the action, are first deducted and paid.
(Italics supplied.)
Appellants argue injury to "property" and "means of support" in the Civil Damage Act are coextensive with "pecuniary loss" in the Wrongful Death Act, and accordingly, the amount of contribution from Taylor and Lynch should also include the $150,000 for "pecuniary loss." In support of their argument appellants advance two theories for consideration. The first is that the existing damage terms of both the Wrongful Death Act and the Civil Damage Act be interpreted as coextensive. The second is that even if the damage terms are not coextensive, Taylor and Lynch are responsible for a full measure of contribution on the basis of negligence.
As to the first theory, appellants recognize previous decisions of this court hold against their proposition. They request, however, the following decisions be overruled: Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Village of Rose Creek, 302 Minn. 282, 225 N.W.2d 6 (1974); Bundy v. City of Fridley, 265 Minn. 549, 122 N.W.2d 585 (1963); Herbes v. Village of Holdingford, 267 Minn. 75, 125 N.W.2d 426 (1963).
In Bundy v. City of Fridley, supra, a 10-year-old child was struck and killed by an intoxicated driver. The child's parents settled the wrongful death claim and took the civil damage claim to trial. At the close of the plaintiff's case, the trial court granted the civil damage...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Osborne v. Twin Town Bowl, Inc., No. A06-1007.
...and that there can be more than one party at fault for the injury. See K.R. v. Sanford, 605 N.W.2d 387, 392 (Minn.2000); Fitzer v. Bloom, 253 N.W.2d 395 (Minn.1977). If more than one party can be liable, it must be the case that more than one party may be the "legal" cause of the injury—nam......
-
McClellan v. Tottenhoff
...a commercial vendor who illegally furnished 3.2 beer, since that situation was not covered by the civil damage act. In Fitzer v. Bloom, Minn., 253 N.W.2d 395 (1977), the court reiterated that a common law cause of action for negligence would be allowed where the civil damage act did not A w......
-
Nelson v. Restaurants of Iowa, Inc.
...of the legislature, and the courts cannot enlarge an act by construction beyond the fair meaning of its language. Fitzer v. Bloom, 253 N.W.2d 395, 402 (Minn.1977). See Snyder v. Davenport, 323 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Iowa 1982) ("when a statute gives a right and creates a liability unknown at comm......
-
Wegan v. Village of Lexington
...a liquor vendor because of legislative pre-emption in the area. Blamey v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884, 890 (Minn.1978); Fitzer v. Bloom, 253 N.W.2d 395, 403 (Minn.1977). Striking the statute would obviate that impediment. I would hold that actions against both 3.2 beer vendors and "intoxicating l......