Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Garcia

• Decision Date: 03 August 2011
• Docket Number: No. 3D10–1625.,3D10–1625.
• Citation: 99 So.3d 539
• Parties: STATE of Florida DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Appellant, v. Juan A. GARCIA, Jr., Juan A. Garcia and Barbara Garcia, as natural parents of Juan Garcia, Jr., Juan A. Garcia, individually, and Barbara Garcia, individually, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

99 So.3d 539

STATE of Florida DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Appellant,

v.Juan A. GARCIA, Jr., Juan A. Garcia and Barbara Garcia, as natural parents of Juan Garcia, Jr., Juan A. Garcia, individually, and Barbara Garcia, individually, Appellees.

No. 3D10–1625.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Aug. 3, 2011.

Hermelee & Geffin and Christopher Perez–Gurri, Ft.Lauderdale, for appellant.

Areces Rodriguez; Podhurst Orseck and Joel D. Eaton, Miami, for appellees.

Before SUAREZ, LAGOA, and EMAS, JJ.

LAGOA, J.

The State of Florida Department of Environmental Protection (the “Department”) appeals from a declaratory judgment entered in favor of Juan Garcia, Jr., and his parents (collectively, the “Garcias”). Because we find that the trial court improperly exercised its declaratory judgment jurisdiction, we reverse.

I. FACTUAL HISTORYA. Negligence Action Against the Department

On February 1, 1989, Juan Garcia, Jr. was rendered quadriplegic when he dove into the ocean along South Beach and struck his head on debris that had been left there after demolition of the South Beach pier. In a separate action, the Garcias sued the City of Miami Beach (the “City”) and the Department, among others, for negligence in failing to remove underwater debris and for failing to take the necessary precautions to prevent the accident. The Department obtained a summary judgment in its favor, which this Court reversed, and the supreme court approved this Court's decision. See Fla. Dep't of Natural Res. v. Garcia, 753 So.2d 72 (Fla.2000). On remand, that suit proceeded against the City and the Department. The City thereafter entered into a “compromise settlement” with the Garcias in the amount of $1,250,000; paid them the statutory limits of liability set forth in section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1997), in the amount of $200,000.00; and agreed to support a claims bill in the amount of $1,050,000.00. In April, 1998, the Legislature passed the claims bill and ordered the City to pay $1,050,000.00 to the Garcias. See Ch. 98–458, Laws of Florida.

The Department then moved for summary judgment on one of its affirmative defenses, asserting that “there is no basis for the court to enter a judgment against the [Department]” because the Garcias had already recovered the maximum amount authorized under section 768.28 from the City, and as the Department read section 11.065(2), Florida Statutes,¹ the Garcias were limited to seeking only one claims bill from the Legislature for the incident. Specifically, the Department argued that “it would be a waste of judicial resources (as well as the resources of the Department) to require the Department to participate in mediation or stand trial in this matter because there is no authority for the Plaintiffs to recover any further damages from the Department through the claims bill process or otherwise.” The motion was denied. The denial of the Department's motion for summary judgment resulted in a non-final, non-appealable order in that action.

B. The Department's Declaratory Action

Because of its belief that “there is no need for the Trial Court in the personal injury action to conduct a trial,” the Department proposed to the Garcias that it file the instant declaratory action presenting the issue of whether section 11.065(2) precluded the Garcias from presenting a claims bill for any excess judgment; have the declaratory action transferred to the judge who denied the motion for summary judgment; and then obtain a final, appealable order in the declaratory action reflecting the ruling in negligence action. In effect, the Department proposed to convert its affirmative defense into a “separate” action in order to obtain appellate review. The Garcias agreed to this procedure.

Both the Department and the Garcias admit that the declaratory action was filed solely as an attempt to obtain appellate review of the denial of the Department's motion for summary judgment on the claims bill issue in order to avoid the “waste of state and judicial resources” in proceeding to trial if the Garcias were ultimately precluded from presenting another claims bill to the Legislature. In other words, the entire strategy admittedly was devised by the parties as a way to obtain review of the exact issue presented and ruled upon in the non-final, non-appealable denial of the motion for summary judgment in the pending negligence action.

The Department then filed the instant complaint for declaratory relief, in which it alleged that the “submission of multiple claims bills to the Legislature for damages resulting from the same incident or occurrence is barred and that, therefore, there is no need for the Trial Court in the personal injury action to conduct a trial.” The Garcias answered, denying that the submission of multiple claims bills was barred. As promised, the Department obtained a transfer of the declaratory action to the same trial judge who was presiding over the negligence case. The Garcias then moved, ore tenus, for final summary judgment at a status conference, without objection by the Department. The Department relied upon its motion for summary judgment filed in the negligence action, and the Garcias relied upon their response in opposition to the Department's motion for summary judgment filed in the negligence action. The trial court granted the Garcias' ore tenus motion for summary judgment, and entered a final judgment in the Garcias' favor in this declaratory action. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSISA. This Court's Jurisdiction

We note our disapproval of the procedural scheme employed in this case. The trial court's denial of the Department's motion for summary judgment in the negligence action was neither an appealable order nor a sufficient basis to invoke this Court's certiorari jurisdiction. See Miami–Dade Cnty. v. Perez, 988 So.2d 40 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (holding that denial of County's motion for summary judgment was a non-appealable non-final order and did not meet criteria for review via certiorari); Taggart v. Morgan, 943 So.2d 250 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (stating rules of appellate procedure do not permit interlocutory appeals of non-final orders denying motions for summary judgment); Harte v. Palm Beach Biltmore Condo. Ass'n, 436 So.2d 444, 445 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (holding that order denying motion for summary judgment was “not a permitted interlocutory appeal [and was] not a proper matter for certiorari”; “the necessity of proceeding with a trial is not a sufficient ground to invoke certiorari”).

The absence of an appealable order meant the parties would have to proceed to trial with the possibility that the Garcias might not be able to secure payment of any excess judgment through a claims bill. To prevent this, the Department filed this declaratory action in order to obtain a final judgment and seek review in this Court. In other words, the parties admittedly used a declaratory action as an “end run” around the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is similar, although not completely analogous, to instances where parties improperly attempt to confer subject matter jurisdiction on a court. See generally Polk Cnty. v. Sofka, 702 So.2d 1243 (Fla.1997) (refusing to decide merits where district court lacked jurisdiction to hear appeal notwithstanding the parties' attempt to confer jurisdiction on the district court); Cunningham v. Standard Guar. Ins. Co., 630 So.2d 179, 181 (Fla.1994) (acknowledging that “the parties cannot stipulate to jurisdiction over the subject matter where none exists”); Rubin v. Gordon, 165 So.2d 824, 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) (dismissing appeal where plaintiff requesteddismissal of complaint in order to seek review; permitting such a procedure would “permit the plaintiff to do indirectly what he could not do directly under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure”).

Despite our disapproval of the manner in which this case arrived at this Court, we are nevertheless presented with a final declaratory judgment and therefore this Court has jurisdiction to proceed with consideration of the appeal.

B. The Trial Court's Jurisdiction

Although this Court has jurisdiction to hear the Department's appeal, we do not reach the merits of the appeal as presented by the parties because we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the declaratory judgment. We acknowledge that neither party addressed the issue of jurisdiction in the trial court or on appeal. However, this does not prevent this Court from raising the issue of the trial court's jurisdiction. In Sofka, the Supreme Court quashed a decision of the district court and remanded with directions to dismiss the appeal because it found that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a stipulated final judgment where an order granting a new trial was contained in the record on appeal. 702 So.2d at 1245. The parties asserted that this conclusion would result “in a waste of judicial resources.” Id. at 1244. In reaching its conclusion the Supreme Court stated:

It is true, as the parties state, that this conclusion “will result in a waste of judicial resources.” However, “[c]ourts are bound to take notice of the limits of their authority and if want of jurisdiction appears at any stage of the proceedings, original or appellate, the court should notice the defect and enter an appropriate order.” West 132 Feet v. City of Orlando, 80 Fla. 233, 239, 86 So. 197, 198–99 (1920). This is because the limits of a court's jurisdiction are of “primary concern,” requiring the court to address the issue “sua sponte when any doubt exists.” Mapoles v. Wilson, 122 So.2d 249, 251 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960). Thus, while the resulting “waste of judicial resources” is regrettable, in the absence of jurisdiction, it is unavoidable.

Id. at 1245 (emphasis added).

The Florida Declaratory Judgment Act, chapter 86, Florida Statutes (2009), is remedial in nature and should be broadly construed. See§ 86.101, Fla. Stat. ...