Fla. Highway Patrol v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 23 January 2020
• Docket Number: No. SC18-468,SC18-468
• Citation: 288 So.3d 1179
• Parties: FLORIDA HIGHWAY PATROL, etc., Petitioner, v. Lashonta Renea JACKSON, etc., Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

288 So.3d 1179

FLORIDA HIGHWAY PATROL, etc., Petitioner,

v.Lashonta Renea JACKSON, etc., Respondent.

No. SC18-468

Supreme Court of Florida.

January 23, 2020

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Britt Thomas, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Amit Agarwal, Solicitor General, and Christopher J. Baum, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner

Jack J. Fine, Julie Aleve Fine, and Melissa S. Morris of Fine, Farkash & Parlapiano, P.A., Gainesville, Florida, for Respondent

Edward G. Guedes and Eric S. Kay of Weiss Serota Helfman Cole & Bierman, P.L., Coral Gables, Florida, for Amici Curiae Florida League of Cities and City of Boca Raton

Frances Guasch De La Guardia of Holland & Knight, LLP, Miami, Florida; and Miriam Soler Ramos, City Attorney, Coral Gables, Florida, for Amicus Curiae City of Coral Gables

MUÑIZ, J.

This case is about the meaning of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(xi), which governs the appealability of nonfinal orders denying sovereign immunity. The decision under review is Florida Highway Patrol v. Jackson , 238 So. 3d 430 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). In that decision, the First District Court of Appeal ruled upon the following question, which the court certified to be of great public importance:

DOES RULE 9.130 [ (A)(3)(C)(XI) ] PERMIT AN APPEAL OF A NON-FINAL ORDER DENYING IMMUNITY IF THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY AS A MATTER OF LAW BUT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT EXPLICITLY PRECLUDE IT AS A DEFENSE?

Id. at 438. We have jurisdiction, see art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Our answer to the certified question is no.

We conclude that the disputed text of rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(xi) has the same meaning that this Court has given to the identically worded text of a preexisting subdivision of rule 9.130. We further conclude, however, that rule 9.130 in its current form insufficiently protects the interests underlying sovereign immunity. Therefore, we also explain our decision to amend the rule 9.130 subdivisions addressing sovereign immunity and comparable government-related immunities from suit.

BACKGROUND

Article V, section 4(b)(1) of the Florida constitution gives district courts jurisdiction to review nonfinal orders "to the extent provided by rules adopted by" this Court. To implement this provision, this Court has adopted Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130, which contains an exclusive list of the categories of nonfinal orders subject to appeal. That list includes nonfinal orders involving four types of immunity: workers' compensation immunity; absolute or qualified immunity in a civil rights claim arising under federal law; immunity under section 768.28(9), Florida Statutes ; and sovereign immunity. Although rule 9.130 addresses each type of immunity in a separate subdivision, each subdivision uses identical jurisdictional language, allowing appeals of "nonfinal orders ... that ... determine ... that, as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to [immunity]." This case is about the meaning of that jurisdictional phrase.

The oldest of the rule 9.130 immunity subdivisions, the one that addresses workers' compensation immunity, has been in its current form since 1996. See Amendments to Fla. Rules of Appellate Procedure , 696 So. 2d 1103, 1127 (Fla. 1996). And in a trio of cases involving the workers' compensation immunity subdivision, this Court construed the jurisdictional language that is now at issue. See Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla. , 889 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 2004) ; Fla. Dep't of Corr. v. Culver , 716 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1998) ; Hastings v. Demming , 694 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 1997).

The key holdings of those cases boil down to three related points. First, "[n]onfinal orders denying summary judgment on a claim of workers' compensation immunity are not appealable unless the trial court order specifically states that, as a matter of law, such a defense is not available to a party." Hastings , 694 So. 2d at 720 ; see also Reeves , 889 So. 2d at 821-22 ("reiterat[ing]" the "well-established rule" of Hastings ). Second, a nonfinal order denying workers' compensation immunity is not subject to appeal if the trial court bases the denial on the existence of disputed facts. See Hastings , 694 So. 2d at 720. And third, to determine the appealability of a nonfinal order under the workers' compensation immunity subdivision, the district court is limited to a review of the order itself and may not consider the underlying record. See Culver , 716 So. 2d at 768-69. For convenience, we will refer to these holdings collectively as "the Hastings / Reeves precedent."

As mentioned earlier, this Court has included in rule 9.130 additional subdivisions that address nonfinal orders denying three other types of immunity. See In re Amendments to Fla. Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130 , 151 So. 3d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 2014) (adding immunity under section 768.28(9) and sovereign immunity subdivisions); Amendments to Fla. Rules of Appellate Procedure , 696 So. 2d at 1127 (adding absolute or qualified immunity in a civil rights claim arising under federal law subdivision). Each time it added a new immunity-related subdivision, the Court used the same jurisdictional language as in the workers' compensation immunity subdivision. See In re Amendments to Fla. Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130 , 151 So. 3d at 1218 ; Amendments to Fla. Rules of Appellate Procedure , 696 So. 2d at 1127. The sovereign immunity subdivision, which the Court added to rule 9.130 in 2014, permits the interlocutory appeal of "nonfinal orders ... that ... determine ... that, as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to sovereign immunity." Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(xi).

This Court has taken up only one case involving the sovereign immunity subdivision: Beach Community Bank v. City of Freeport , 150 So. 3d 1111 (Fla. 2014), decided the same day the Court (in a separate opinion) added that subdivision to rule 9.130. See Amendments to Fla. Rules of Appellate Procedure , 696 So. 2d at 1127. The Court had accepted jurisdiction in Beach Community Bank to address whether the First District could invoke its certiorari jurisdiction to review a trial court order denying a sovereign immunity-based motion to dismiss. Applying its then-recent decision in Rodriguez v. Miami-Dade County , 117 So. 3d 400 (Fla. 2013), the Court answered no to that question.

But the Court went on to hold that the trial court's order was appealable under the brand new sovereign immunity subdivision of rule 9.130. Without quoting the text of either that subdivision or the order under review, the Court stated that the new "amendment permits district courts to review nonfinal orders of decisions determining entitlement to sovereign immunity where the case involves a pure legal question." Beach Community Bank , 150 So. 3d at 1113. The Court ended its opinion by twice stating that the "amendment to rule 9.130 covers this exact scenario pertaining to a nonfinal order denying a sovereign immunity defense as a matter of law." Id. at 1114-15.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Against that backdrop, we turn briefly to the facts of this case. Vontavia Robinson tragically died in a predawn car accident on I-75. The accident occurred after smoke from a nearby brushfire caused visibility on the interstate suddenly to deteriorate. Several hours earlier, smoke from the same brushfire had caused two other car crashes, leading the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) to close the interstate for several hours. Mr. Robinson's deadly accident happened shortly after FHP had reopened the interstate.

Lashonta Renea Jackson, the personal representative of Mr. Robinson's estate, sued FHP. The complaint alleged that FHP's reopening and subsequent monitoring of the interstate were negligent operational decisions. After discovery, FHP moved for summary judgment, claiming both that it owed Mr. Robinson no special duty and that its challenged decisions were discretionary and therefore protected by sovereign immunity.

The trial court held a summary judgment hearing and later issued a brief order denying FHP's motion. The relevant portion of the order read: "Disputed issues of material fact exist, including, but not limited to, the extent and adequacy of DHSMV's continued monitoring of the roadway, that prevent the entry of Final Summary Judgment." The hearing transcript sheds no additional light on the trial court's reasoning.

FHP appealed the nonfinal order to the First District, relying on the sovereign immunity subdivision of rule 9.130 as the basis for the district court's jurisdiction. A panel of the First District voted unanimously to dismiss the appeal. In a thorough and thoughtful opinion, Judge Winokur concluded that the district court was "constrained to find that Hastings and Reeves preclude appellate review." Jackson , 238 So. 3d at 436. He reasoned that, under those cases, "a defendant in Florida asserting that the trial court erroneously denied immunity may not appeal unless the order explicitly states that the defendant is not entitled to immunity." Id. at 435. This conclusion is consistent with decisions of the Third District Court of Appeal that have also carefully examined the issue. See, e.g. , Citizens Property Ins. Corp. v. Calonge , 246 So. 3d 447 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) ; Miami-Dade County v. Pozos , 242 So. 3d 1152 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017).

Nonetheless, Judge Winokur observed that recent legal developments—including this Court's Beach Community Bank decision—suggested that the Hastings / Reeves precedents "unduly restrict interlocutory appellate review of orders denying immunity." Jackson , 238 So. 3d at 436-37. Judge Winokur also noted "the perceived conflict between Beach Community Bank and prior case law." Id. at 438. To address those issues, the panel certified the following as a question of great public importance:

DOES RULE 9.130 [ (A)(3)(C)(XI) ] PERMIT AN APPEAL OF A NON-FINAL ORDER DENYING IMMUNITY IF THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY AS A MATTER OF LAW

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