Flaherty v. Metal Products Corp.

• Decision Date: 19 October 1955
• Citation: 83 So.2d 9
• Parties: 29 Lab.Cas. P 69,516 Francis FLAHERTY et al., Appellants, v. The METAL PRODUCTS CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 9

83 So.2d 9

29 Lab.Cas. P 69,516

Francis FLAHERTY et al., Appellants, v. The METAL PRODUCTS CORPORATION, a Florida corporation, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida, Special Division A.

Oct. 19, 1955.

Claude Pepper law offices, for appellants.

Smathers, Thompson, Maxwell & Dyer, Miami, for appellee.

ALLEN, Associate Justice.

The appellants were plaintiffs in the trial court and appeal from a summary final decree entered for the appellee.

Appellants in the trial court by way of declaratory decree action sought to have construed portions of a contract between appellants and other employees and the company under which a controversy had arisen about the amount of payment for overtime work.

Among other things the contract provided in Sec. 3 of Art. 9 as follows: 'should any complaint, dispute or grievance not be adjusted or settled the services of the United States Conciliation Service should be requested by both the Employer and the Union.' It is suggested in the briefs that this clause effects an agreement to arbitrate controversies of the kind presented by this suit which is binding on the parties and precludes the maintenance of the suit without first having exhausted the contract remedy for settlement of disputes. We do not agree.

By common law doctrine, which has been recognized by this court, parties to a contract are unable to make an irrevocable agreement to arbitrate all future controversies. Such agreement is said to be contrary to public policy and obnoxious to the law in that it seeks to oust courts of jurisdiction. Steinhardt v. Consolidated Grocery Co., 80 Fla. 531, 86 So. 431; Fenster v. Makovsky, Fla., 1953, 67 So.2d 427. This is the rule generally followed. See Note, 1941, 135 A.L.R. 79, 86.

Even if the clause be construed as a contract to arbitrate all future disputes, a question which we do not now decide, its existence could be no bar to the maintenance of the suit under the above authorities. The complaint stated a cause of action.

Appellee in his answer denied the material allegations in the complaint and further set up new matters alleging, 'that on or about July 27, 1953, the Defendant and the Union, which is the exclusive representative of the Defendant's employees belonging to said Union, pursuant to the terms and provisions of the contract, Plaintiffs' Exhibit A, entered into a written agreement to submit to arbitration as provided therein the general matter which is in dispute in this suit, and thereafter, to wit: on or about July 29, 1953, pursuant to the said contract, Plaintiffs' Exhibit A, and pursuant to the applicable Federal Statutes, the United States Conciliation Service furnished a list of arbiters so that the contracting parties could select an arbiter; that such selection was made, and on the 15th of September, 1953, the Defendant and its employees in the City of Miami, Florida, submitted their grievance to one J. W. Lawson, as arbiter, and then and there agreed that the decision of the arbiter would be binding upon both the Defendant and its employees, all of which will appear from pages 8, 9 and 10 of the transcript of arbitration proceedings, a certified copy of which is attached hereto, marked Defendant's Exhibit No. 1, and by reference made a part thereof. Thereafter, on November 17, 1953, the said arbiter entered his award, deciding among other things that the Defendant acted properly in its interpretation of Article XVIII of the contract, Plaintiffs' Exhibit A, and owes no sum in addition to that which has been paid to the Defendant's...