Jackson v. State

Decision Date16 May 2013
Docket NumberNo. CR 12–859.,CR 12–859.
Citation2013 Ark. 201,427 S.W.3d 607
PartiesRonald Tywan JACKSON, Appellant v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Robert M. “Robby” Golden, for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att'y Gen., by: Lauren Elizabeth Heil, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.

DONALD L. CORBIN, Justice.

Appellant Ronald Tywan Jackson appeals the order of the Lonoke County Circuit Court convicting him of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver and sentencing him to a term of five years' imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress (1) evidence seized pursuant to an illegal detention, (2) evidence where the warrantless search of his vehicle was not reasonable, and (3) the custodial statement that violated his Miranda rights and the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine. We affirm.

The record reflects the following facts. On October 26, 2010, at approximately 3:39 p.m., Corporal Trenton Behnke of the Arkansas State Police stopped a pickup truck traveling eastbound on Interstate 40. According to Corporal Behnke, he stopped the vehicle because of an [i]mproper lane change, cutting in front of a tractor trailer, and following too close.” Leonard Maysonet was driving the vehicle, Jackson was the front-seat passenger, and John Fykes was a rear-seat passenger. Upon approaching the vehicle, Corporal Behnke did not notice anything in the bed of the truck but saw fast-food wrappers and a small suitcase in the backseat. Corporal Behnke requested and received Maysonet's identification and the vehicle's rental agreement that showed Jackson as the person who had rented the truck. According to Corporal Behnke, the rental agreement stated that Jackson had rented the truck in Tennessee on October 22, 2010, at approximately 9:01 a.m. and that the vehicle was due to be returned at 8:00 a.m. on October 25, 2010, the day before the traffic stop.

Corporal Behnke questioned Maysonet about his travels, and Maysonet told the officer that he had been to Dallas, Texas, to visit his cousin for a few days. Corporal Behnke then checked the vehicle's VIN sticker and federal VIN plate, and while doing so, noticed a large road atlas, which he thought was suspicious. Then, the officer asked Jackson for his driver's license and asked him about his travels. Jackson told the officer that the men had been to Dallas, Texas, “to see their girls” and once they arrived in Dallas, they went their separate ways. After backup arrived, Corporal Behnke deployed his dog, K–9 Major, around the truck. Based on the dog's alert, Corporal Behnke then searched the vehicle and discovered four or five Ziplock bags of a green, leafy-vegetable matter, which he determined to be marijuana, inside the one suitcase in the truck.

Jackson was arrested and charged with one count of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence and his roadside and custodial statements, asserting that the officer had conducted a warrantless and unreasonable search and seizure of the vehicle in violation of his rights under the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as the Arkansas and United States Constitutions.

A hearing on the suppression motion was held on July 14, 2011. Therein, Corporal Behnke testified about his stop and subsequent search of the vehicle rented to Jackson. He stated that after pulling the truck over, he first asked for Maysonet's license and the rental agreement and then later requested Jackson's driver's license, as he was the renter of the truck. Corporal Behnke explained that while waiting on the return from the Arkansas Crime Information Center (“ACIC”) and after talking with Maysonet and Jackson some more, he became suspicious that they might be transporting narcotics. He also found it odd that when he asked them questions, he did not get immediate responses. Corporal Behnke asked Jackson for permission to search the vehicle, and Jackson said, [N]o.” Corporal Behnke told Jackson he had an officer on the way to assist him and once he arrived, Behnke was going to deploy his dog, K–9 Major, around the vehicle. According to Corporal Behnke, he first allowed the dog to conduct a free-air sniff by letting him run around the vehicle by himself. This was followed by a detailed sniff where the officer presented different areas outside the vehicle. Corporal Behnke testified that K–9 Major's behavior constituted a profound alert, which meant that he was dealing with an odor of narcotics. Corporal Behnke then reported to Jackson that his dog alerted to the odor of narcotics in the vehicle. Jackson told the officer that his girl had smoked marijuana in the truck the day before, and Corporal Behnke advised Jackson that he was going to search the vehicle. Jackson then admitted there were four or five pounds of marijuana in the truck. Corporal Behnke testified that after Jackson was transported to the Lonoke County Sheriff's Office, he was advised of his Miranda rights, but refused to give a statement, saying, “There's nothing for me to say because you already have my weed.”

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the circuit court ruled that it would suppress the roadside statement by Jackson, wherein he admitted that there were four or five pounds of marijuana in the car. But, the circuit court denied the motion to suppress the evidence and the custodial statement. The circuit court specifically found that Corporal Behnke had not completed the purpose of the stop at the time he deployed the dog, as he was waiting on a return from ACIC on one of the men, and that K–9 Major was reliable and alerted, thereby giving Corporal Behnke probable cause to search the vehicle. Jackson was then tried before the bench on July 14, 2011, found guilty and sentenced as previously set forth.

Jackson appealed his conviction and sentence to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, and the court of appeals affirmed. Jackson v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 508, 2012 WL 4194657. Jackson petitioned this court for review, and we granted that petition on November 8, 2012. When we grant a petition for review, we treat the appeal as if it had been originally filed in this court. See Chambers v. State, 2012 Ark. 407, 424 S.W.3d 296. We turn now to the issues raised by Jackson.

As his first point on appeal, Jackson argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized in violation of Rule 3.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as the Arkansas and United States Constitutions.1 While Jackson concedes that the officer's stop of the truck was valid, he asserts that Corporal Behnke illegally detained him after the purpose of the stop had been completed and that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to continue the investigation. The State counters that because the purpose of the traffic stop had not been completed at the time that Corporal Behnke deployed K–9 Major, the circuit court's denial of the motion to suppress was correct and should be affirmed by this court. Alternatively, the State argues that any further detention of Jackson was supported by reasonable suspicion that Jackson was involved in criminal activity and, thus, the circuit court's denial of the motion to suppress should be affirmed.

In reviewing a circuit court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we conduct a de novo review based on the totality of the circumstances, reviewing findings of historical facts for clear error and determining whether those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable cause, giving due weight to inferences drawn by the circuit court and proper deference to the circuit court's findings. E.g., Menne v. State, 2012 Ark. 37, 386 S.W.3d 451. A finding is clearly erroneous, even if there is evidence to support it, when the appellate court, after review of the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. E.g., Lee v. State, 2009 Ark. 255, 308 S.W.3d 596. We defer to the superiority of the circuit court to evaluate the credibility of witnesses who testify at a suppression hearing. E.g., Cockrell v. State, 2010 Ark. 258, 370 S.W.3d 197. We reverse only if the circuit court's ruling is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Ritter v. State, 2011 Ark. 427, 385 S.W.3d 740.

This court has held that a law-enforcement officer, as part of a valid traffic stop, may detain a traffic offender while completing certain routine tasks, such as computerized checks of the vehicle's registration and the driver's license and criminal history, and the writing up of a citation or warning. Sims v. State, 356 Ark. 507, 157 S.W.3d 530 (2004). During this process, the officer may ask the motorist routine questions such as his destination, the purpose of the trip, or whether the officer may search the vehicle, and he may act on whatever information is volunteered. Id. After these routine checks are completed, continued detention of the driver can become unreasonable, unless the officer has a reasonably articulable suspicion for believing that criminal activity is afoot. Id.

We are called upon in this case to review the circuit court's finding that the traffic stop at issue here had not been completed at the time Corporal Behnke deployed K–9 Major. Jackson acknowledges that there is case law suggesting that a stop is not completed until the driver's license and any accompanying paperwork is returned, which is precisely what we recently stated in Menne, 2012 Ark. 37, 386 S.W.3d 451. But, according to Jackson, we have not established a bright-line rule that a traffic stop cannot be completed before that time.

While we may not have a bright-line rule for when a stop is legitimately completed, our case law has consistently held that a stop is not concluded when the officer has not returned the license, paperwork, or ticket. In Yarbrough v. State, 370 Ark. 31, 257 S.W.3d 50...

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