Flathead Lake Methodist Camp v. Webb, 10790

Decision Date18 February 1965
Docket NumberNo. 10790,10790
Citation144 Mont. 565,399 P.2d 90
PartiesFLATHEAD LAKE METHODIST CAMP, a non-profit corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Correan M. WEBB, as County Treasurer of Lake County, Montana, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

Richard P. Heinz (argued), Polson, for appellant.

Skelton & Hendricks, Missoula, Robert Skelton (argued) Missoula, for respondent.

JAMES T. HARRISON, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal, by the defendant from a judgment entered in the district court of Lake County, Montana.

The record discloses that plaintiff is a non-profit corporation, incorporated for the purpose of establishing and maintaining a Methodist Church summer camp on Flathead Lake in Lake County, Montana. The corporation owns two tracts of land, one of 3.55 acres which is not used for camp purposes and is not claimed to be exempt, and the other being the property here involved and consists of approximately twenty-two acres in the form of a small peninsula on the edge of the Lake. The plaintiff and several Montana Methodist congregations maintain some twenty-eight improvements on this property. The various congregations have built and maintain fourteen dormitory cottages. Other improvements include faculty housing, employee accommodations, an auditoriumdining room building, storage and shop, and bathing facilities. There is a garage, parking area, boat dock, water supply tank, and garbage disposal. Also, there is a chapel and four classroom buildings. One edge of the peninsula is a ragged shoreline with rocky bluffs. This side of the land is used for nature walks and meditation. The cities of Polson and Kalispell each lie about twenty-eight miles away in opposite directions, making it necessary that the camp be virtually self-sufficient.

The campsite was purchased and some of the facilities were constructed by money obtained from fire insurance collected on the former camp in Glacier Park which burned in 1932. Other income came from the sale of the property whereon the burned camp had been situated. The funds for the maintenance of the camp come from private donations, Methodist Church contributions, and, in small measure, from the money paid by the children and others who come there.

The camp caters principally to children on an organized, two-week basis. They are segregated by age throughout the summer, each two-week camp having approximately 150 children in attendance. The area served is somewhat larger than a circle encompassing western Montana. The activities range from instruction, praying, meditation, and nature walks to secular recreation such as archery, swimming, and crafts. Each day is organized to provide a balanced program of arts and crafts, physical activity, religious instruction, rest, chores, and prayers. The majority of the children are Methodists, but there is evidence that many different faiths have been represented there over the years.

In 1962, plaintiff paid real estate taxes to the treasurer of Lake County under protest and commenced this action to recover them. Plaintiff alleged that all of the property came within the tax exemption of Article XII, § 2 of the Montana Constitution and section 84-202, R.C.M.1947. The constitutional provision provides in part:

'The property of the United States, * * * shall be exempt from taxation; and such other property as may be used exclusively for the agricultural and horticultural societies, for educational purposes, places for actual religious worship, * * * institutions of purely public charity * * *, may be exempt from taxation.' (Emphasis supplied.)

Section 84-202, is legislative expression of the same exemption and provides in part:

'The property of the United States, * * * such other property as is used exclusively for agricultural and horticultural societies, for educational purposes, places of actual religious worship, * * * and institutions of purely public charity * * * are exempt from taxation, but no more land than is necessary for such purpose is exempt * * *.'

The original complaint sought to establish that the camp was a 'place for actual religious worship', but so much testimony was elicited on the educational and charitable aspects of the camp that the plaintiff's motion at the close of the testimony to amend the complaint to include those two grounds was granted.

The case was tried before District Judge E. Gardner Brownlee and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. The judgment holds all of the property to be exempt under section 84-202, R.C.M.1947. The defendant, Lake County Treasurer, brings this appeal contending that the chapel and the four classroom buildings and the real property they are situated on are properly exempt, but that it was error to exempt all of the campsite. The basis for this alleged error is the clause in the statute reading: 'no more land than is necessary for such purpose is exempt * * *.'

The appellant argues that only the four classroom buildings and the chapel are 'necessary' as a place of actual religious worship within the meaning of that phrase in the statute. In other words, there is no contest that some of the property is exempt. Appellant only seeks to restrict the exemption. While we might be persuaded to agree with counsel that only the chapel and the classroom buildings are necessary for actual religious worship we must consider much of the argument on that point to be wasted because the complaint was amended to include other grounds for exemption. We must test the instant case from the viewpoint of the religious, educational, and charitable grounds for exemption. It seems counsel has stressed the religious worship argument because that was the way the complaint read until the conclusion of the testimony. At the close of the case, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to conform to the proof.

Our review of the record leads us to the conclusion that the 'exclusive' use of the premises is for 'educational purposes' within the meaning of the statute. The term 'educational purposes' is not, by the weight of authority, defined in terms of the common scholastic institutions of grammar school, high school, and university or college. People ex rel. Board of Trustees of Mt. Pleasant Academy v. Mezger, 98 App.Div. 237, 90 N.Y.S. 488. Organizations for the social, intellectual, physical, or religious welfare of children are exempt equally. The end of the education may be to develop either the mental, physical, or moral qualities. Westminster Foundation of the City of Philadelphia v. Board of Revision of Taxes, 70 Pa.Dist. & Co.R. 111, 41 Mun. 267; Buffalo Turn Verein v. Reuling, 155 Misc. 797, 281 N.Y.S. 545; Charter Oak Council, Inc., Boy Scouts of America v. Town of New Hartford, 121 Conn. 466, 185 A. 575; Stoolman v. Camden County Council, Boy Scouts of America, 77 N.J.Super. 129, 185 A.2d 436. Religious education is exempt as an 'educational purpose' and not as 'actual religious worship' even though elements of the latter may be present and may serve to strengthen the exemption of all of the property.

Our court has stated: 'Education may be particularly directed to either mental, moral, or physical powers or faculties, but in its broadest and best sense it embraces them all.' McNair v. School Dist. No. 1 of Cascade County, 87 Mont. 423, 428, 288 P. 188, 190, 69 A.L.R. 866. It has been held elsewhere that 'education' includes the cultivation of one's religious or moral sentiment. Commissioners of District of Columbia v. Shannon & Luchs Const. Co., 57 App.D.C. 67, 17 F.2d 219. The camp involved in the instant case is more directly devoted to an 'educational purpose' than to the religious or charitable purposes, at least insofar as a tax exemption is concerned. We will examine the other two bases before explaining the 'educational purposes' aspect further.

The amended complaint includes as grounds for exemption the phrase in the statute exempting an 'institution of purely public charity.' It cannot be said that the exclusive use of this property is as a charitable institution without giving the term 'institution of purely public charity' too broad a definition. A charity may be devoted to bringing people under 'religious influence'. The beneficiaries of the charity may pay a small portion of the cost. Also, the activity may be limited to a particular class so long as the numbers who may participate remain somewhat indefinite. Finally, when exempting an institution of charity, sufficient residence and recreation area may also be exempt. 51 Am.Jur., Taxation, §§ 601, 603, 607. Thus, even casually it is seen that the camp might be exempt as an institution of purely public charity.

The camp also has many elements of religious worship, and counsel for appellant emphasizes this exemption basis repeatedly. Appellant cites several Pennsylvania cases showing that the phrase 'actual religious worship' contemplates the temple, chapel, or church building only. City of Philadelphia to Use of State Paving & Const. Co. v. Overbrook Park Congregation, 171 Pa.Super. 581, 91 A.2d 310. Other Pennsylvania cases are cited to show that property surrounding a church cannot be exempt by borrowing exempt status from the church structure. Second Church of Christ Scientist of Philadelphia v. City of Philadelphia, 398 Pa. 65, 157 A.2d 54, 75 A.L.R.2d 1103. However, all of the cases so cited involve parking lots, lots, open fields, etc., surrounding the church structure. The campsite presented here is not controlled by those cases. Our research shows us that Pennsylvania would agree with that distinction. Eastern District Council of the Assemblies of God v. Zendt, 42 Pa.Dist. & Co.R. 235, 58 Montg. 1. In that case there was a campsite situation similar to the one involved here. The only major difference seems to be that the camp was for older people, and...

To continue reading

Request your trial
10 cases
  • San Francisco Boys' Club, Inc. v. Mendocino County
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • September 21, 1967
    ...and see St. Francis Hosp. v. City & County of S.F., supra, 137 Cal.App.2d 321, 326, 290 P.2d 275; and Flathead Lake Methodist Camp v. Webb (1965) 144 Mont. 565, 574, 399 P.2d 90, 95.) It is concluded that unless some other activity on or use of the property operates to destroy the claimed e......
  • North Idaho Jurisdiction of Episcopal Churches, Inc. v. Kootenai County
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • April 24, 1972
    ...group involved. While cases from other jurisdictions squarely in point are somewhat rare, the case of Flathead Lake Methodist Camp v. Webb, 144 Mont. 565, 399 P.2d 90 (Mont.1965) is highly persuasive. The Montana Court also had for consideration an asserted tax exemption for a church summer......
  • West Brandt Foundation, Inc. v. Carper, 80SC279
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • September 13, 1982
    ...Borough v. King's Lake, supra; Jewish Community Centers Ass'n v. State Tax Commission, 520 S.W.2d 23 (Mo.1975); Flathead Lake Methodist Camp v. Webb, Mont., 399 P.2d 90 (1965); Gospel Volunteers v. Speculator, 33 A.D.2d 407, 308 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1970); Wayne County Board of Assessment v. Rolli......
  • State ex rel. Bartmess v. Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. 1
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • September 18, 1986
    ...hold that a swimming pool in a school was a performance of an educational duty by the school trustees. In Flathead Lake Methodist Camp v. Webb (1965), 144 Mont. 565, 399 P.2d 90, the question was whether the Methodist Church was entitled to a Montana property tax exemption for the maintenan......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT