Flather v. Norberg
| Citation | 377 A.2d 225,119 R.I. 276 |
| Decision Date | 29 August 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 75-136-M,75-136-M |
| Parties | Charles R. FLATHER v. John H. NORBERG, Tax Administrator. P. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This petition for certiorari, filed pursuant to G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 42-35-16 of the Administrative Procedures Act, seeks review of a Superior Court judgment affirming a final decision of the respondent tax administrator holding that the petitioner, at least for the year 1972, was a resident of the State of Rhode Island as that term is defined in G.L.1956 (1970 Reenactment) § 44-30-5(a) and was, therefore, liable for payment of personal income tax.
On December 10, 1973, the tax administrator notified petitioner, Charles R. Flather, a career naval officer, that personal income tax for the year 1972 in the amount of $342.94 plus interest and penalty was due. Commander Flather petitioned for redetermination of the deficiency on March 11, 1974, and, thereafter, a hearing was held at which the commander sought to establish that he was not a Rhode Island resident because he maintained a "permanent place of abode" outside of the state. 1
The record indicates that since September 1956, Commander Flather has been stationed with the United States Navy outside the State of Rhode Island. During this period he has lived in at least eight different states and one territory. Generally, his family accompanied him to these various locations; however, in July 1971, he and his wife separated and for 8 months thereafter, he lived alone in bachelors officers' quarters at the San Francisco shipyard. For approximately the next 6 weeks he was in command of a naval vessel at sea, after which he returned to California where he remained for an additional 3 weeks. In July, he was assigned to Washington, D. C., where, at least until the time of the hearing, he lived in an apartment with a month-to-month tenancy in Arlington, Virginia.
Commander Flather's testimony that he owned no real estate, rented no apartment, had not sent his children to school, and did not register his automobile in Rhode Island during the tax year in question was not contradicted at the hearing. Commander Flather also testified that he spent only 10 days in Rhode Island during 1972; apparently this was for the purpose of visiting relatives residing here. He did state, however, that he used the address of his parents, who live in Providence, in filing his federal income tax return; that he voted in Rhode Island by absentee ballot; and that his military records indicate that his home of record was Rhode Island.
In his decision the hearing officer stated that "permanent place of abode" within the meaning of § 44-30-5(a)(1) is determined by physical presence and the intent of the taxpayer to establish a permanent abode. Applying this standard the hearing officer determined that the evidence failed to support Commander Flather's position. This decision was approved by the tax administrator.
Commander Flather, having been aggrieved by the administrator's decision, sought judicial review of that decision in Superior Court pursuant to § 42-35-15 of the Administrative Procedures Act. The Superior Court justice affirmed the administrator's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Commander Flather then filed a timely petition for certiorari to review the action of the trial justice. His sole challenge is that the judgment of the Superior Court "is clearly in violation of the statutory provision defining 'resident' in § 44-30-5(a)(1) and clearly erroneous as a matter of law." Thus, the question before us is whether petitioner was a resident of Rhode Island for personal income tax purposes during the year 1972.
In determining whether petitioner is a resident of this state for purposes of personal income tax liability, we subscribe to the rule that when a Legislature undertakes to define a term used in its statutory enactments, the court is bound by the definition therein set out. Broadway Auto Sales, Inc. v. Asselin, 93 R.I. 403, 406, 176 A.2d 714, 716 (1961); Landry v. Cornell Constr. Co., 87 R.I. 1, 137 A.2d 410 (1957); Mount Pleasant Cab Co. v. Rhode Island Unemploy. Compensation Bd., 73 R.I. 7, 53 A.2d 485 (1947). The definition of "resident" as used in the personal income tax statutes is contained in § 44-30-5(a)(1) which reads in relevant part:
The petitioner has conceded the fact that he is a domiciliary of Rhode Island. Accordingly, he must be able to meet the requirements contained in subsection (1) in order to be considered a nonresident.
It is not contested that Commander Flather maintained no permanent place of abode in Rhode Island and that he spent less than 30 days in this state during the taxable year. The only question before us, then, is whether petitioner maintained a permanent place of abode other than in Rhode Island during 1972. In urging error, petitioner does not dispute the findings of fact determined by the tax administrator in this respect but, rather, contends that the administrator, in effect, equated "permanent place of abode" with "domicile" by applying the same standard to each determination. We agree. 2 In his decision the hearing officer stated that "(a)s in 'domicile,' a 'permanent place of abode' is determined by physical presence and the intent of the taxpayer to establish a permanent abode." (Emphasis added.) While a literal reading of § 44-30-5(a)(1), giving full effect to the word "permanent," would support the tax administrator's position, it results in the inescapable conclusion that the words "domicile" and "permanent place of abode" are synonymous. Such an interpretation would render the section inefficacious, a result which would violate the principle of statutory construction which declares that "no court will ascribe to a legislature the intent to enact a law inefficacious and nugatory." Town of Scituate v. O'Rourke, 103 R.I. 499, 509, 239 A.2d 176, 182 (1968). Furthermore, statutes should not be read literally when to do so would result in a patent absurdity. State v. Haggerty, 89 R.I. 158, 161, 151 A.2d 382, 384 (1959).
It is true that "residence is sometimes construed to mean domicile and the terms are often used to connote the same meaning." Reese & Green, That Elusive Word, "Residence," 6 Vand.L.Rev. 561, 569-74 (1953). Nonetheless, domicile, as it is properly understood, has a reasonably distinguishable and constant meaning.
" " Nevin v. Nevin, 88 R.I. 426, 433, 149 A.2d 722, 725 (1959), quoting McCarthy v. McCarthy, 45 R.I. 367, 369, 122 A. 529, 531 (1923).
Generally, the controlling factor in determining a person's domicile is whether he or she possessed the requisite domiciliary intent. Soucy v. Knight, 52 R.I. 405, 408-409, 161 A. 132, 133 (1932).
Residence, on the other hand, is not a word of fixed legal definition but must be interpreted according to the context and the purpose of the statute in which it is found. District of Columbia v. In re H. J. B., 359 A.2d 285 (D.C.App.1976). See Reese & Green, That Elusive Word, "Residence," supra at 563-64; Cramton, Currie & Kay, Conflict of Laws 48 (2d ed. 1975).
The legislative intent which must be given effect here is that of establishing a fair and practicable basis for personal income taxation. It is evident that the purpose of § 44-30-5(a) is to insure that all those who are in Rhode Island for other than a temporary or transitory purpose,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Gott v. Norberg
...the law is and its applicability to the facts." Narragansett Wire Co. v. Norberg, R.I., 376 A.2d 1, 6 (1977). See Flather v. Norberg, R.I., 377 A.2d 225, 227, n. 2 (1977). If the administrator relies on fairly debatable legal judgments to impose a tax, a subsequent judicial reversal will no......
-
Blanchard v. Peerless Ins. Co.
...the residence; and (4) the person's intentions regarding the length and nature of the stay. See id. at 984 (quoting Flather v. Norberg, 119 R.I. 276, 377 A.2d 225, 229 (1977)). Under the Carrera decision, as well as Barricelli v. American Universal Ins. Co., 583 A.2d 1270 (R.I.1990), the on......
-
Pullano v. City of Bluefield
...§ 28-12-4.1. The Legislature is presumed to know the state of existing relevant law when it enacts or amends a statute. Flather v. Norberg, R.I., 377 A.2d 225 (1977); Bailey v. Huling, R.I., 377 A.2d 220 (1977). We therefore must presume that the Legislature knew in 1976 when it amended § 5......
-
Ray Reedy, Inc. v. Town of North Kingstown
...its enforcement is entitled to some deference, as long as that construction is not clearly erroneous or unauthorized. Flather v. Norberg, 119 R.I. 276, 283 n.3, 377 A.2d 225, 229 n.3 (1977). However, a zoning board's determinations of law "are not binding on the reviewing court; they 'may b......