Mount Pleasant Cab Co. v. R.I. Unemployment Comp. Bd.. City Cab Co.
| Decision Date | 26 May 1947 |
| Docket Number | M.P. 837 to M.P. 839. |
| Citation | 53 A.2d 485 |
| Parties | MOUNT PLEASANT CAB CO. v. RHODE ISLAND UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD. CITY CAB CO. v. SAME. MAMBRO v. SAME. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Petitions by Mount Pleasant Cab Company, by City Cab Company, and by William Mambro, doing business as Majestic Cabs, to quash the record of the Rhode Island Unemployment Compensation Board, so far as the record declares that the operators of certain livery cabs were employees of petitioners and that therefore the petitioners were subject to the provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Act.
Decision quashed and records sent back to the respondent board.
Walter J. Hennessey, of Providence, for petitioners.
Marshall B. Marcus and G. William Grande, both of Providence, for respondent.
These are petitions for certiorari to quash the record of the respondent Rhose Island Unemployment Compensation Board, hereinafter referred to as the board, in so far as such record declares that the operators of certain livery cabs were employees of the petitioners and that, therefore, the petitioners were subject to the provisions of the unemployment compensation act, General Laws 1938, chapter 284, as amended, hereinafter called the act. Pursuant to the writs, the board has made a return to this court of all pertinent records, including a certified transcription of the evidence presented at the hearing before it.
William Mambro does business under the name of Majestic Cabs. He also operates and controls the Mount Pleasant Cab Co. and the City Cab Company, Rhode Island corporations. Since the interests of all three petitioners are identical, we will consider the cases as if William Mambro were the sole petitioner. His contention is that the operators of the livery cabs, hereinafter referred to merely as cabs, which are owned by him or his corporations, are independent contractors by virtue of certain leases and that, therefore, he does not come under the act.
The only evidence before the board came from the petitioner, his accountant and a lessee. Petitioner's counsel was also permitted to make any explanations that he or the board deemed pertinent. Such evidence is undisputed and unchallenged.
It appeared in evidence that all the cabs were owned by the petitioner and that all necessary licenses were issued to him. Until April 1, 1944, the operators of the cabs were admittedly employees of the petitioner. At that time the petitioner changed his method of doing business and instituted the plan of letting out the cabs to acceptable operators under a contract in the form of a lease, the provisions of which were later changed and a new lease substituted therefor. As the provisions of the latter lease, hereinafter called the lease, are of controlling force in this case, we will set them out in detail, as they appear in a blank form admitted in evidence, together with such pertinent testimony as appears of record with reference to those provisions.
The lease provided that in consideration of the delivery by the lessor to the lessee of the cab therein described, the latter agreed as follows: Item 1, title to the property to be and remain in the lessor. Item 2, possession by the lessee to continue for a specified time. The testimony shows that all leases were for a period of one year. Item 3, the lessee to pay a definite amount for the entire term payable as follows: a certain sum upon the execution of the lease and the balance to be evidenced by lessee's promissory note, payable according to the tenor thereof. It appears in evidence that all lessees were required to pay $400 upon the signing of the lease, and $28 a week during the term of the lease. Item 4, the leased property to be used exclusively as a cab and always in compliance with the laws and regulations of city, state or federal governments. Item 5, rates for cab service charged by the lessee not to conflict with rates charged by the lessor for similar service. According to the evidence, the purpose of this provision was to protect the public against discrimination by securing uniformity of rates in all cases for the same service, so that if the charge was ‘$.50 today to go downtown, that should be the same tomorrow.’
The lease further provided: Item 6, calls made by the lessee from boxes controlled by the lessor to be submitted in proper order. The following explanation of this provision was given by the petitioner: Item 7, lessee to use the personal property exclusively for cab service. Item 8, at the expiration of the lease the personal property to be returned to the lessor in good condition, ordinary wear and tear excepted. Lessee to maintain said property in a fit and proper condition. During the term of the lease, the lessee to do no act or thing which may make void or voidable any insurance maintained by the lessor in relation to said personal property. In the matter of insurance the evidence shows that all insurance was carried in the name of the lessor, but that the premiums therefor were apportioned among the lessees and their proportionate parts were paid by them with the weekly payments. Item 9, the lease to terminate if the lessor was prevented from carrying out the provisions thereof by any law or governmental regulation. Item 10, the lessor, at this option, to terminate the lease upon breach of certain conditions. Item 11, waiver by the lessor of a breach of any provision in the lease to be considered as a waiver of that breach alone. Item 12, lessee not to sublet the personal property. And, lastly, item 13, any replacement of parts, additions or improvements to the personal property to become forthwith the property of the lessor.
Our review of the evidence is for the sole purpose of ascertaining whether there is any legal evidence in the record before us to support the finding of the board. The evidence clearly shows that, operating under this lease, the operators of the cabs were under no obligation to make any report or give any information to the petitioner as to their hours of work; or where they operated from; or what their earnings were; or where they purchased oil and gasoline, except during wartime, when they were obliged to buy gasoline from the petitioner because all ration stamps for that commodity were then issued to the registered owner of the cabs; or where they had repairs made and what the cost was; or where they stored the cabs when not in operation. According to the evidence, so long as the provisions of the lease were complied with, the operators were free from any and all control by the petitioner. They were entirely free to work whenever and to whatever extent they chose, or not at all; to trade for supplies wherever it suited their convenience; to keep exclusively for themselves all net earnings, whether large or small; and they had to bear all losses, if any. The petitioner was in no way interested as to the manner in which the operators conducted their business or in the earnings that they should or might derive therefrom.
The interpretation of the pertinent provisions of the act is a matter of initial concern to this court. Such interpretation therefore requires a detailed reference to those provisions, for here, as in all cases of statutory construction, our primary duty is to ascertain the intent of the legislature and to give it effect. The most practical method that suggests itself to accomplish this purpose is to quote the various pertinent provisions of the act as they appear therein. Such pertinent provisions are as follows:
‘Sec. 3. Definitions. * * *
‘(4) ‘Employee’ means any person who is or has been employed by an employer subject to this act and in employment subject to this act.
‘(5) ‘Employer.’
‘(a) Employer means:
‘(1) Any employing unit which for some portion of a day * * * has or had in employment four or more individuals (irrespective of whether the same individuals are or were employed in each such day) * * *
‘(7) ‘Employment.’
‘(a) Employment, subject to the other provisions of this sub-section, means service, including service in interstate commerce, performed for wages or under any contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied. * * *
‘(e) Services performed by an individual for wages shall be deemed to be employment subject to this act unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the board that--
‘(1) such individual has been...
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