Flechas v. Flechas, 2000-CA-00223-COA.

• Decision Date: 24 July 2001
• Docket Number: No. 2000-CA-00223-COA.,2000-CA-00223-COA.
• Citation: 791 So.2d 295
• Parties: Eunice S. FLECHAS, Appellant, v. Miguel Martin FLECHAS, III, Appellee.
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

791 So.2d 295

Eunice S. FLECHAS, Appellant, v. Miguel Martin FLECHAS, III, Appellee.

No. 2000-CA-00223-COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

July 24, 2001.

Gary L. Roberts, Gautier, Attorney for Appellant.

Mark B. Strickland, Gulfport, Attorney for Appellee.

EN BANC.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

PAYNE, J., for the Court:

¶ 1. Miguel "Mike" Flechas and Eunice Flechas were married in June 1991 and were granted a divorce in October 1997 due to irreconcilable differences. In the judgment of divorce, the chancellor ruled that no assets were acquired by either party during the marriage raising no need for equitable distribution. The chancellor also awarded Eunice $18,000 in lump sum alimony and $750 per month for one year in rehabilitative alimony. Aggrieved of the chancellor's decision, Eunice appealed to this Court. In Flechas v. Flechas, 724 So.2d 948 (Miss.Ct.App.1998), we reversed and remanded this matter to the chancellor with instructions that he provide specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. We directed the chancellor to give specific justification for his decision not to award any equitable distribution particularly as concerning Eunice's non-economic contributions to the accumulation of marital assets, and also to explain his method of calculating the amount of lump sum alimony and rehabilitative alimony awarded to Eunice. Flechas, 724 So.2d at (¶¶ 12, 15)

¶ 2. On remand, the chancellor entered findings, altering his previous ruling to say that Eunice had contributed an "indirect economic contribution" to the "accumulation of the marital assets of the parties in the sum of $36,000," but did not make any distribution of marital assets, finding "that the Wife has no interest in the real or personal property of the Husband acquired as to her indirect economic contribution to the same, this being the agreement of the parties, at the time of the marriage, which is supported by the manner in which the parties lived during the marriage." The chancellor found that due to the substantial disparity in the parties' estates, Eunice was entitled to $36,000 in lump sum alimony, which was twice the previous award. With regard to periodic alimony, the chancellor also increased the award from $750 to $2,000 per month for one year. Still aggrieved of the chancellor's judgment after remand, Eunice again has appealed to this Court.

¶ 3. We again reverse and remand, finding that the court has failed to properly consider marital assets. We also reverse and remand on the issue of lump sum alimony.

FACTS

¶ 4. Both Mike and Eunice were sixty years old at the time of their divorce, which occurred after six years of marriage. Prior to the marriage, Eunice had been a teacher in Georgia earning $33,000 per year, and upon Mike's proposal Eunice resigned from her job, sold her home and moved to Mississippi. Eunice did not work outside the home once she was married, nor did she renew her teaching certificate in Georgia or become certified to teach in Mississippi. As a homemaker, Eunice refurbished Mike's home, kept house, cooked meals and helped care for Mike's children. On a monthly budget of $2,000,¹ which Mike deposited in a joint bank account each month for Eunice to access, Eunice paid the family bills and purchased necessities such as food and clothing for all members of the household, which at times included her daughter and two of Mike's sons. Eunice's net worth at the time of the divorce was approximately $500,000 which included proceeds from the sale of her Georgia home and an inheritance from her mother.

¶ 5. Mike is the sole owner of M.M. Flechas Shipyard Company and also has an interest in F & F Towing Company, Lynn's Machine Works and Self Serve Marine, Inc., amassing substantial assets throughout his career which totaled $6.4 million at the time of the divorce. His monthly income was nearly $17,000 per month. Eunice claims that she is entitled to an equitable share of marital assets and a more fair lump sum alimony award. We review the chancellor's findings and find that the chancellor erred in failing to consider and address pertinent facts and factors as described herein. Accordingly, as explained with this opinion, we reverse and remand on the question of equitable distribution and reverse and remand on the matter of lump sum alimony. No issue is raised as to the award of periodic alimony, and that will be affirmed.

ISSUES PRESENTED

¶ 6. With this appeal, Eunice makes the following assignments of error:

I. THE TRIAL COURT WAS MANIFESTLY IN ERROR BY REFUSING TO AWARD EUNICE ANY OF THE ASSETS ACQUIRED DURING THE MARRIAGE.

II. THE TRIAL COURT WAS MANIFESTLY IN ERROR IN AWARDING

ONLY $36,000 IN LUMP SUM ALIMONY.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7. Out standard of review in domestic relations cases is clear:

This Court will not disturb the findings of a chancellor unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied. In other words, on appeal this Court is required to respect the findings of fact by the chancellor supported by credible evidence and not manifestly wrong.

Sandlin v. Sandlin, 699 So.2d 1198, 1203 (Miss.1997) (citations omitted). Nonetheless, if manifest error is present or a legal standard is misapplied, this Court will not hesitate to reverse. Tilley v. Tilley, 610 So.2d 348, 351 (Miss.1992)

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES

I. THE TRIAL COURT WAS MANIFESTLY IN ERROR BY REFUSING TO AWARD EUNICE ANY OF THE ASSETS ACQUIRED DURING THE MARRIAGE.

¶ 8. In matters of equitable distribution of marital assets, the first determination is which assets are marital assets versus non-martial assets. Burnham-Steptoe v. Steptoe, 755 So.2d 1225 (¶ 25) (Miss.Ct.App.1999). Assets acquired during the course of marriage are marital assets and subject to equitable distribution unless it can be proven that such assets belonged to one of the separate estates prior to marriage. Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d 909, 914 (Miss.1994). As stated in Hemsley:

We define marital property for the purpose of divorce as being any and all property acquired or accumulated during the marriage. Assets so acquired or accumulated during the course of the marriage are marital assets and are subject to an equitable distribution by the chancellor. We assume for divorce purposes that the contributions and efforts of the marital partners, whether economic, domestic or otherwise are of equal value.

Id. at 915, 639 So.2d 909.

¶ 9. Before we specifically address the issue of classification of certain assets as marital or non-marital, we address Mike and Eunice's alleged oral agreement, upon which the chancellor based his decision. As described herein, we disagree with the chancellor's reliance on, indeed his enforcement of, a nebulous oral agreement to the supposed effect that property accumulated during marriage would not become marital property. We find that the understanding does not comply with the requirements for enforceable prenuptial agreements.

¶ 10. This agreement was central to two parts of the chancellor's decree. First, the chancellor found that property accumulated during the marriage was not marital property and did not need to be equitably divided. Secondly, the court determined that Eunice's "indirect contribution... to the accumulation of the marital assets [was] the sum of $36,000.00." The court made this determination because our 1998 opinion remanding the case required this finding of fact. Flechas v. Flechas, 724 So.2d at (¶ 12). The chancellor found that even though Eunice had made this indirect contribution, the oral agreement prevented her from sharing in any way in accumulated assets. Thus, she did not receive the $36,000.

¶ 11. What is initially confusing is the coincidence that the judgment contained a different $36,000 figure. That separate amount was awarded as lump sum alimony. ¶ 12. What controlled the outcome was the existence of an oral agreement between the parties. Whether there was an explicit agreement or just an understanding is unclear. Mike said that the conversation occurred before the marriage. This is the description given by the chancellor:

In reference to an agreement or understanding between the parties concerning the division of assets at the conclusion of the marriage, the Wife testified that, at the time of the marriage, it was her intention to keep her assets and investments separate from the Husband, so that she could give them to her children.

She further testified that the Husband intended to keep his assets and investments separate from the Wife so that he could leave those assets to his children.

The chancellor then found that the parties had largely kept their assets uncommingled during the marriage, the exceptions being two small joint banking accounts. The entire weight of the chancellor's decision to ignore marital property, i.e., property accumulated during the marriage and not inherited or otherwise separately acquired, must be supported by the strength of this oral agreement.

¶ 13. One kind of agreement that can bear the weight of the chancellor's conclusions would be a written prenuptial agreement. An agreement in consideration of marriage must be in writing. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-3-1(b) (Rev.1995). The record is silent on whether the agreement was "in consideration," meaning that it was a prerequisite of the marriage, or whether this agreement was simply "in contemplation" of marriage. The latter has been found not to be subject to the statute of frauds requirement of a writing. Steen v. Kirkpatrick, 84 Miss. 63, 69, 36 So. 140, 141 (1904). Regardless of whether the agreement was in consideration or only in contemplation of marriage, it is treated as a contract with contract formalities. The terms being enforced must be clear, otherwise there would not have been a meeting of the minds by the parties. Smith v. Smith, 656 So.2d 1143, 1147 (Miss.1995). We therefore turn to the record for evidence of this agreement.

¶ 14. Mr. Flechas...