Fleishman v. Superior Court
Decision Date | 23 September 2002 |
Docket Number | No. B159487.,B159487. |
Parties | David M. FLEISHMAN, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of San Luis Obispo County, Respondent, Chester Salisbury, Real Party in Interest. |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Lewis D'Amato, Brisbois & Bisgaard; Bruce L. Shaffer, Sacramento, and Andreas C. Rockas, for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Thomas M. Morlan, Atascadero, for Real Party in Interest.
David Fleishman (petitioner), an attorney for Sunterra Corporation (hereafter Sunterra), seeks extraordinary writ review of the trial court's order denying his motion for judgment on the pleadings in a malicious prosecution action filed against him. Chester Salisbury (Salisbury), a former Sunterra employee, alleges that petitioner maliciously prosecuted an earlier action (hereafter Sunterra's action) against him. In that action, the trial court granted Sunterra's application for a preliminary injunction. Petitioner contends that the issuance of the preliminary injunction conclusively establishes that Sunterra's entire action was brought with probable cause. We agree and order the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate.
Petitioner filed the Sunterra action in July 1999. The complaint alleged as follows: Salisbury was employed by Sunterra to sell timeshare interests in the San Luis Bay Inn (hereafter the Inn). In April 1999 Sunterra terminated his employment. Salisbury thereafter "solicited owners of timeshare interests [in] the [ ] Inn ... to sell their timeshare interests using [Salisbury] as broker[ ] and salesperson[ ] in the transaction." He induced Craig and Anne Swanson (hereafter the Swansons) to terminate a contract with Sunterra for the purchase of a timeshare interest in the Inn. In addition, Salisbury misappropriated Sunterra's trade secrets, falsely advertised that he was affiliated with the Inn, and conducted his brokerage activities under unlicensed fictitious business names.
The Sunterra complaint contained six causes of action: (1) intentional interference with Sunterra's contractual relationship with the Swansons; (2) unfair competition; (3) false advertising; (4) conducting real estate brokerage activities under unlicensed fictitious business names (Cal.Code Regs., tit. 10, § 2731); (5) misappropriation of trade secrets in violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (Civ.Code, § 3426 et seq.); (6) common law misappropriation of trade secrets. Sunterra sought damages under the first and sixth causes of action, injunctive relief under the second, third, and fourth causes of action, and both damages and injunctive relief under the fifth cause of action.
The trial court granted Sunterra's application for a temporary restraining order. It subsequently issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting Salisbury from: (1) destroying documents memorializing Sunterra's trade secrets; (2) disclosing or using Sunterra's trade secrets; (3) "soliciting any customers of [Sunterra] whose identities or product preferences became known to Salisbury during his employment with [Sunterra];" (4) making false or misleading statements concerning his affiliation with Sunterra, the Inn, or his provision of real estate sales services; and (5) "conducting real estate sales and brokerage activities under [fictitious] business names without possession of a real estate license for such fictitious business names, unless working under a licensed brokerf.]"
In November 2000 Sunterra voluntarily dismissed its action without prejudice. In November 2001 Salisbury filed the within malicious prosecution action against petitioner. The complaint consisted of a single cause of action. The trial court overruled petitioner's demurrer and denied his motion for judgment on the pleadings.
(Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 544.) (Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. (1996) 44 Cal. App.4th 194, 198, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 622.)
Issuance Of Preliminary Injunction Conclusively Establishes Probable Cause For Bringing Action
(Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 871-872, 254 Cal.Rptr. 336, 765 P.2d 498.)
(Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 825, 123 Cal.Rptr .2d 19, 50 P.3d 733 (hereafter Wilson).) (Id., at p. 817,123 Cal.Rptr.2d 19, 50 P.3d 733.)
"Claims that have succeeded at a hearing on the merits, even if that result is subsequently reversed by the trial or appellate court, are not so lacking in potential merit that a reasonable attorney or litigant would necessarily have recognized their frivolousness." (Id., at p. 818, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 19, 50 P.3d 733.)1 Such claims include those that have withstood a special motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute (Code Civ. Proc, § 425.16). In Wilson our Supreme Court held: "[A] trial court's denial of a motion to strike under section 425.16, on the ground that the plaintiff has established the requisite probability of success, establishes probable cause to bring the action, and precludes the maintenance of a subsequent malicious prosecution action, unless the prior ruling is shown to have been obtained by fraud or perjury." (Id., at p. 820, 123 Cal.Rptr .2d 19, 50 P.3d 733.) The court reasoned: "The rights of litigants and attorneys to bring nonfrivolous civil actions, `"even if it is extremely unlikely that they will win"` [citation], would be unduly burdened were they exposed to tort liability for malicious prosecution for actions that had been found potentially meritorious under section 425.16." (Ibid.) On the other hand, "denial of the motion solely on technical or procedural grounds, ... rather than because the plaintiff has shown a probability of success, would say nothing about the action's potential merit and would not establish probable cause." (Id., at pp. 823-824, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 19, 50 P.3d 733.)
To defeat an anti-SLAPP motion by establishing a probability of success on the merits, (Wilson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 821, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 19, 50 P.3d 733.) (Ibid.)
If the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion based on the action's potential merit conclusively establishes probable cause for the action, the issuance of a preliminary injunction must have the same effect. (Ancora-Citronelle Corp. v. Green (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 146, 148, 115 Cal.Rptr. 879.) (Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 441-442, 261 Cal.Rptr. 574, 777 P.2d 610.) "[A]n injunction pendente lite must not issue unless it is reasonably probable that the moving party will prevail on the merits [citations]...." (San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 438, 442, 216 Cal.Rptr. 462; accord, Weingand v. Atlantic Sav. & Loan Assn. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 806, 820, 83 Cal.Rptr. 650, 464 P.2d 106; Trader Joe's Co. v. Progressive Campaigns (1999) 73 Cal. App.4th 425, 429, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 442; see also College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 715, 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 898, 882 P.2d 894 [].) The plaintiff bears the burden of presenting facts establishing the requisite reasonable probability: "[T]he drastic remedy of an injunction pendente lite may not be permitted except upon a sufficient factual showing, by someone having knowledge thereof, made under oath or by declaration under penalty of perjury." (Ancora-Citronelle Corp. v Green, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d at p. 150, 115 Cal.Rptr. 879.)
Before issuing a preliminary injunction, the trial court must "carefully weigh the evidence and decide...
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