Fleming, In re
Decision Date | 03 July 1981 |
Parties | In re David FLEMING. |
Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Paine & Lynch, Martha J. Harris, Stern & Goldsmith, Marshall Stern, Jerome Goldsmith, Bangor, for appellant.
James S. Erwin, Wayne S. Moss, Asst. Attys. Gen., Augusta, for defendant.
Before McKUSICK, C. J., and WERNICK, GODFREY and CARTER, JJ.
the court shall order the release of the petitioner. Such release may be subject to conditions imposed by the court. 15 M.R.S.A. § 104-A(1)(A-B).
Petitioner was committed to the Bangor Mental Health Institute in 1974, in accordance with 15 M.R.S.A. § 103, following his acquittal of murder, by reason of mental disease or defect, in relation to the deaths of his girlfriend and son. Petitioner has been held at the Bangor Mental Health Institute since the commitment in 1974. 1
As required by 15 M.R.S.A. § 104-A, a hearing on the Petition for Release was held in Superior Court. Petitioner was represented by counsel and presented the testimony of psychiatrists Dr. Ulrich Jacobsohn and Dr. David Anderson. Dr. Jacobsohn had examined petitioner prior to his murder trial and testified at trial that petitioner suffered from paranoid schizophrenia at the time of the killings. Since 1974, Dr. Jacobsohn has participated in several extended evaluations of petitioner. Dr. Anderson has been the psychiatrist responsible for petitioner's primary care since petitioner's admission to the Bangor Mental Health Institute. Both Dr. Jacobsohn and Dr. Anderson are now in agreement that, despite the earlier contrary diagnosis of process or paranoid schizophrenia, petitioner was suffering from an acute psychotic episode at the time of the homicides. Applying a medical "rule of thumb", the doctors have concluded that because petitioner has experienced no recurrence of these episodes in the last five years, the original episode was not part of a process disease. Consequently, the doctors testified that petitioner is now free of mental disease or defect. This testimony by Drs. Jacobsohn and Anderson was uncontradicted.
The Superior Court justice denied the Petition for Release, holding that petitioner had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is now free from mental disease or defect. Petitioner contends that the evidence of record proved as a matter of law that he met his burden of proof 2 i. e., that no rational person, acting rationally, could entertain a doubt that was reasonable as to petitioner's being free of mental disease or defect.
We disagree and therefore deny the appeal and affirm the judgment.
Even if the psychiatric testimony introduced by petitioner was undisputed, the presiding justice as fact-finder had the prerogative selectively to accept or reject it, in terms of the credibility of the witnesses or the internal cogency of the content. Alternatively, the presiding justice was entitled to conclude that the medical standard utilized by the psychiatrists does not coincide with the legal standard set forth in the statute.
Here, even though the presiding justice did not take issue with the medical "rule of thumb" Dr. Jacobsohn and Dr. Anderson each...
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