State v. Putnoki
| Decision Date | 17 June 1986 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Geraldine E. PUTNOKI. |
Thomas C. White, Winsted, for appellant (defendant).
Christopher Malany, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., with whom were James G. Clark, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., and, on brief, John J. Kelly, Chief State's Atty., for appellee (State).
Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, DANNEHY, SANTANIELLO and CALLAHAN, JJ.
This case principally concerns the proper interpretation and application of General Statutes (Rev. to 1983) § 53a-47, 1 which governs the confinement, evaluation, and release of individuals who have been found guilty of an offense, but not criminally responsible because of mental disease or defect. 2 The defendant, Geraldine Putnoki, was found guilty of, but not criminally responsible for, manslaughter in the first degree and was ordered placed in the custody of the commissioner of mental health for twelve years. The defendant appeals from the order of confinement.
The underlying facts are undisputed. On March 21, 1983, while pregnant with her third child, the defendant stabbed her mother-in-law to death. Following a psychiatric examination of the defendant, the trial court found the defendant incompetent to stand trial on May 26, 1983. On November 7, 1983, a competency hearing was held at which the defendant's treating psychiatrist at Fairfield Hills State Hospital testified that, although the defendant required further inpatient treatment, she was able to prepare for trial and to assist in her own defense. The trial court accordingly found her competent to stand trial, but ordered the defendant to remain in Fairfield Hills Hospital as an inpatient. On April 27, 1984, following a trial to the court, the defendant was found guilty of, but not criminally responsible for, the killing of her mother-in-law. In accordance with the procedures outlined in § 53a-47(a)(1), the trial court then ordered the defendant temporarily committed to Fairfield Hills Hospital for an examination to determine her mental condition.
In June of 1984, two psychiatrists submitted reports to the court. Dr. W. Fernando, the defendant's treating psychiatrist at Fairfield Hills Hospital, reported that the defendant "has a biological predisposition to suffer from recurrent depression of psychotic [proportions] under severe stress," and "a vulnerability to become depressed and possibly psychotic during periods of stress." He concluded that, in his opinion, the defendant could be released from the hospital with "minimal" danger to herself or to others if she received "appropriate psychiatric care which should consist of outpatient chemotherapy, psychotherapy, family therapy, [and] probation for a stipulated period of time."
A second psychiatrist, Dr. Jeremy August, who had examined the defendant several times at her request, reported that the defendant's mental illness was currently in remission, although she would "[m]ost likely ... at some point in the future suffer a relapse of her depressive illness, with or without psychotic symptoms." He concluded that in her present "compensated state" she did not present a danger to herself or to others, but, noting abnormalities on her EEG (electroencephalogram), recommended that she continue to take her prescribed medications and even suggested that an additional anticonvulsant drug be prescribed.
Following receipt of these reports, the trial court held a formal hearing pursuant to § 53a-47(a)(4). Both psychiatrists testified at this hearing, as did the defendant's husband. Dr. Fernando testified that, as an inpatient, the defendant was daily taking both Ludiomil, an antidepressant drug, "to prevent her from lapsing into depression," and Haldol, an antipsychotic drug, "to prevent her from relapsing into psychosis," and was also receiving both individual and group psychotherapy. He stated that, although there was no cure for her illness, the medication she was receiving "corrects the chemical imbalance which is responsible for the symptoms ... and thereby improves [her] inside judgment, orientation, memory and all the aspects of thinking and functioning." He reiterated his opinion that the defendant's release would pose only a "minimal" risk of danger to herself or to others as long as she continued to receive her prescribed medication and therapy, but that she might be dangerous if such treatment were discontinued.
Dr. August testified that "where [the defendant] is not depressed and psychotic, she is not a violent person ... [but] [w]hen she is crazy, I think anything goes." He stated that, in his opinion, she was no longer mentally ill and that he "wouldn't be surprised" if she no longer needed medication. He concluded that she was "low on the list of potentially dangerous persons," and believed that she could be released without danger to herself or to others.
At the end of the hearing, the trial court ruled that the state had sustained its burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was "potentially a danger to herself or others at the present time." In reaching this conclusion, the court focused on testimony that the defendant was being kept "in a locked ward" at the hospital and was "continually under medication," and that "no attempt [had been made] to take her off medication and see what the reaction [would be]." The court noted that Dr. Fernando's stated opinion that the defendant's release would constitute only a minimal danger was expressly conditioned on her continuing to receive "appropriate chemotherapy, psychotherapy, family therapy and [to] be on probation for a stipulated period of time." Concluding that § 53a-47(a)(4) prohibited the imposition of conditions upon release but instead required either unconditional release or further confinement, the court ordered the defendant confined to Fairfield Hills Hospital for a maximum of twelve years or until release was determined to be warranted under the ongoing review provisions contained in § 53a-47(c). 3
In appealing from the order of confinement, the defendant claims that the trial court erred: (1) in interpreting § 53a-47 to prohibit conditional release from confinement; (2) in concluding that the state had established by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was mentally ill to the extent that her release would constitute a danger to herself or to others; and (3) in certain evidentiary rulings. 4 We find error and remand for a new hearing.
The defendant initially claims that the trial court's interpretation of § 53a-47 to prohibit conditional release was erroneous. During her presentation of evidence at the July, 1984 hearing and again during closing arguments to the court, the defendant argued that § 53a-47(f) gave the trial court the option of releasing the defendant under appropriate conditions. The trial court disagreed, ruling that although § 53a-47(a)(1) expressly authorized the court to order a conditional release immediately after trial § 53a-47(a)(4) did not provide the court with a similar option at a hearing following confinement for evaluation. Consequently, the trial court refused both to permit the defendant to introduce any evidence relevant to a conditional release or to consider such an option in evaluating the advisability of releasing the defendant from confinement.
Our resolution of the issue before us requires us to examine the language of subsection (f) of § 53a-47, which authorizes conditional release, and then to determine its applicability to subsection (a), which establishes procedures for the evaluation, confinement, and release of a person who has been adjudged guilty of, but not criminally responsible for, an offense because of mental illness or defect. In doing so, we are mindful that "[t]he fundamental objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature." State v. Kozlowski, 199 Conn. 667, 673, 509 A.2d 20 (1986); Hayes v. Smith, 194 Conn. 52, 57, 480 A.2d 425 (1984); 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed.Sands 1984) § 45.05.
Our examination of the relevant language of § 53a-47 convinces us that subsection (f) permits a trial court, in its discretion, to order a conditional release from confinement whenever it determined that release under this statute was appropriate, regardless of the stage in the proceedings at which the release was to occur. In reaching the opposite conclusion, the trial court focused exclusively on the contrast between the express reference to the conditional release option contained in subsection (a)(1) and the absence of such a reference in subsection (a)(4). Although, standing alone, such an inconsistency may signal a legislative intent to permit conditional release in the former instance while prohibiting it in the latter, we believe that such a construction is foreclosed by the plain language of subsection (f) itself. See Mazur v. Blum, 184 Conn. 116, 118-19, 441 A.2d 65 (1981). That subsection provided that "[t]he court may order that a person released pursuant to this section be released under such conditions and supervision as the court deems appropriate to his situation...." (Emphasis added.) It is apparent from a review of the statute in its entirety that the words "this section" contained in subsection (f) refer to section 53a-47 as a whole, and not to any particular subsection. Significantly, there is no statutory language which expressly limited the application of this conditional release option to one particular stage of the proceedings to the exclusion of any other stage. The unqualified wording of subsection (f), therefore, compels the conclusion that the legislature intended to vest the trial court with the discretion to order conditional release from confinement whenever it contemplated a release under § 53a-47.
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