Fleming v. Patterson, No. 13-08-00199-CV (Tex. App. 2/25/2010)
| Decision Date | 25 February 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-08-00199-CV.,13-08-00199-CV. |
| Parties | JOHN SCOTT FLEMING, Appellant, v. JERRY PATTERSON, LAND COMMISSIONER OF THE STATE OF TEXAS AND CITY OF CORPUS CHRISTI, Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from 214th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
Before Chief Justice VALDEZ and Justices YAÑEZ and BENAVIDES.
John Scott Fleming, appellant, appeals from the trial court's order granting pleas to the jurisdiction in favor of appellees, Jerry Patterson, Land Commissioner of the State of Texas ("Patterson"), and the City of Corpus Christi (the "City"). We affirm.
Fleming initially sued the State of Texas and the City asserting ownership of certain lots on Mustang Island near Corpus Christi, Texas. The lots were included in land the State leased to the City. Fleming claimed that the State and the City, as the State's lessee, had no rights to the property at issue and asked the trial court to issue a declaratory judgment clarifying the parties' rights to the property. Additionally, Fleming asked the trial court to both try and quiet title "as appropriate." Both the State and the City filed pleas to the jurisdiction asserting sovereign immunity and governmental immunity, respectively.1
On April 4, 2007, the trial court held a hearing on the State's plea to the jurisdiction.2 The same day, Fleming filed a "Supplemental Petition" adding as defendants in their official capacities: (1) the "State Land Commissioner;" and (2) "all Officials through which the State of Texas acts." At the April 4, 2007 hearing, the State presented evidence, including the testimony of its surveyor, asserting its title and right of possession to the property. The testimony confirmed that Fleming's asserted title conflicts with the State's. The hearing exclusively involved evidence presented on behalf of the State, and no evidence was presented on behalf of any state officials. During Fleming's cross-examination of the State's surveyor, counsel for the State reiterated that, at the time of the hearing, Fleming "has sued the State of Texas, and we're here on behalf of the State of Texas . . . and no state official is really a party . . . ." Fleming later stated that "as soon as we add the names of [the State officials], the court will clearly have additional jurisdiction under [Lain]." See State v. Lain, 162 Tex. 549, 349 S.W.2d 579, 581-82 (1961).
On September 20, 2007, Fleming filed his "Second Supplemental Petition and Partial Nonsuit," in which he nonsuited all parties except for the City and specifically named as the defendant "Jerry Patterson as Chairman of the School Land Board and as Commissioner of the General Land Office." That same day, the trial court held a hearing on Patterson's plea to the jurisdiction. Patterson offered the same evidence admitted on the State's behalf during the April 4, 2007 hearing. That evidence was admitted into the record of the September 20, 2007 hearing. Fleming did not introduce any evidence at this hearing.
On November 5, 2007, the trial court granted Patterson's plea to the jurisdiction. On January 30, 2008, the trial court granted the City's plea to the jurisdiction. Fleming appealed.
A plea to the jurisdiction challenges the court's subject-matter jurisdiction and comprises a question of law which we review de novo. See Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex. 2002); Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 54 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). A court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a governmental defendant when that defendant is immune from suit. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993).
To determine subject-matter jurisdiction, we begin with the pleadings. Tex. Dep't of Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). The plaintiff must plead facts affirmatively demonstrating the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d at 446. We are to construe the pleadings liberally, look to the pleader's intent, and accept the pleader's factual assertions as true. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226, 228. When the plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we resolve the jurisdictional facts by considering the evidence presented by the parties. Bland, 54 S.W.3d at 555.
When the evidence presented creates a fact issue, the plea to the jurisdiction must be denied and the fact question answered by the fact finder. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227-28. "[I]f the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law." Id. at 228. This standard is similar to that of a traditional motion for summary judgment. Id. "[A]fter the state asserts and supports with evidence that the trial court lacks subject[-]matter jurisdiction, we simply require the plaintiffs, when the facts underlying the merits and subject[-]matter jurisdiction are intertwined, to show that there is a disputed material fact regarding the jurisdictional issue." Id.
In his plea to the jurisdiction, Patterson argued that a suit against him as a government official is a suit against the State, and that, absent a waiver of sovereign immunity, the State, and therefore Patterson, is immune from Fleming's lawsuit. While we affirm the order of the trial court dismissing Patterson, due to the nature of the underlying lawsuit, we do not agree with Patterson's assertion.
The parties disagree as to the nature of Fleming's lawsuit: Fleming asserts that he is merely seeking a declaration that "the State of Texas and its lessee have no rights in the property . . .," and Patterson claims that the action is one of trespass to try title. We conclude that the action is a trespass to try title action under section 22.001(a) of the property code. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 22.001(a) (Vernon 2000).
In his original petition, Fleming sought declaratory relief3 and asked the trial court "to both try title and quiet title as appropriate to establish title to these lots . . . ." Fleming then concluded that the court "should grant all requested relief." Fleming continued to seek this relief through his first and second supplemental petitions. The Texas Legislature has mandated that "[a] trespass to try title action is the method of determining title to lands, tenements, or other real property." Id.; see Martin v. Amerman, 133 S.W.3d 262, 264-65 (Tex. 2004). Therefore, we conclude that Fleming's action is one of trespass to try title and not one merely seeking a declaratory judgment. See State v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 290 S.W.3d 345, 352, 361, 363 (Tex. App.-Austin 2009, pet. filed) () (citing Tex. A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 839-40 (Tex. 2007)).
Patterson argues that Fleming failed to demonstrate that sovereign immunity has been waived in trespass to try title suits brought against State officials acting in their official capacity. Fleming, however, asserts that under Lain, among other cases, sovereign immunity does not bar his claim against Patterson in his official capacity. See 349 S.W.2d at 581-82. Patterson attempts to rebut this argument by citing cases, including IT-Davy, which hold that a suit against a government official acting within the scope of his authority is a suit against the State. See 74 S.W.3d at 855-56. Patterson states that "if a State official asserts the State's title to such property, in the exercise of his discretion, then immunity bars the lawsuit and the plaintiff must go to the [l]egislature for permission to have the suit tried in court." We disagree with Patterson's interpretation of how the law applies in this specific case.
Our sister court, the Austin Court of Appeals, dealt with this same issue in BP Am. Prod. Co., 290 S.W.3d at 352, 354. In determining that sovereign immunity does not bar a trespass to try title claim against a governmental official acting in his official capacity, the Austin Court stated that Id. at 356-57 (internal citations omitted). We agree that Lain is still controlling precedent, and we must follow it here. See Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554, 565 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.) ("As an intermediate appellate court, we are not free to mold Texas law as we see fit but must instead follow the precedents of the Texas Supreme Court unless and until the high court overrules them or the Texas Legislature supersedes them by statute.").
The supreme court noted in Lain that "[w]hen suit for recovery of title to and possession of land, filed without legislative consent, is not against the state itself, but is against individuals only, the mere assertion by pleading that the defendants claim title or right of possession as officials of the state and on behalf of the state, will not bar prosecution of the suit." Lain, 349 S.W.2d at 582. This is so because:
[o]ne who takes possession of another's land without legal right is no less a trespasser because he is a state official or employee, and the owner should not be required to obtain legislative consent to institute a suit to oust him simply because he asserts a good faith but overzealous claim that title or right of possession is in the state and that he...
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