Fletcher v. Drath

• Decision Date: 31 October 1877
• Parties: FLETCHER, Trustee, &c., Appellant, v. DRATH.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

66 Mo. 126

FLETCHER, Trustee, &c., Appellant,

v.DRATH.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1877.

Appeal from Johnson Circuit Court.--HON. F. P. WRIGHT, Judge.

In this suit plaintiff claimed the possession of specific personal property. Henry M. Malone was, originally, the owner, and in possession of the property. Both parties claimed title directly from him; the plaintiff, as trustee, under a deed of trust, executed, to secure advances made and to be made to him, dated September 6th, 1871, and under authority from him, contained in an instrument of writing dated November 4th, 1871, to take possession of the property; the defendant, under a bill of sale, dated and executed March 18th, 1870, and possession of the property from that time until the commencement of the suit. To destroy the effect of the bill of sale under which defendant claimed, plaintiff offered in evidence a receipt for $1,800, dated April 27th, 1871, and signed by defendant, purporting to annul the bill of sale, and relinquish all rights to the property. Defendant claimed, however, that this receipt was fraudulently obtained by Malone. Other facts appear in the opinion of the court.

Graves & Wood for appellant.

1. Defendant is estopped from denying that the release or receipt is valid as to this plaintiff. It was his duty to know the contents thereof, and he cannot now be heard to plead his ignorance, so far as to injure this plaintiff who is an innocent party. Capital Bank v. Armstrong, 62 Mo. 67; Trigg v. Taylor, 27 Mo. 245.

Crittenden & Cockrell for respondent.

1. This court will not disturb a verdict after a refusal to grant a new trial on the ground that the evidence does not support the verdict, except in cases where gross wrong has been done. State v. Anderson, 19 Mo. 246; Price v. Evans, 49 Mo. 396; 3 Central Law Journal 752.

2. That possession is prima facie evidence of ownership, is one of the oldest principles of law. Law 5th of table 6, of the twelve tables of Roman law, provided that “In litigated cases the presumption shall always be on the side of the possessor.” Cooper's Justinian, page 660, (appendix); 60 Pa. St. 384.

3. Malone conveyed to plaintiff only such title as he possessed. Not being in possession, the maxim, caveat emptor, applies. Kent's Comm., Vol. 2, p. 608, side page 478; Cooper's Justinian, Lib. 2, Tit. 6, Sec. 2, p. 97: Spaulding v. Brewster, 50 Barb. 142.

NAPTON, J.

This suit depends solely on questions of fact, on which the evidence is very contradictory. There were two trials of the case, in the first of which the jury did not agree, and in the second a verdict was found for defendant.

The question was between two railroad contractors, as to the title to certain mules and wagons. These contractors had been in partnership in Kansas, and it was natural that the witnesses, who were teamsters for one or the other, should differ as to the question of possession. The jury was competent to decide this, where the evidence was conflicting, and they did so. It is not clear that this court could have determined the facts more correctly--but it is certain that this court will only review the finding of a jury, when the judge, presiding at the trial, has given improper instructions. Where no evidence is submitted, having any tendency to establish the plaintiff's case, the judge superintending the trial may give such directions as will necessarily lead to a non-suit. So far, his competency is recognized--but upon the weight of evidence submitted on both sides, the determination of the tribunal selected by the law to determine this, is conclusive. Juries are supposed to be the best tribunals to try questions of fact.

In this case, the only question of law submitted to the court, related to the validity of a paper signed by the defendant, Drath, resigning his title to the property in controversy to Malone, the grantor in the deed of trust, which, if genuine, would, of course, have had a material influence in the determination of the case for the plaintiff. The instruction given by the court, was as follows:

“If the jury believe, from the evidence, that prior to...