Fletcher v. Fletcher
| Citation | 447 Mich. 871,526 N.W.2d 889 |
| Decision Date | 30 December 1994 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 97232,No. 6,6 |
| Parties | John David FLETCHER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Debra Mae FLETCHER, Defendant-Appellee. Calendar |
| Court | Supreme Court of Michigan |
Marilyn A. Knak, Mount Clemens, for plaintiff-appellant.
Henry E. Sarnacki, Mount Clemens, for defendant-appellee.
Julie Kunce Field, Women and the Law Clinic, Ann Arbor, Elizabeth K. Bransdorfer, President, Women Lawyers Ass'n of Michigan, Lansing, for amicus curiae The University of Michigan.
Jerrold Schrotenboer, Ann Arbor, for amicus curiae Legal Services of Southeastern Michigan.
Lynn Pargo, Detroit, and Michael Robbins, Birmingham, for State Bar of Michigan, Family Law Council.
This is a child custody case in which the circuit court awarded the parties joint legal custody of their three minor children, with physical custody to the plaintiff father and liberal visitation to the defendant mother. The Court of Appeals reversed and awarded physical custody to the defendant. Because it did not correctly review this matter, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in so far as it relates to the standards of review applicable to child custody cases, and remand to circuit court for further proceedings.
The parties were married in 1975 and have three children. The plaintiff filed for divorce in 1990. Following extended hearings incident to the divorce proceeding, a referee recommended that physical custody of the children be awarded to the defendant.
The referee reached this conclusion after reviewing the statutory factors for determining the best interests of the children. See M.C.L. § 722.23; M.S.A. § 25.312(3). 1 Although the referee found that most of the factors were of neutral weight, he did find that factors b and c weighed slightly in favor of the defendant and factor f weighed slightly in favor of the plaintiff. The referee also indicated that he considered what the children had told him during private and separate interviews.
At the request of the plaintiff, the circuit court held a de novo hearing. After hearing the testimony of the parties, reviewing the evidentiary record made before the referee, and interviewing the two older children, the circuit court granted physical custody to the plaintiff. Although the circuit court judge found that most of the statutory factors were of neutral weight, he found that factors b, e, and f weighed slightly in favor of the plaintiff. The circuit court issued a December 6, 1991, custody order granting physical custody to the plaintiff and awarding the defendant liberal visitation rights, as well as joint legal custody.
The defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the custody determination, concluding that the circuit court had made clearly erroneous findings of fact with regard to factor f and had committed clear legal errors concerning factors b, e and f. 200 Mich.App. 505, 504 N.W.2d 684 (1993). Without discussing the remaining factors, the Court of Appeals further stated that upon de novo review it found the parties to be equal on all the statutory factors except factor i, which relates to the child's reasonable preference. On the basis of that factor, the Court of Appeals awarded custody to the defendant.
The plaintiff appealed to this Court.
We are asked to clarify the proper standard of review in child custody cases. We conclude that such cases are to be reviewed in accordance with § 8 of the Child Custody Act, which provides:
To expedite the resolution of a child custody dispute by prompt and final adjudication, all orders and judgments of the circuit court shall be affirmed on appeal unless the trial judge made findings of fact against the great weight of evidence or committed a palpable abuse of discretion or a clear legal error on a major issue. [M.C.L. § 722.28; M.S.A. § 25.312(8).]
By its terms, § 8 distinguishes among three types of findings and assigns standards of review to each. Findings of fact are to be reviewed under the "great weight" standard, discretionary rulings are to be reviewed for "abuse of discretion," and questions of law for "clear legal error."
As noted by the Court of Appeals, the review standards of the Child Custody Act differ from the standards that this Court has applied in alimony disputes and property disputes incident to divorce. However, unlike the Court of Appeals, we do not attempt to import or superimpose the standards applicable to property and alimony disputes into the legislatively prescribed standards applicable to custody disputes. We believe that the difference in standards comports with the fact that the interests at stake in a child custody dispute differ from those involved in a dispute over money or property.
The three standards of review enumerated in § 8 of the custody act are part of the Legislature's comprehensive effort to promote the best interests and welfare of children. By incorporating standards of review into the act, the Legislature apparently recognized that in custody cases the proceedings themselves may jeopardize a child's welfare. Because we believe that standards set forth in § 8 reasonably minimize the possibility of unwarranted and disruptive changes in custody, while at the same time enabling courts to pursue suitable custody arrangements, we adopt those standards as explained more fully herein.
The Child Custody Act provides that findings of fact in child custody cases are reviewed under the "great weight of evidence" standard. M.C.L. § 722.28; M.S.A. § 25.312(8). When the Legislature enacted the custody act it presumably used the phrase, "against the great weight of evidence," with knowledge of its existing meaning and with intent that the phrase maintain its existing meaning. In re Chamberlain Estate, 298 Mich. 278, 284, 299 N.W. 82 (1941). "Against the great weight of evidence" was defined by Murchie v. Standard Oil Co., 355 Mich. 550, 558, 94 N.W.2d 799 (1959). The Court explained that a reviewing court should not substitute its judgment on questions of fact unless they "clearly preponderate in the opposite direction." The court should review "the record in order to determine whether the verdict is so contrary to the great weight of the evidence as to disclose an unwarranted finding, or whether the verdict is so plainly a miscarriage of justice as to call for a new trial...." Id.
Although the great weight standard traditionally is applied in the context of granting and denying new trials, the Legislature's adoption of that standard for appellate review of child custody orders reasonably furthers its express intent to: "expedite the resolution of a child custody dispute by prompt and final adjudication...." M.C.L. § 722.28; M.S.A. § 25.312(8). In custody trials, the trial judge is the finder of fact. Thus, when an appellate court reviews a trial judge's findings, it acts as the functional equivalent of a trial judge reviewing the findings of a jury. Therefore, the great weight standard, which is the standard by which jury findings are reviewed, is also a logical standard by which to review findings of a trial judge. The great weight standard of review allows a meaningful yet deferential review by the Court of Appeals. A more deferential standard, such as "insufficient evidence" or "supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence," could effectively immunize the trial judge's fact finding in contravention of a child's best interests. 2 In the context of child custody cases, there are findings of ultimate facts, i.e., a finding regarding each factor, and there are findings of ordinary or evidentiary facts. The great weight of the evidence standard applies to all findings of fact. Thus, a trial court's findings on each factor should be affirmed unless the evidence "clearly preponderates in the opposite direction." Murchie, supra at 558, 94 N.W.2d 799.
Under the Child Custody Act, discretionary rulings are reviewed under a "palpable abuse of discretion" standard. M.C.L. § 722.28; M.S.A. § 25.312(8). Abuse of discretion was defined in Spalding v. Spalding, 355 Mich. 382, 384-385, 94 N.W.2d 810 (1959), as follows:
Where, as here, the exercise of discretion turns upon a factual determination made by the trier of the facts, an abuse of discretion involves far more than a difference in judicial opinion between the trial and appellate courts.... In order to have an "abuse" in reaching such determination, the result must be so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias.
Although defendant and amici curiae have suggested that this Court abandon the Spalding definition, at least in the context of custody disputes, the disposition of this case does not require such an outright rejection. 3 By using the word "palpable," the Legislature clearly contemplated a strict standard of review. Nevertheless, we do not agree with plaintiff that the Legislature's use of the word "palpable" should be construed as requiring an even stricter standard than Spalding--in essence, plaintiff proposes: palpability plus Spalding. A standard stricter than Spalding, as suggested by plaintiff, would effectively grant trial courts unfettered discretion over child custody matters and potentially jeopardize a child's best interests. Because we construe statutes in harmony with the spirit and intent of the act and in a manner that does not achieve absurd or unreasonable results, In re State Hwy. Comm., 383 Mich. 709, 714-715, 178 N.W.2d 923 (1970), we instead conclude that the Legislature's reference to "palpable," the same word this Court used in Spalding, manifests its intent to adopt a high standard of review not significantly unlike the Spalding standard.
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