Fletcher v. Fletcher
| Decision Date | 22 January 1952 |
| Docket Number | No. 34437,34437 |
| Citation | 244 P.2d 827,206 Okla. 481 |
| Parties | FLETCHER v. FLETCHER. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Where a husband purchases land with his own money and takes title thereto in the name of his wife, no trust arises in favor of the husband by reason thereof, in the lands standing in the name of the wife, but the presumption of law, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, is that an advancement or gift was intended.
2. When a husband, following a divorce, seeks to assert any claim to any part of his former wife's property, he must establish that right by the decree, or by a valid contract between himself and his former wife.
3. In an equitable action, this court will consider the whole record, weigh the evidence, and where the judgment of the trial court is clearly against the weight of the evidence, will render or cause to be rendered, such judgment as the trial court should have rendered.
Edward J. Fleming, Tulsa, for plaintiff in error.
The plaintiff in error, Julia V. Fletcher, brought this action as plaintiff against her former husband, John A. Fletcher, to quiet title to a house and lot in Tulsa, and to three oil royalty interests in LaFayette County, Arkansas. The defendant cross-petitioned, alleging the plaintiff held a half interest in such property in trust for his use and benefit and asked that such interest be set over to him and his title quieted. From a judgment for the defendant on such cross-petition the plaintiff appeals.
The legal title to all the property involved was in the plaintiff. The parties were married in 1915 and lived together as husband and wife until 1945. No children were born to the marriage but they had one adopted son who was fifteen years of age at the time of the separation. An uncontested decree of divorce was granted the husband in the circuit court of Barry County, Missouri, on June 25, 1946. In this decree no mention was made either of the property rights or of the custody of the child. The child remained with the mother.
The present litigation arises out of the property settlement between the parties prior to the divorce and their attempts at reconciliation after the settlement and before the divorce as well as their attempts at reconciliation after the divorce.
The defendant in his answer and cross-petition relied upon a written agreement dated July 29, 1945, admittedly drawn by the defendant and alleged to have been signed by both parties. The agreement recited the parties could not longer live together as husband and wife and that the plaintiff agreed to obtain a divorce by an uncontested suit in which the defendant was to sign a waiver. The purported agreement also recited that the adopted child should be in the custody of the plaintiff and that all property of the parties should be deeded to the plaintiff, to be retained and used by her until the child became self-supporting or reached the age of 18 years, at which time the property was to be divided one-half to the plaintiff and one-half to the defendant. It further provided that the personal property should be sold at public sale and the proceeds divided two-thirds to the plaintiff and one-third to the defendant, and that a one thousand dollar note receivable, as well as an automobile, should be the property of the plaintiff. The plaintiff denied that she signed such contract and denied any knowledge of the same or its contents. She admitted, however, that the signature did look like hers with the exception of some minor discrepancy and that if it was her signature to the instrument the same was obtained by the defendant by some artifice or trick and without her knowledge of the contents of the instrument. Admittedly the parties continued to live together as husband and wife until after a farm sale at the Missouri farm on September 6, 1945.
In his amended answer and cross-petition defendant admits this contract of July 29, was superseded by a later agreement made on August 23, 1945. On that date the parties met in an attorney's office in Cassville, Missouri, for the purpose of settling their property rights. A written property settlement was then entered into between them and pursuant to this property settlement all of the property not then in the name of the plaintiff was transferred to her except a 400 acre farm in Barry County, Missouri. She testified this written property settlement provided she was to have all of the property in her name or then transferred to her for her part, and that the Barry County, Missouri, farm was to go to the defendant as his part of the property. She denied there were any qualifications or exceptions to these conveyances and denied that any part of the property was to go to the defendant when the minor became self-supporting or reached the age of 18. She was supported in this testimony by the attorney who prepared the instrument. This testimony was disputed by the defendant who contended that the property settlement agreement then closely followed the instrument he had prepared on July 29th.
The conveyances executed on August 23, were promptly recorded, with the exception of an additional conveyance wherein the defendant conveyed the Barry County, Missouri, farm to the plaintiff. This conveyance was placed in an attorney's safe to be delivered to the defendant at his request. This last conveyance was apparently drawn and placed in the attorney's safe for the protection of the defendant in his property rights, if any trouble developed between him and a neighbor woman he planned to marry as soon as the divorce could be obtained from the plaintiff. The farm sale was held on September 6th, 1945, and the proceeds were about evenly divided between the parties. A few days later the parties came to the home of plaintiff's father, in Tulsa, and remained there for a few days. The farm was rented by the defendant to a tenant and the parties separated.
On November 28, 1945, plaintiff re-conveyed the Barry County farm to the defendant, at his request. On the same date the defendant commenced a divorce action against the plaintiff, in Tulsa County, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The defendant then moved to Kansas, and began living as husband and wife with the neighbor woman over whom the plaintiff and defendant had separated. Following this plaintiff filed suit in Barry County, Missouri, to recover the farm, alleging the reconveyance to the defendant had been procured by fraud, coercion and misrepresentation. During the negotiations for settlement of this suit the defendant admitted, in his own handwriting, that the settlement between the parties, claimed by the plaintiff, had been made and that his part of the property was to be the Barry County farm, which he agreed should be sold for $8,000.00, and the proceeds paid to him. On the 18th day of April, 1946, the defendant deeded the Barry County farm back to the plaintiff.
On June 25, 1946, the defendant obtained an uncontested decree of divorce from the plaintiff in ...
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