Fletcher v. State
| Decision Date | 18 January 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 79A02–1009–CR–1096.,79A02–1009–CR–1096. |
| Citation | 959 N.E.2d 922 |
| Parties | Corey FLETCHER, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Jason W. Bennett, Bennett Boehning & Clary LLP, Lafayette, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Ryan D. Johanningsmeier, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Corey Fletcher appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for discharge under Ind. Criminal Rule 4(B). Fletcher raises one issue which we revise and restate as whether the trial court improperly denied his motion. We reverse.
The relevant facts follow. On October 28, 2009, the State charged Fletcher with conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine as a class A felony, possession of methamphetamine as a class B felony, and possession of precursors with intent to manufacture methamphetamine as a class C felony. The State also alleged that Fletcher was an habitual substance offender.
On February 19, 2010, the court held an initial hearing at which Fletcher appeared in person, and the court appointed a public defender. The court also scheduled a jury trial for May 11, 2010. On February 26, 2010, the court appointed John Antalis as Special Public Defender. On March 2, 2010, the court entered an order indicating that it was advised that Antalis was unable to accept appointment as Special Public Defender and the court appointed Timothy Broden to represent Fletcher. That same day, Fletcher filed a pro se motion for fast and speedy trial. The motion stated: “Comes now defendant Corey Fletcher, pro se[,] public defender not yet assigned respectfully request [sic] a fast and speedy trial on the day of 2–29–2010.” Appellant's Appendix at 36. An entry in the chronological case summary (“CCS”) dated March 3, 2010, states: Id. at 9. On March 5, 2010, Broden filed an appearance form.
On March 15, 2010, the State filed a motion to strike Fletcher's motion for fast and speedy trial. The State argued that Fletcher was represented at the time that he filed his motion. The court set the matter for a status hearing on the State's motion to strike Fletcher's motion for March 26, 2010. On March 26, 2010, the parties agreed to schedule a hearing on the State's motion to strike for April 9, 2010. The CCS does not reflect a hearing on April 9, 2010. On April 19, 2010, the court held a status hearing and scheduled the matter for a telephone status conference for April 20, 2010, and Fletcher's attorney “object[ed] to resetting trial date past the May 11, 2010 jury trial date.” Id. at 8.
On May 12, 2010, Fletcher's attorney filed a motion for discharge pursuant to Ind. Criminal Rule 4(B). The motion stated that Fletcher “would show that more than seventy (70) days have elapsed since the filing of [his] pro se Motion for Speedy Trial on March 2, 2010 and no trial of the above entitled cause has been conducted.” Id. at 55. On June 9, 2010, the court held a hearing on Fletcher's motion for discharge and denied the motion.
After a trial, a jury found Fletcher guilty of conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine as a class A felony and possession of precursors with intent to manufacture methamphetamine as a class C felony, but not guilty of possession of methamphetamine. Fletcher waived a jury for the habitual offender phase, and the court found that he was an habitual substance offender and habitual offender. The court sentenced Fletcher to forty years for conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine as a class A felony. The court found that the charge of possession of precursors with intent to manufacture methamphetamine as a class C felony merged with the charge of conspiracy, and sentenced Fletcher to thirty additional years for being an habitual offender. The court suspended eight years of Fletcher's sentence for an aggregate sentence of seventy years with sixty-two years executed.
The issue is whether the trial court improperly denied Fletcher's motion for discharge under Ind. Criminal Rule 4(B). We review de novo a trial court's denial of a motion to discharge a defendant. Kirby v. State, 774 N.E.2d 523, 530 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Wilkins v. State, 901 N.E.2d 535, 537 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (citing Clark v. State, 659 N.E.2d 548, 551 (Ind.1995)), trans. denied. Ind. Criminal Rule 4(B)(1) provides, in pertinent part:
If any defendant held in jail on an indictment or an affidavit shall move for an early trial, he shall be discharged if not brought to trial within seventy (70) calendar days from the date of such motion, except where a continuance within said period is had on his motion, or the delay is otherwise caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient time to try him during such seventy (70) calendar days because of the congestion of the court calendar.
“The purpose served by Crim. R. 4(B) is to prevent a defendant from being detained in jail for more than 70 days after requesting an early trial.” Williams v. State, 631 N.E.2d 485, 486 (Ind.1994), reh'g denied. Restraint on liberty is one policy underlying Rule 4(B), but it is not the only policy. Poore v. State, 685 N.E.2d 36, 40 (Ind.1997). “There is also the anxiety and humiliation that can accompany public accusation.” Id. “These considerations are unrelated to whether the accused is incarcerated on other grounds at the time the speedy trial is demanded.” Id. “Equally importantly, a prompt trial enables a defendant to make his or her case before exculpatory evidence vanishes or becomes stale.” Id.
“The onus is on the State, not the defendant, to expedite prosecution.” Jackson v. State, 663 N.E.2d 766, 769 (Ind.1996). A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process. Id. A movant for an early trial must maintain a position which is reasonably consistent with the request that he has made. Wilburn v. State, 442 N.E.2d 1098, 1103 (Ind.1982). “[I]t is incumbent upon defendant to object at the earliest opportunity when his trial date is scheduled beyond the time limits prescribed by Ind. R.Crim. P. 4(B)(1).” Smith v. State, 477 N.E.2d 857, 861–862 (Ind.1985). “This requirement is enforced to enable the trial court to reset the trial date within the proper time period.” Dukes v. State, 661 N.E.2d 1263, 1266 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). “A defendant who permits the court, without objection, to set a trial date outside the 70–day limit is considered to have waived any speedy trial request.” Stephenson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 463, 488 (Ind.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1105, 122 S.Ct. 905, 151 L.Ed.2d 874 (2002).
Fletcher argues his counsel advocated for the motion at all appropriate times, objected to continuing the trial, and timely filed a motion for discharge when the permitted seventy days had elapsed. Fletcher acknowledges that the Indiana Supreme Court has stated that “once counsel was appointed, Defendant spoke to the court through counsel,” in Underwood v. State, 722 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ind.2000), reh'g denied, but argues that the Court in Underwood “had no need to distinguish between ‘appointment’ and ‘appearance,’ since none of the pro se pleadings in that case were filed in between those two events.” Appellant's Brief at 10–11. Fletcher also argues that because “ Underwood never draws, nor needed to draw, the distinction that language suggests, citing it for that purpose would simply take it out of context.” Id. at 11. Fletcher argues that “[f]orcing [him] to sit idly through incarceration while waiting for counsel to appear and file a speedy-trial motion on his behalf would serve no useful purpose....” Id. at 6. Fletcher also argues that his counsel had not yet filed an appearance at the time that he filed his motion for a fast and speedy trial and that “[t]he formal filing of an appearance is not just a technicality—it is a substantive event that changes the parties' rights and obligations as the case progresses.” Id. at 10. Fletcher contends that “the purposes of [Ind. Rule 4(B)] would be eviscerated if an indigent defendant must wait some indeterminate amount of time for appointed counsel to appear, before a court will acknowledge his bright-line right to be tried within 70 days of a written request.” Id. at 13.
Fletcher relies upon Jackson v. State, 663 N.E.2d 766 (Ind.1996). Fletcher acknowledges that in Jackson, “the pro se request was filed before the initial hearing; while here, it was filed after initial hearing and an order appointing counsel, but before any attorney had actually appeared on Mr. Fletcher's behalf.” Id. at 10. However, Fletcher argues that this difference is immaterial. Lastly, Fletcher contends that his motion for a fast and speedy trial was never struck.
The State argues that Fletcher “had appointed counsel when he filed his pro se speedy trial motion” and that “[a] represented defendant speaks to the court through his counsel, and a trial court is not required to respond to a defendant's pro se request or objection.” Appellee's Brief at 6–7 (citing Underwood, 722 N.E.2d at 832). The State argues that “[w]hen a defendant is represented by counsel, it is within the trial court's discretion to entertain or strike pro se motions.” Id. at 7 (citing Vance v. State, 620 N.E.2d 687, 689 (Ind.1993)). The State cites Jenkins v. State, 809 N.E.2d 361 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied, and argues that “this Court rejected Defendant's argument that a trial court cannot strike a pro se defendant's filing when counsel has been appointed but not yet appeared.” Id. The State also...
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