Flint Elec. Membership Corp. v. Ed Smith Const. Co., Inc., A97A2529

Decision Date15 December 1997
Docket NumberNo. A97A2529,A97A2529
Citation495 S.E.2d 136,229 Ga.App. 838
Parties, 98 FCDR 175 FLINT ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION v. ED SMITH CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Chambless, Higdon & Carson, Emmitte H. Griggs, Jon C. Wolfe, Joseph H. Davis, Macon, Daniel, Lawson, Tuggle & Jerles, Tom W. Daniel, Perry, for appellant.

Weissman, Nowack, Curry & Zaleon, Frances R. Mathis, Leigh M. Wilco, Atlanta, for appellee.

BIRDSONG, Presiding Judge.

Appellant Flint Electric Membership Corporation appeals from an order granting summary judgment in behalf of appellee/third party defendant Ed Smith Construction Company, Inc.

Suit was filed for damages for personal injury and loss of consortium by Edward and Patricia Lee against appellant Flint Electric who, contemporaneously with the filing of their answer, filed a third-party complaint against Ed Smith Construction Company relying upon the indemnity provisions of the "High-voltage Safety Act." See generally OCGA § 46-3-30 et seq. At the time of injury, Mr. Lee was an employee of appellee construction company. While the construction company was reconstructing a bridge and culvert, a crane being operated by one of its employees came in contact with a high voltage line of appellant electric company. Mr. Lee who was on the job at the time sustained an electrical shock when electricity from appellant's lines passed through the crane's cable into a bundle of steel bars that he was touching. Thereafter, Mr. Lee filed a workers' compensation claim against the construction company and was awarded some weekly and medical benefits until the self-insured workers' compensation program went into receivership.

Appellant's sole enumeration is that the trial court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment. Appellant contends that it was entitled to indemnity under the provisions of the High-voltage Safety Act and that such indemnity is not and should not be barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. Held:

OCGA § 46-3-40(b) of the High-voltage Safety Act pertinently provides: "Any person responsible for the work who violates the requirements of Code Section 46-3-33 [required conditions for commencing work within ten feet of high-voltage line] and whose subsequent activities within the vicinity of high-voltage lines result in ... injury or damage to person or property shall be strictly liable for said injury or damage. Any such person shall also indemnify the owner or operator of such high-voltage lines against all claims, if any, for personal injury, including death, property damage, or service interruptions, including costs incurred in defending any such claims resulting from work in violation of Code Section 46-3-33." Except as exempted under §§ 46-3-37 and 46-3-48, which sections are not here applicable, the term, " '[p]erson responsible for the work' means the person actually doing the work as well as any person, firm or corporation who employs and carries on his payroll any person actually doing the work." OCGA § 46-3-32(3). Although the above indemnity provisions are statutory, appellee construction company contends it cannot be subjected to suit, as a third party, in view of the exclusive remedy bar of the Workers' Compensation Act (OCGA § 34-9-11). OCGA § 34-9-11(a) pertinently provides: "The rights and the remedies granted to an employee by this chapter shall...

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5 cases
  • Steiner v. Handler
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • December 15, 1997
    ... ... and directors of Corporate Art International, Inc. (Corporate Art) and their wives, all of whom ... 835] of their co-defendants. Appellant enumerates three errors ... Ga.-Pacific Corp., 177 Ga.App. 852, 341 S.E.2d 499, found that ... ...
  • Flint Elec. Membership v. Ed Smith Const.
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • January 11, 1999
    ...of the WCA barred Flint's claim for indemnification under the HVSA. The Court of Appeals affirmed, Flint EMC v. Ed Smith Constr. Co., 229 Ga.App. 838, 495 S.E.2d 136 (1997), and we granted Flint's petition for certiorari to consider whether the exclusive remedy provision of the WCA preclude......
  • Georgia Power Co. v. Franco Remodeling Co.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 12, 1999
    ...Co.,1 270 Ga. 464, 466, 511 S.E.2d 160 (1999), our Supreme Court reversed this court's decision in Flint Elec. Membership Corp. v. Ed Smith Constr. Co., 229 Ga.App. 838, 495 S.E.2d 136 (1997), and determined that the indemnity provision of the High-voltage Safety Act could be enforced witho......
  • Georgia Power Co. v. FRANCO REMODELING, A98A0156.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • June 15, 1998
    ...controlled by City of Dalton v. Gene Rogers Constr. Co., 223 Ga.App. 819, 479 S.E.2d 171. See also Flint Elec. Membership Corp. v. Ed Smith Constr. Co., 229 Ga.App. 838, 495 S.E.2d 136 (1997); Preston v. Ga. Power Co., 227 Ga.App. 449, 452(1), 489 S.E.2d 573 (1997); compare Allen v. King Pl......
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