Flores v. State
| Decision Date | 17 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 212,123 |
| Parties | Rafael L. Flores, Appellant, v. State of Kansas, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appeal from Ford District Court; LAURA H. LEWIS, judge.
Peter J. Antosh, of Garcia &Antosh, LLP, of Dodge City, for appellant.
Natalie Chalmers, assistant solicitor general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before GREEN, P.J., ISHERWOOD, J., and MCANANY, S.J.
In October 1996, 14-year-old Rafael L. Flores fired several shots into a crowd, killing one person and wounding another. He pled no contest to first-degree felony murder and attempted voluntary manslaughter in July 1997. For the felony murder conviction, the district court sentenced him, as an adult, to a mandatory life sentence with parole eligibility after 15 years. For the attempted voluntary manslaughter charge, the district court sentenced him to the aggravated 34-month jail sentence, to run consecutive to his life sentence. The district court also imposed lifetime postrelease supervision. Flores appealed and the Kansas Supreme Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Over 20 years later, Flores now challenges the legality of his convictions by filing a K.S.A. 60 1507 motion. The district court summarily denied Flores' motion. Flores timely appeals. Because Flores fails to successfully argue an extension of the one-year statute of limitations will prevent manifest injustice, the summary denial of his motion is affirmed. And because this court may raise an illegal sentence issue sua sponte, we vacate the lifetime postrelease supervision provision of Flores' sentence.
In July 1997, Flores pled no contest to first-degree felony murder an off-grid person felony, and attempted voluntary manslaughter for crimes he committed as a juvenile in October 1996. In October 1997, the district court sentenced Flores as an adult to a life sentence with parole eligibility after 15 years with a consecutive 34-month prison sentence. The district court also ordered lifetime postrelease supervision.
Flores has filed many appeals in conjunction with his case State v. Flores, 268 Kan. 657, 999 P.2d 919 (2000) (challenged sentence and court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction to review a "presumptive sentence"); State v. Flores, 283 Kan. 380, 153 P.3d 506 (2007) (motion to correct illegal sentence); State v Flores, 292 Kan. 257, 252 P.3d 570 (2011) (); and Flores v. State, No. 120, 711 (order dated March 28, 2019) (unpublished) (dismissal of writ of habeas corpus under K.S.A. 601501).
Flores filed a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion in December 2019, 19 years after his case became final. Flores' K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, liberally construed, raised two issues: (1) in State v. Ross, 295 Kan. 1126, 289 P.3d 76 (2012), the Kansas Supreme Court overruled the mechanism which allowed for the dismissal of Flores' direct appeal, rendering that dismissal erroneous; and (2) Flores' mandatory life sentence, imposed when he was a juvenile, is unconstitutional. In trying to provide an adequate legal foundation for his claims, Flores directed the court to various decisions from both the United States and Kansas Supreme Courts, the statutory right to appeal under Kansas law, and the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In his argument to extend the one-year statute of limitations, Flores argued that the relevant legal authority was unavailable to him at the time of his direct appeal and that extension of the time limit would prevent a manifest injustice.
The district court summarily denied Flores' motion and outlined its findings in a written order. It first found that manifest injustice would not occur if it declined to extend the one-year statute of limitations for Flores to bring his motion. The court observed that Flores had appealed to the Kansas Supreme Court on three separate occasions. Therefore, he had ample opportunity to raise all issues of which he was aware or should have been aware.
The court also touched upon the merits of Flores' issues. It found that the cases he cited as relevant to his claims were so factually distinguishable from his case that they did not control its resolution. The court specifically stated that Ross was inapplicable because it analyzed whether an illegal sentence arose when a sentencing court failed to impose a defined duration of postrelease supervision, a matter not at issue in Flores' case. The judge determined she was unable to sufficiently address Flores' broad references to his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution because he failed to specify a particular point or set forth any evidence for the court to review.
Flores timely appeals.
Summary Denial of Flores' K.S.A. 60-1507 Motion was Appropriate.
On appeal, Flores argues that the district court erred in concluding that: (1) the cited caselaw was inapplicable to his case; (2) his motion was time-barred; (3) Flores' arguments were precluded by waiver or res judicata; and (4) his arguments lacked sufficient specificity. The State argues Flores' motion is both time-barred and successive. It forgoes analysis on those assertions, however, and substantively, stands solely on its assertion that Flores' motion fails on the merits.
To be entitled to relief under K.S.A. 60-1507, the movant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence either: (1) "the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction" (2) "the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or is otherwise open to collateral attack"; or (3) "there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(b); Supreme Court Rule 183(g) (2021 Kan. S.Ct. R. 239).
A district court has three options when handling a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion:
" White v. State, 308 Kan. 491, 504, 421 P.3d 718 (2018).
The standard of review turns on which of these options a district court used. White, 308 Kan. at 504. When the district court summarily denies a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, an appellate court conducts de novo review to determine whether the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively establish that the movant is not entitled to relief. Beauclair v. State, 308 Kan. 284, 293, 419 P.3d 1180 (2018).
To avoid summary denial of his or her motion, a movant bears the burden of establishing that an evidentiary hearing is warranted. To meet this burden, a movant's contentions must be more than conclusory, and either the movant must set forth an evidentiary basis to support those contentions or that basis must be evident from the record. If a movant succeeds in making such a showing, the court must hold a hearing unless the motion is a "'second'" or "'successive'" motion seeking similar relief. Sola-Morales v. State, 300 Kan. 875, 881, 335 P.3d 1162 (2014) (quoting Holmes v. State, 292 Kan. 271, 274, 252 P.3d 573 [2011]); see also Littlejohn v. State, 310 Kan. 439, Syl., 447 P.3d 375 (2019) ("An inmate filing a second or successive motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 must show exceptional circumstances to avoid having the motion dismissed as an abuse of remedy.").
In order for a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion to be considered timely filed, the movant must file the motion within one year of either (1) "the final order of the last appellate court in this state to exercise jurisdiction on a direct appeal or the termination of such appellate jurisdiction"; or (2) "the denial of a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States supreme court or issuance of such court's final order following granting such petition." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(f)(1). The district court may extend the one-year time limitation for bringing an action under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(f)(1) only to prevent manifest injustice. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2). A movant who files a motion outside the one-year time limitation and fails to affirmatively assert manifest injustice is procedurally barred from maintaining the action. State v. Trotter, 296 Kan. 898, 905, 295 P.3d 1039 (2013).
Courts are to dismiss a motion as untimely filed if, after inspection of the motion, files, and records of the case, the court determines that the time limitations have been exceeded and that dismissing the motion would not result in manifest injustice. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-1507(f)(3).
When a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence presents a substantial question of law or triable issue of fact, it triggers the second option, and the court must appoint counsel to represent an indigent movant. Rule 183(i). Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. State v. Andrews, 228 Kan. 368, 370, 614 P.2d 447 (1980). But a pro se movant still bears the burden to allege facts sufficient to warrant a hearing and "mere conclusions of the defendant or movant are not sufficient to raise a substantial issue of fact when no factual basis is alleged or appears from the record." State v. Jackson, 255 Kan. 455, 463, 874 P.2d 1138 (1994).
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