Florida Cent. & P.R. Co. v. Williams

• Decision Date: 14 April 1896
• Parties: FLORIDA CENT & P. R. CO. v. WILLIAMS.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

20 So. 558

37 Fla. 406

FLORIDA CENT & P. R. CO. v. WILLIAMS.

Florida Supreme Court

April 14, 1896

Appeal from circuit court, Alachua county; J. J. Finley, Judge.

Action by Edward Williams against the Florida Central & Peninsular Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. Where steam railroads are laid and operated along or across the streets of populous towns or communities, where numerous people of all conditions and descriptions are aggregated, or likely to be, it is their duty to operate the dangerous implements used by them with the utmost degree of care strictly commensurate with the circumstances by which they are there surrounded, in order to avoid injury to others. But, while it is thus the duty of such companies to guard against injury to others with the utmost caution, care, and vigilance, there is at the same time a mutual obligation resting upon the public, and each and every of them, in the presence of such dangerous surroundings, to exercise such a degree of care, caution, and vigilance for their own safety as is commensurate with the known dangers there present.

2. It is gross negligence in a blind man to expose himself alone and unattended in any situation where he knows that the faculty of sight is absolutely necessary to the safety of life and limb.

3. The blind have as much right to frequent railroad depots, public crossings, and other places of danger as any other of the general public; but, when they do so, due care dictates that they must provide themselves with such surroundings while there as are reasonably necessary to avoid upon their part all the known dangers that encompass the place.

4. In an action for an injury occasioned by the alleged negligence of the defendant, the negligence, if any, of either plaintiff or defendant, is to be measured by the condition of things at the place where the accident took place, as they were known to exist by each of the parties at the time the acts of each are complained of as being negligent.

5. Though the defendant may be guilty of some negligence at the time of the accident, yet, in order to justify a recovery, it must be made to appear that the particular negligence of which it was at the time guilty was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.

6. From the Code of the State of Georgia our legislature has adopted the following, as section 1, c. 3744, Laws approved June 7 1887: 'That no person shall recover damages from a railroad company for injury to himself or his property when the same is done by his own consent, or is caused by his own negligence. If the complainant and the agents of the company are both at fault, the former may recover, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury trying the case in proportion to the amount of default attributable to him.' Its effect is to abrogate in Florida the old rule prevailing almost universally elsewhere, that wholly relieved the defendant from all liability when contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff was shown, and introduces here the modern doctrine of comparative negligence, by which the contributory negligence of the plaintiff does not wholly relieve the defendant from liability, but entitles him to a credit only in reduction of the amount of his liability. The judges, in giving this statute in charge, should instruct the juries that, in making the apportionment between the plaintiff's and defendant's negligence, they should not take into consideration any negligence of either of the parties that did not directly or proximately contribute to the bringing about of the injury complained of.

7. The judge should never give an affirmative charge directing a verdict for the defendant that is tantamount to an order sustaining a demurrer to the evidence, unless it is clear that there is no evidence whatever adduced that could in law support a verdict. If the evidence is conflicting, or will admit of different reasonable inferences, or if there is evidence tending to prove the issue, the case should be submitted to the jury for their finding on the facts, and not taken from them to be passed upon by the judge as a question of law.

8. The engineer in charge of a railroad locomotive has the right to presume that an adult person whom he sees upon or beside the track ahead of his approaching engine is in possession of his faculties, and that he will obey the instinctive law of self-preservation by getting off the track if already on it or that he will not get on it if already off; and in such case it would not be negligence on the engineer's part if he failed to attempt to stop his engine, unless he knew the party, and that he labored under some disability that prevented him from knowing of his danger, or that would prevent his getting or keeping out of the way, or unless he sees evidence of such disability from the party's actions or appearance, or that he cannot or will not get or keep out of the way.

COUNSEL

[FLORIDA CENT & PR CO V WILLIAMS 20 So. 558(1896)]

John A. Henderson and W. W. Hampton, for appellant.

S. Y. Finley, for appellee.

OPINION

TAYLOR, J.

Edward Williams, the appellee, sued the appellant in case for personal injuries received in being run over by one of the defendant's engines, and recovered judgment for $500 from which the defendant appeals.

The declaration, in substance, alleges that on the 6th day of January, 1890, while the plaintiff was upon and going along a highway within the corporate limits of the town of Gainesville, in Alachua county, at and near the place where the defendant's railroad crosses two other railroads, the Savannah, Florida & Western Railway and the Florida Southern Railway, and at and within the depot limits of said two last-named roads in said town, the defendant, through its servants and agents, was then and there driving and running a locomotive engine and train of cars on and along the said road, at and near the crossing aforesaid, within the limits of the public depot aforesaid, and within the corporate limits of said town, and, in so doing, failed to ring the bell or sound the whistle, or to give any other notice or warning of its movements; that plaintiff was totally blind, and entirely dependent upon his sense of hearing for safety; that, with all care and diligence, he was then and there in the act of going across the defendant's road at the said street crossing, and the defendant then and there so carelessly, improperly, and wrongfully drove and managed the said engine that it ran against and struck the plaintiff, throwing him with great violence upon the ground, and greatly bruised, hurt, and wounded him, crushing one of his feet so that the same had to be amputated, rendering him, when coupled with his blindness, wholly helpless for life, and whereby he suffered great pain, injury, and damage. The defendant pleaded the general issue of not guilty.

At the trial, the proof showed that the accident happened at or within a few feet of the point where the defendant's roadway crosses the tracts of two other railroads, the Savannah, Florida & Western Railway and the Florida Southern Railway, all of which tracts, with their sidings, cross each other in a network of rails near the center of where two public streets of the town of Gainesville cross each other and which crossing is within the depot yard limits of the three railroads, and is a place much frequented by the people of the town; that engines, trains, and cars are continuously switching and moving over these tracks of the three roads, during almost every hour of the day; that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was totally blind, and had been so for several years; that he was struck by the tender of an engine of the defendant that was engaged in switching out [FLORIDA CENT & PR CO V WILLIAMS 20 So. 558(1896)] cars, and that was running backward at the very slow rate of about two miles per hour; that the exact place where he was struck was the usual public street crossing over the tracks of the defendant's road for persons coming from or going to the depots of the Florida Southern Railway and the Savannah, Florida & Western Railway. There is no proof that the plaintiff had any one with him to guide him, but, from the proofs, he seems to have been making his way alone. It is evident from the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses that he attempted to cross over the defendant's track immediately in front of the moving tender, and was struck by the tender as soon as he got on the track, which threw him off, and over on the track of the Savannah, Florida & Western Railway, where he began rolling around on the tracks, and, according to one witness, would have rolled immediately under the engine if the witness had not run to and pulled him away. He received some scalp wounds about the head, and had one foot mangled so that it had to be partially amputated. There is some conflict in the proofs as to the giving of signals by the engine; the plaintiff's witnesses swearing that no bell was being rung on the engine or whistle sounding immediately at the time of the accident, but that the bell had been ringing, but was stopped when the engine was about 30 or 40 yards off from where it struck the plaintiff. The proof is conflicting, also, as to whether the engineer in charge of the engine was keeping a lookout in the direction that he was going at the time of the accident; one of the plaintiff's witnesses swearing that the engineer at the time was looking in the opposite direction, and that no one was on the lookout; while the engineer himself swears that he was vigilantly looking in the direction he was backing his engine, and, besides, had a brakeman ahead of him on the ground, at a switch...