Florida Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cox

• Decision Date: 26 October 2006
• Docket Number: No. 1D05-4111.,1D05-4111.
• Citation: 943 So.2d 823
• Parties: FLORIDA FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE CO., Appellant, v. Eugene A. COX and Debra Cox, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

943 So.2d 823

FLORIDA FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE CO., Appellant, v. Eugene A. COX and Debra Cox, Appellees.

No. 1D05-4111.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

October 26, 2006.

Order Granting Certification December 15, 2006.

Rehearing Denied December 15, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Mark J. Upton, Esquire of Daniell, Upton, Perry & Morris, P.C., Daphne, AL, for Appellant.

Gregory M. Shoemaker, Esquire of Schofield, Wade, Roane & Shoemaker, P.A., Pensacola and Louis K. Rosenbloum, Esquire of Louis K. Rosenbloum, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellees.

Charles F. Beall, Jr., Esquire of Moore, Hill & Westmoreland, P.A., Pensacola, for Amicus Curiae Helping Hands Legal Center.

BENTON, J.

Called upon to construe the 2004 version of Florida's Valued Policy Law (VPL or Law), the version in existence when Eugene A. and Debra Cox contracted with Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company (Farm Bureau) for homeowners' insurance, we give the statutory language literal effect, and affirm the judgment entered in favor of the Coxes on the pleadings below. We hold the VPL forecloses an insurer's challenge to the measure of damages in the event of a total loss. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Redding, 47 Fla. 228, 37 So. 62, 65 (1904).

On October 16, 2004, Hurricane Ivan left the Coxes' home in Santa Rosa County, which the policy valued at $65,000.00, a total loss. Wind and water both contributed. Farm Bureau alleged in its complaint for declaratory judgment that the loss was caused primarily by flooding. The Coxes counterclaimed for policy limits. The VPL provides that, when there is a total loss of a structure which is insured "as to a covered peril, . . . the insurer's liability, if any," is in the amount for which the property was insured. § 627.702(1), Fla. Stat. (2004).

I.

At the outset, we note that the current Valued Policy Law differs dramatically from the earlier version that controls here, and that the Legislature explicitly provided that the amended Law would not apply retroactively.¹ If the power the Florida Constitution assigns to the Legislature were ours instead, considerations like ease of actuarial analysis, the economics of the insurance industry, and even our own notions of fairness might well lead us to an interpretation of the 2004 statute not unlike what the statute has required since it was significantly revised in 2005. But reaching such a result in the face of the previous (and controlling) statutory language would violate our state's organic law, which commands us to refrain from exercising the powers of another branch of government. Art. II, 3, Fla. Const.

Judicial restraint requires us to defer to the Legislature's broad power to enact substantive law in conformity with the state and federal constitutions, even if we are persuaded that a particular law may have negative consequences. In construing statutes, we must hew as closely as possible to the statutory language. As Justice Scalia has written, we are bound by the "objective indication of the words, rather than the intent of the legislature," understood in some amorphous sense discoverable apart from the words themselves. See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 29 (Amy Gutmann, ed. 1997). Therefore, we hold that the insurer here is liable for the total loss under the 2004 Valued Policy Law. In so holding, we express no opinion regarding the merits either of the 2004 or of the 2005 version of the statute, matters which are properly for the Legislature, not the courts, in the absence of any constitutional challenge.

II.

Neither version of the VPL applies unless insured property is a total loss. In this narrow class of cases, however, plain language in the 2004 version of the statute makes the insurer liable, if at all, then in the full amount for which the property was insured. "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of words. . . ." Anderson v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 485 So.2d 849, 851-52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (quoting Fla. State Racing Comm'n v. Bourquardez, 42 So.2d 87, 88 (Fla.1949)). The operative language in the VPL is this:

In the event of the total loss of any . . . structure . . . insured by any insurer as to a covered peril, . . . the insurer's liability, if any, under the policy for such total loss shall be in the amount of money for which such property was so insured as specified in the policy and for which a premium has been charged and paid.

§ 627.702(1), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis supplied). (The statute does not address any question concerning insurers' subrogation rights.) Nothing in the VPL reduces the insurer's liability to the insured when multiple perils contribute to the total loss of insured property. The VPL continues to operate as a liquidated damages provision. See Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Kirkland, 490 So.2d 149, 153 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (stating the VPL "valu[es] the loss in the nature of liquidated damages").

This is what the trial court ruled in the present case, relying on the Fourth District's decision in Mierzwa v. Florida Windstorm Underwriting Association, 877 So.2d 774 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), where the Fourth District characterized the VPL as "simple and straightforward":

The meaning of the VPL is simple and straightforward. There are two essentials in the statute. The first is that the building be "insured by [an] insurer as to a [e.s.] covered peril." § 627.702(1). The second is that the building be a total loss. If these two facts are true, the VPL mandates that the carrier is liable to the owner for the face amount of the policy, no matter what other facts are involved as to the cost of repairs or replacement. That is to say, if the insurance carrier has any liability at all to the owner for a building damaged by a covered peril and deemed a total loss, that liability is for the face amount of the policy.

Id. at 775-76. The Mierzwa court pointed out that the Legislature used the indefinite article "a" before "covered peril" rather than "the," and concluded that the use of "a" contemplates multiple perils. Id. at 776. Nothing in the statutory language limits the VPL's application to cases in which a solitary covered peril is the sole cause of the loss. The Law calls for more than partial payment in the event of total loss.

If an insurer has any obligation under the policy to pay on account of a covered peril, and the structure is a total loss, then the insurer is responsible for paying the total amount of the policy. The statute provides that the insurer's "liability" "if any" is in the amount for which the property is insured. § 627.702(1), Fla. Stat. (2004). "Liability" means "legal responsibility to another" or the "state of being legally obligated or accountable." Black's Law Dictionary 925 (7th ed.1999). "Liable" is defined as "legally obligated." Id. at 927. "If any" in the VPL means "if there is any obligation to indemnify for loss attributable to the covered peril." Subsection one stands in contrast to subsection two, which provides that the "insurer's liability, if any" in "the case of a partial loss" "shall be for the actual amount of such loss but shall not exceed the amount of insurance specified in the policy as to such property and such peril." § 627.702(2), Fla. Stat. (2004). The insurer's responsibility to pay the full amount of the policy is triggered when a total loss occurs and the insurer has "any" liability for a covered peril.

At issue in the present case is nothing more or less than whether courts should give this unambiguous statutory directive effect. We recently said:

"`[T]his court is without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. To do so would be an abrogation of legislative power.' Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Fla. v. Williams, 212 So.2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)." Beshore v. Dep't of Fin. Servs., [928 So.2d 411, 413 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)]. "`It is a settled rule of statutory construction that unambiguous language is not subject to judicial construction, however wise it may seem to alter the plain language. . . . We trust that if the legislature did not intend the result mandated by the statute's plain language, the legislature itself will amend the statute at the next opportunity.'" [Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs. v. McKim, 869 So.2d at 760, 762 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)] (quoting State v. Jett, 626 So.2d 691, 692 (Fla.1993)).

Atlantis at Perdido Ass'n, Inc. v. Warner, 932 So.2d 1206, 1212-13 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). We reaffirm our recently restated commitment to these fundamental principles, and acknowledge that our limited role in the constitutional scheme leaves statutory amendment to the Legislature.

When the statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will not look behind the statute's plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent. In such instance, the statute's plain and ordinary meaning must control, unless this leads to an unreasonable result or a result clearly contrary to legislative intent. When the statutory language is clear, "courts have no occasion to resort to rules of construction — they must read the statute as written, for to do otherwise would constitute an abrogation of legislative power." Nicoll v. Baker, 668 So.2d 989, 990-91 (Fla.1996).

Koile v. State, 934 So.2d 1226, 1230-31 (Fla.2006) (quoting Daniels v. Fla. Dep't of Health, 898 So.2d 61, 64-65 (Fla.2005)) (internal citations omitted). To fail to "read the statute as written," the majority would unconstitutionally appropriate "legislative power" to this court. Id.

III.

When the Legislature amended the VPL in the wake of the Mierzwa decision, it produced a very different statute, deleting the words "if any" and adding new language:

In the event of the total loss of any . . . structure . . . insured by any insurer as to a covered peril,...