Florida Greyhound Lines v. Jones
| Decision Date | 01 August 1952 |
| Citation | 60 So.2d 396 |
| Parties | FLORIDA GREYHOUND LINES, Inc. v. JONES et al. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Knight, Smith & Underwood and Blackwell, Walker & Gray, Miami, for appellant.
Nichols, Gaither & Green, Miami, for appellees.
This was an action to recover for damages alleged to have been suffered by a husband and wife as a result of the negligent operation of a bus which rammed the rear end of the car in which the appellees were traveling.
Appellant urges most strongly that the trial was so conducted that it could not have been fair and impartial. Their criticisms and complaints are presented in eight questions, seven of which we will undertake to answer.
First, it is contended that harmful reversible error was committed at the time an expert medical witness, Dr. Kuckku, was testifying in appellees' behalf. He was asked by counsel for the appellant if there had not been a substitution of appellees' attorneys at his request, to which he replied in the negative. He was then asked if this had not been done upon his suggestion. Before he answered the second question an objection was interposed, and the judge without ruling demanded the purpose of the inquiry. Appellant's lawyer explained that the witness was being examined in this way in order to determine 'whether or not he was concerned with trying to help the plaintiffs' [appellees'] lawsuit.' The attorney for appellees again objected, whereupon the court remarked: The judge then told counsel, whose questions had precipitated these remarks, that he was entitled to a broad cross-examination but that 'at this state there is no basis for it, * * *' meaning, apparently, any challenge of the witness' professional conduct.
We must confess that we do not understand why the allusion to the physician's behavior was made, and we cannot reconcile the apparent disapproval of the question in the first place with an assurance, in the second place, that counsel could not only conduct an extensive examination, but could 'develop anything which you wish to develop along any line, including this one * * *.' (Italics ours.) He was then referring to the concern of the witness for the success of appellees' case.
The original question seems to have been quite proper as an answer would have shown whether the doctor had taken an interest in the appellees' cause; whether he was so concerned that he had even suggested the employment of different attorneys.
The appellant thinks that the court's comment was a recommendation of the witness' credibility. As we construe it, no such thought was conveyed, but only the judge's idea that at the particular time there was no reason to believe that this medical witness, or any other, had violated the ancient Hippocratic oath, the physician's creed. What there was in the colloquy among lawyers and judge to suggest an instruction to the jury on the matter we cannot say. Although we think the remarks were ill-timed, we are not convinced that they could be interpreted, when viewed in the light of all that occurred at the time, as an imprimatur by the judge of the testimony the witness had given and was to give.
The appellant also feels that an injustice was done it when the judge permitted an investigator, employed by the appellees' attorneys, to sit at the counsel table. We agree with the trial judge that this was a discretionary matter, and we have been shown nothing to indicate an abuse of that discretion or any harm to appellant as distinguished from a probable advantage to appellees from having immediately available such advice and information as the investigator was prepared to offer.
The next challenge to the propriety of the proceeding is based on the court's permitting 'THE APPEARANCE OF THE APPELLEE, ANNA JONES, BEFORE THE JURY, WHEN SHE WAS ON A STRETCHER AND, APPARENTLY, IN A WEAK, SICKENED AND STUPIFIED CONDITION AND ATTENDED BY A NURSE AND A HOSPITAL ATTENDANT.' The quotation is taken from the appellant's brief.
We think this point is wholly without merit. One who institutes an...
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In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc.
...clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such a derivative right has been recognized by several courts. See, e.g., Florida Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Jones, 60 So.2d 396 (Fla.1952) (plaintiff on stretcher has right to be present); Carlisle v. Nassau, 64 App. Div.2d 15, 408 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1978) (par......
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Cary by and through Cary v. Oneok, Inc.
...727 F.2d 1100 (1983) (severely injured passenger was entitled to be present at the liability phase of his trial); Florida Greyhound Lines v. Jones, 60 So.2d 396 (Fla.1952) (woman on a stretcher had a right to be present at her ¶12 Regardless of their approach, courts agree on two points: (1......
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...Telephone & Telegraph Co., 203 So.2d 508 (Fla.App.1967), cert. denied, 210 So.2d 223 (Fla.1968), and Florida Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Jones, 60 So.2d 396 (Fla.1952), the Helminski court held that "a plaintiff's physical condition alone does not warrant his exclusion from the courtroom durin......
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Kesterson v. Jarrett
...he happened to be unsightly from injuries which he was trying to prove the defendant negligently caused.Florida Greyhound Lines v. Jones, 60 So.2d 396, 397 (Fla.1952). Under the law of the land and the ambit of our Constitution, a person does not sacrifice her “right to prosecute ... in per......
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Trial Preparation
...may never be a valid basis to exclude him from any portion of the trial. Justice Titone cited Florida Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Jones , 60 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1952), which stated: One who institutes an action is entitled to be present when it is tried. That, we think, is a right that should not ......