Florida League of Cities v. Smith, 80489

• Decision Date: 29 October 1992
• Docket Number: No. 80489,80489
• Citation: 607 So.2d 397
• Parties: 17 Fla. L. Week. S665 FLORIDA LEAGUE OF CITIES, et al., Petitioners, v. Jim SMITH, etc., Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 397

607 So.2d 397

17 Fla. L. Week. S665

FLORIDA LEAGUE OF CITIES, et al., Petitioners, v. Jim SMITH, etc., Respondent.

No. 80489.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Oct. 29, 1992.

Irwin J. Block, Ross A. McVoy and Benjamin K. Phipps, Fine, Jacobson, Schwartz, Nash & Block, and Jane C. Hayman, Deputy Gen. Counsel and Nancy Stuparich, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Florida League of Cities, Inc., Tallahassee, for petitioners.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Richard E. Doran, Asst. Deputy Atty. Gen. and Louis F. Hubener, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.

Theodore L. Tripp, Jr., Garvin & Tripp, P.A., Fort Myers, amicus curiae, for Save Our Homes, Inc.

Joseph W. Little, Gainesville, amicus curiae, for David Biddulph and Tax Cap Foundation, Inc.

KOGAN, Justice.

The Florida League of Cities and Florida Association of Counties petition this Court for writ of mandamus directing that respondent Jim Smith, the Florida Secretary of State and chief elections officer, remove from the November ballot proposed constitutional amendment 10. We have original jurisdiction. Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(8), Fla. Const.

The facts regarding the proposed amendment at issue today are recited in this Court's earlier advisory opinion issued pursuant to article IV, section 10 of the Florida Constitution, and section 16.061, Florida Statutes (1991). In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General--Homestead Valuation Limitation, 581 So.2d 586 (Fla.1991). In that proceeding, we expressed our opinion that the proposed amendment did not violate the single subject requirement of the Constitution, and likewise did not contain a ballot summary that failed to adequately advise voters of the amendment's effect. Id. at 588 (citing Askew v. Firestone, 421 So.2d 151, 155 (Fla.1982)).

Petitioners now call to our attention an issue not addressed in our prior opinion. They note that article VII, subsection 6(d) of the Florida Constitution contains a provision that could be interpreted as repealing part of Florida's homestead exemption if the present amendment is approved by the voters in November. The repealer would take effect "on the effective date of any amendment to section 4 [of article VII] which provides for the assessment of homestead property at a specified percentage of its just value." Art. VII, Sec. 6(d), Fla. Const. The present amendment affects section 4, ¹ attempts to limit assessments, and thus could be construed as triggering the repealer.

The existing homestead exemption generally reduces a homeowner's property taxes by rendering a portion of the total assessment exempt from taxation. Three relevant exemptions exist. Article VII, subsection 6(a) of the Florida Constitution exempts the first $5,000 of the assessment from taxation for all purposes. Article VII, subsection 6(c) exempts an additional $20,000 from taxation solely for tax levies of school districts. Article VII, subsection 6(d) exempts an additional $20,000 from taxation for all taxing authorities other than school districts.

Only subsection 6(d) is subject to the repealer quoted above. Thus, if the repealer is activated by the proposed amendment, it will have the effect of eliminating $20,000 of the homestead tax exemption for all purposes except school-district taxation. Obviously, such a change in the existing law has sweeping ramifications for taxpayers and local governments. It also is obvious that the ballot summary we previously approved makes no reference whatsoever to the repealer. ²

Initially, we must address the question of whether our earlier advisory proceeding precludes us from considering the present cause. It is true that article IV, section 10 and article V, subsection 3(b)(10) are silent as to whether the advisory proceeding raises a procedural bar or otherwise deprives this Court of jurisdiction over the present case. Thus, an ambiguity exists requiring judicial construction.

When those provisions were under consideration before the 1986 Legislature, the accompanying legislative staff summaries stated a belief that any advisory opinion regarding initiative petitions would not be binding precedent ³ and would only constitute persuasive authority as to any other adversarial legal challenge that might later be raised. Staff of Fla.H.R.Comm. on Judiciary, CS/HJR 71 (1986), Staff Analysis 2 (March 6, 1986) (available from Fla.Div. of Archives); Staff of Fla.H.R.Comm. on Judiciary, PCS/HJR 71 (1986), Staff Analysis 2 (Feb. 18, 1986) (available from Fla.Div. of Archives). ⁴ This necessarily implies that other legal challenges would continue to be permissible under existing precedent; and our precedent clearly holds that a petition for mandamus is an appropriate method for challenging an allegedly defective proposed amendment to the Constitution. E.g., Askew; Smith v. American Airlines, Inc., 606 So.2d 618 (Fla.1992).

We emphasize, however, that relitigation of issues expressly addressed in an advisory opinion on a proposed amendment is strongly disfavored and almost always will result in this Court refusing to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. Renewed litigation will be entertained only in truly extraordinary cases, such as in the present case where a vital issue was not addressed in the earlier opinion.

On the question of whether this petition should be granted because of problems with the ballot summary, we first must note that no relief is possible unless the summary is clearly and conclusively defective. This could be established inter alia if the ballot summary is defective for "fail[ing] to specify exactly what was being changed, thereby confusing voters" or for "giv[ing] the appearance of creating new rights or protections, when the actual effect is to reduce or eliminate rights or protections already in existence." People Against Tax Revenue Mismanagement, Inc. v. County of Leon, 583 So.2d 1373, 1376 (Fla.1991) (citing Askew, 421 So.2d at 154; Wadhams v. Board of County Comm'rs, 567 So.2d 414, 416-17 (Fla.1990)).

In other words, there is no possible injury and no need for mandamus relief unless the repealer will be triggered by the proposed amendment. Triggering of the repealer would meet the criteria above, because it is clear that the ballot summary makes no mention of a possible loss of a portion of the homestead exemption. The parties conceded as much in oral argument.

On this question, we find that the language of the repealer itself is plain: It applies only if homestead property is assessed "at a specified percentage of its just value." Art. VII, Sec. 6(d), Fla. Const. (emphasis added). The use of the word "specified" leaves no doubt as to the intent underlying the repealer.

"Specify" means "[t]o mention specifically; to state in full and explicit terms; to point out; to tell or state precisely or in detail; to particularize, or to distinguish by words one thing from another." Black's Law Dictionary 1399 (6th ed. 1991). "Specify" means a "statement explicit, detailed, and specific so that misunderstanding is impossible." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1412 (1981) (discussion of synonyms of "mention"). Thus, a "specified percentage" is one that is both stated and precise.

Our construction of the Constitution today is strongly bolstered by the historical context from which the repealer emerged. In 1980, at least two separate and inconsistent proposals for property tax relief were proposed. The first included the repealer at issue here. The second, which failed to obtain enough petition signatures to be placed on the ballot, expressly would have reduced all assessments in the state to sixty-five percent of just value. See Manning J. Dauer et al., Proposed Amendments to Florida Constitution to Be on Ballot on October 7, 1980 and on November 4, 1980 Elections 3 (Univ. of Fla. Pub. Admin. Clearing Service No. 63, 1980).

It thus is clear that, by using the specific language now included in the repealer, the framers intended that Florida voters in 1980 could choose one but not both of these proposals, thereby eliminating the mutual inconsistencies. A "yes" vote on the reduction in assessments to sixty-five percent automatically would have repealed the increased homestead exemption put to the voters that year. Obviously, the repealer by its own plain terms would apply in the future if a similar proposal involving a specified percentage reduction in assessments is placed on the ballot. However, such is not the case today. Proposed amendment 10 involves a variable cap that will not apply to all homestead property, ⁵ not a specified percentage reduction. Accordingly, amendment 10 will not trigger the repealer and thus will not reduce the homestead exemption. ⁶

We acknowledge that there has been much inconsistent discussion of the exact meaning of the repealer contained in article VII, section 6(d). Some commentators have suggested albeit without analysis that the repealer will be triggered by any constitutional amendment that results in tax assessments at less than full market value. Steve Pajcic et al., Truth or Consequences: Florida Opts for Truth in Millage in Response to the Proposition 13 Syndrome, 8 Fla.St.U.L.Rev. 593, 618 (1980). Some of the historical materials submitted by the parties make a similar suggestion. However, these statements are cursory, vague, and unpersuasive.

In any event, the law is settled that when constitutional language is precise, its exact letter must be enforced and extrinsic guides to construction are not allowed to defeat the plain language. State ex rel. West v. Gray, 74 So.2d 114 (Fla.1954); City of Jacksonville v. Continental Can Co., 113 Fla. 168, 151 So. 488 (1933). Ambiguity is an absolute prerequisite to judicial construction, id., and there is no ambiguity here. The repealer is triggered only when property is assessed "at a specified percentage of its just value." Art. VII, Sec. 6(d), Fla. Const. (emphasis added). We are confident that, had the framers of this language intended...