Florida Medical Center, Inc. v. McCoy

• Decision Date: 12 July 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-3420,93-3420
• Citation: 657 So.2d 1248
• Parties: 20 Fla. L. Weekly D1596 FLORIDA MEDICAL CENTER, INC., a Florida Corporation, Appellant, v. Gilbert McCOY and Regina McCoy, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1248

657 So.2d 1248

20 Fla. L. Weekly D1596

FLORIDA MEDICAL CENTER, INC., a Florida Corporation, Appellant, v. Gilbert McCOY and Regina McCoy, Appellees.

No. 93-3420.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Fourth District.

July 12, 1995

Robert J. Orovitz, P.A., of Hayt, Hayt & Landau, Miami, for appellant.

Alexander Clark of Peterson, Bernard, Vandenberg, Zei, Geisler & Martin, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee-Regina McCoy.

FARMER, Judge.

When Regina McCoy's late husband was admitted to the Florida Medical Center, she and her husband were both required by the hospital to sign a form entitled "ADMISSION, CONSENT AND RELEASE." The form deals with assignments of insurance benefits, a consent to emergency treatment, a verification of the correctness of information necessary for medicare and medicaid reimbursement, and other subjects irrelevant to this case. Pertinent to this dispute are the following provision and signature lines:

"4. FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: I understand that I am responsible to the hospital and physician(s) for all reasonable charges incurred by me and not paid by third party benefits. In the event that said hospital bill, or any part thereof, is deemed delinquent by the hospital, I understand that I will be responsible for collection expenses as well as reasonable attorney's fees and court costs if suit is instituted."

* * * * * *

/s/ Gilbert McCoy

PATIENT

/s/ Regina McCoy

PATIENT'S AGENT OR REPRESENTATIVE"

There was a signature on both lines, and the handwriting for the two signatures is identical. After her husband passed away, the hospital sued both of them for the unpaid balance on the final bill, but the hospital later dropped him as a party. In a final judgment following a non-jury trial, the court determined that the hospital could recover nothing from her. ¹ She, in turn, then moved for an award of attorney's fees under the above quoted paragraph, which the trial court granted. The hospital appeals. We reverse.

In granting the motion for fees, the court explained:

"(1) a valid contract existed between [hospital] and Gilbert McCoy; (2) Plaintiff brought suit against defendants, Gilbert McCoy and Regina McCoy, individually, under that contract; (3) the contract contains a provision awarding attorneys fees to Plaintiff in the event Plaintiff is the prevailing party; (4) the same provision, pursuant to F.S. Sec. 57.105(2) applies to Defendant; (5) Defendant, Regina McCoy was found to be neither a party to a contract or a guarantor of the contract; and (6) Defendant, Regina McCoy is entitled to recover fees under the contract pursuant to F.S. Sec. 57.015(2)." ²

The hospital argues that David v. Richman, 568 So.2d 922 (Fla.1990), and Gibson v. Courtois, 539 So.2d 459 (Fla.1989), control this issue and that under these decisions no award of fees to Mrs. McCoy is possible.

Because the right to attorney's fees must be found in a contract or statute, the specific text of the contractual or statutory provision granting the right is critical. In Gibson, the contractual provision for fees read as follows:

"Attorney's Fees and Costs: In connection with any litigation arising out of the contract, the prevailing parties shall be entitled to recover all costs incurred, including reasonable attorney's fees."

The dispute in that case was between the seller and buyer of a residence. The buyer tendered an offer with an earnest money deposit through a broker but revoked the offer before acceptance. The broker refused to return the deposit. The trial court ruled that because the offer was revoked before acceptance no contract ever came into being with anyone, and the deposit must be returned to the buyer. The court denied fees to the buyer, and the district court affirmed. In rejecting the buyer's estoppel theory to support fees, the supreme court wrote:

"If because of his original position [seller] is estopped from asserting that the contract was invalid, then one could argue that because [buyer] originally contended that the offer was revoked prior to acceptance he should be now estopped from seeking to recover attorney's fees under the contract. The principle of estoppel is simply inapplicable in this situation. The fact that no contract was formed is dispositive of the issues presented." [e.s.]

539 So.2d at 460.

In David, the attorney's fee provision stated:

"In connection with any litigation including appellate proceedings arising out of this Contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs."

The transaction concerned the sale of a townhouse. The document was first signed by seller and later by the buyer. Seller sued for specific performance. In denying relief, the court found the financial provisions ambiguous and thus no agreement as to the essential term of payment of the price, as well as the seller's lack of the financial ability to close when required. The court then denied fees to the buyer and the district court affirmed. The supreme court approved the denial of fees on the basis that a contract was never formed between the parties because of the lack of mutual assent to an essential term.

Both of these decisions should be read with Katz v. Van Der Noord, 546 So.2d 1047 (Fla.1989), where a contract was actually completed for the sale of a trailer park, but no closing was ever held. A jury found that the buyer had breached, but the trial court set aside the verdict on the grounds that the seller had misrepresented an essential condition and ordered a new trial on buyer's damages. On the first appeal, the new trial order was quashed. The buyer then moved for attorney's fees as the prevailing party, which the trial court granted. The district court reversed the award of fees, reasoning that the buyer had elected a remedy in the nature of rescission, thereby effectually nullifying the agreement as though it had never existed. The supreme court disapproved that decision, ruling that "[t]he legal fictions which accompany a judgment of rescission do not change the fact that a contract did exist." 546 So.2d at 1049.

In both Gibson and David the fee agreement limited attorney's fees entitlement to "litigation arising from the/this contract." The essential fact in both Gibson and David was the determination that a contract did not exist between anyone. The essential fact in Katz was the determination that a contract did exist and that the later rescission could not be taken to mean that...