Flowers v. State
Decision Date | 05 December 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 79S00-9908-CR-411.,79S00-9908-CR-411. |
Citation | 738 N.E.2d 1051 |
Parties | Danny FLOWERS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Kevin R. O'Reilly, Lafayette, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.
Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, Sarah E. Scherrer, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee. RUCKER, Justice
Case Summary
A jury convicted Danny Flowers of rape as a Class A felony and burglary as a Class B felony. The jury also adjudged him a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Flowers to forty-three years imprisonment for the rape conviction enhanced by twenty-five years for the habitual offender adjudication. The trial court also sentenced Flowers to fifteen years for burglary to be served consecutively to the rape conviction. In this direct appeal, Flowers raises five issues for our review which we consolidate into four and rephrase as follows: (1) did the trial court err in denying Flowers' motion to quash probable cause affidavit and to dismiss; (2) did the trial court err in admitting the victim's in-court identification; (3) did the trial court err in denying Flowers' motions for mistrial; and (4) did the trial court err in denying Flowers' motion for change of judge. Finding no error, we affirm.
Facts
In the early morning hours of May 17, 1991, H.B. was awakened to discover that a man she did not know had climbed through her window and was standing on the back of her couch. The intruder grabbed H.B., and the two fought and struggled. Ultimately the intruder raped H.B. Subsequent genetic testing showed a match between Flowers' DNA and that of the intruder. At trial H.B. identified Flowers as her attacker. A jury convicted Flowers of rape and burglary and also adjudged him a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Flowers to an aggregate term of eighty-three years. This appeal ensued in due course. Additional facts are set forth below where relevant.1
Discussion
Gilliam v. State, 270 Ind. 71, 383 N.E.2d 297, 303 (1978).
Thus, if Flowers were correct in his contention that the probable cause affidavit was deficient then his only remedy would have been release from pre-trial detention predicated upon an illegal arrest. Id.; see also Felders v. State, 516 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind.1987) (). At this stage of the proceedings, we may address only whether the alleged illegal arrest affected the admissibility of evidence obtained through a search incident to arrest. Thomas v. State, 451 N.E.2d 651, 654 (Ind.1983); Williams v. State, 261 Ind. 385, 386-87, 304 N.E.2d 311, 313 (1973). This brings us to the next flaw in Flowers' argument.
The record shows that the State charged Flowers with rape and burglary on April 24, 1992. It does not show when he was arrested. However, on May 13, 1992, while Flowers was in custody, the State filed a motion to obtain samples of Flowers' blood, hair, and saliva. R. at 3. The trial court entered an order granting the motion. In this appeal Flowers asserts that his "bodily samples were taken on the strength of [the] defective affidavit of probable cause" and that "the evidence gleaned from [his] bodily samples should have been excluded." Brief of Appellant at 11, 12.
We first observe that Flowers has failed to provide any citation to the record supporting his claim that the trial court's order was premised on the probable cause affidavit at issue in this appeal. And our own examination of the record reveals no such support. Rather, the record merely shows the existence of the probable cause affidavit and a CCS entry where the trial court granted the State's motion for blood, hair, and saliva samples. In any case, Flowers neither objected to the taking of the samples nor filed a motion to suppress the evidence. Further, at trial Flowers' only objection to the admission of the blood, hair, and saliva samples was that there was an insufficient chain of custody and thus "the State has failed to lay a proper foundation." R. at 2367. In like fashion Flowers made the same objection to the DNA evidence derived from the blood sample evidence. A party may not object on one ground at trial and then assert a different ground on appeal. Willsey v. State, 698 N.E.2d 784, 793 (Ind. 1998). To the extent Flowers now claims the evidence was inadmissible because it was the product of a search incident to an illegal arrest, the issue is waived for review. See id.
Similarly, to the extent Flowers claims that the alleged defective affidavit provided the basis for a body search warrant and thus the evidence seized thereby was inadmissible, this issue is waived also because it is a different claim than that made at trial. We note, however, that this Court has held that "[p]olice are allowed to take samples of [hair, blood, and saliva] from a defendant without a warrant provided no unreasonable intrusion is involved." Jackson v. State, 597 N.E.2d 950, 959 (Ind. 1992) (, )cert. denied, 507 U.S. 976, 113 S.Ct. 1424, 122 L.Ed.2d 793 (1993), appeal after remand, 625 N.E.2d 1219 (Ind.1993); see also Heald v. State, 492 N.E.2d 671, 681 (Ind.1986) ( ). In sum, we find no error in the trial court denying Flowers' motion. And because Flowers makes an argument on appeal not raised before the trial court concerning the admission of evidence, this issue is waived for review.
Prior to trial Flowers filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude the rape victim's in-court identification. Characterizing her identification of him at his first trial in 1992 as a "pre-trial identification," Flowers contended that it was an unduly suggestive "show-up" and would provide the sole basis for the in-court identification in the instant case. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Over Flowers' objection, the trial court allowed the victim to identify Flowers at trial as her attacker. Making the same argument before this Court that he made before the trial court, Flowers contends the trial court erred in overruling his objection.
First, we reject the notion that Flowers' appearance in court at his first trial amounted to a "show-up"—unduly suggestive or otherwise. A "show-up" presupposes an out-of-court confrontation conducted by police for the purpose of allowing a witness to identify a suspect. See, e.g., Wethington v. State, 560 N.E.2d 496, 501 (Ind.1990) ( ). No such conduct occurred here. Second, even if Flowers were subjected to an unduly suggestive pre-trial procedure, the law is settled that an in-court identification is nonetheless admissible " `if the witness has an adequate independent basis for [the] in-court identification.'" Logan v. State, 729 N.E.2d 125, 131 (Ind.2000) (quoting Brown v. State, 577 N.E.2d 221, 225 (Ind.1991)); see also French v. State, 516 N.E.2d 40, 42 (Ind.1987); Henson v. State, 467 N.E.2d 750, 753 (Ind.1984). Although not an exhaustive list, the factors a court considers in determining whether an independent basis exists include:
[T]he amount of time the witness was in the presence of the perpetrator and the amount of attention the witness had focused on him, the distance between the two and the lighting conditions at the time, the witness's capacity for observation and opportunity to perceive particular characteristics of the perpetrator, the lapse of time between the crime and the subsequent identification....
Wethington, 560 N.E.2d at 503. Although H.B. could not quantify the exact amount of time that Flowers was present in her apartment, she did testify that he was there "a few minutes" during which time she fought and struggled with him and she "got a good look at him." R. at 1446, 1448. H.B. also testified that after the struggle Flowers placed a blanket over her head and raped her. When the assault was over, H.B. removed the blanket, and she "saw him again" as Flowers pulled up his pants and ran out the door. R. at 1482, 1448. According to H.B., during the entire encounter, the room was illuminated with light from the television that "lit up the whole front room." R. at 1447. Based on this evidence, we conclude a basis for H.B.'s in-court identification existed independent of any alleged unduly suggestive pre-trial procedure. The trial court did not err in admitting the in-court identification.
During the course of trial Flowers made two motions for mistrial:2 one during voir...
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