Logan v. State

• Decision Date: 26 May 2000
• Docket Number: No. 02S00-9708-CR-448.,02S00-9708-CR-448.
• Citation: 729 N.E.2d 125
• Parties: Sirlando D. LOGAN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

729 N.E.2d 125

Sirlando D. LOGAN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 02S00-9708-CR-448.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

May 26, 2000.

Randall J. Hammond, Deputy Public Defender, Fort Wayne, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.

Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, Arthur Thaddeus Perry, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee. RUCKER, Justice

CASE SUMMARY

A jury convicted Sirlando Logan of murder, felony murder, and robbery of a pizza deliveryman. The State requested and the jury recommended that Logan be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. The trial court followed the jury's recommendation. The trial court also sentenced Logan to a term of years for robbery as a Class A felony. In this direct appeal Logan raises six issues for our review which we separate into seven and rephrase as follows: (1) did the trial court err in denying Logan's motion to suppress evidence; (2) did the trial court err in allowing evidence of a witness's out-of-court identification of Logan; (3) did the trial court err in precluding Logan from questioning prospective jurors regarding life without parole during voir dire; (4) did the trial court err in precluding Logan from cross-examining a witness regarding a juvenile car-jacking adjudication; (5) did the trial court err in permitting the State to question Logan regarding a prior conviction; (6) was the evidence sufficient to support the convictions; and (7) was the evidence sufficient to support a sentence of life without parole. We address sua sponte whether the trial court erred in sentencing Logan for robbery as a Class A felony.

We affirm and remand.

FACTS

In the late evening hours of February 15, 1996, Logan and four accomplices ordered a pizza from Saylor's Pizza Parlor in Fort Wayne and directed that it be delivered to a nearby address. Saylor's Pizza employee Milton Turner went to the address, knocked on the door, and a woman answered. She informed Turner that she had not ordered pizza. Logan, who was standing on the front porch of the building, told Turner the pizza was to be delivered to a side apartment that was located down a dark hallway. Turner refused to enter the hallway and told Logan that whomever ordered the pizza would have to call Saylor's Pizza to confirm the address. Turner left and drove back to work.

Logan and his companions made another call to Saylor's Pizza demanding delivery of their order. When Turner returned, he told the store's owner that he would not re-deliver the pizza because he saw four shadows in a dark hallway and believed he was being lured into a dangerous situation. Employees Don Riebersol and Jean Poff agreed to make the delivery.

Riebersol and Poff drove to the address and knocked on the door. Logan was again standing on the front porch and motioned the pair to come to the side apartment down the dark hallway. They complied. Once in the hallway, they were confronted by three other young men. Logan stood behind them and told Riebersol to knock on the apartment door. Riebersol again complied and a young male answered. Riebersol handed the pizza to the man and asked about payment. Logan produced a handgun and, using it as a club, struck Riebersol in the face. Logan then began firing the handgun at Riebersol. Riebersol, Poff, and Logan's companions ran out of the hallway. Riebersol was shot three times and collapsed on the sidewalk outside the apartment. As Riebersol lay on the ground, Logan grabbed him by the hair, lifted his head off the ground, and put the gun to his head. Poff, who had escaped injury, screamed and pleaded for Logan not to kill Riebersol. Logan dropped Riebersol's head onto the ground, reached inside Riebersol's pocket, removed cash, and fled. Riebersol ultimately died of a gunshot wound to the abdomen.

Later that evening, police determined that the call to Saylor's Pizza had been made from the home of three of the young men involved in the robbery. Those men identified Logan as the shooter and gave police the address where Logan was staying. Logan was residing with Helen Cunegin and her son, using the living room couch as a bed. Police went to the address and knocked on the door. Logan answered and the police immediately took him into custody. Police obtained Cunegin's consent to search the home and discovered pizza boxes and the gun used in the shooting.

The State charged Logan with murder, felony murder, and robbery resulting in serious bodily injury. The State also sought to have Logan sentenced to life without parole. In a bifurcated trial, a jury convicted Logan as charged and recommended that Logan be sentenced to life without parole. On the robbery conviction, the trial court sentenced Logan to thirty years imprisonment. Upon the jury's recommendation, the trial court sentenced Logan to life without parole for murder. The trial court did not sentence Logan on the felony murder conviction. This direct appeal followed. Additional facts are set forth below where relevant.

DISCUSSION

I. Search and Seizure

Prior to trial, Logan filed a motion to suppress as evidence the gun and pizza boxes. After a hearing the trial court denied the motion. Over Logan's objection, the evidence was introduced at trial. Logan contends the trial court erred in allowing the exhibits into evidence because the search was conducted without a warrant and that Cunegin's alleged consent to his private living space was not valid.

Searches and seizures "conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Middleton v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1099, 1101 (Ind.1999) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (footnote omitted)). One exception to the federal prohibition on warrantless searches exists where consent to a search is given by a third party who has common authority over the premises. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974); Brown v. State, 691 N.E.2d 438, 443 (Ind.1998). The consent of one who possesses common authority over the premises or effects is valid against the absent, non-consenting person who shares the authority. Trowbridge v. State, 717 N.E.2d 138, 144 (Ind. 1999). Common authority depends on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-habitants has the right to permit the inspection. Id. The State has the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at the time of the search. Brown, 691 N.E.2d at 443. Additionally, when reviewing a trial court's determination of the validity of a search, we consider the evidence favorable to the trial court's ruling and any uncontradicted contrary evidence. Id. The test is sufficiency of the evidence. Id.

Logan contends that Cunegin did not possess common authority over the living room and thus, lacked the authority to consent to the search. He cites the testimony of Cunegin and her son given at the motion to suppress hearing, indicating they would not enter the room without Logan's permission. Although other evidence tended to show Cunegin and her son held common authority over the living room, we need not determine whether they in fact had such authority. That issue bears mainly on the credibility and weight of the evidence, and here the trial court did not render its decision on that basis. Rather, the trial court found that police reasonably relied on Cunegin's consent in searching the room. The trial court's ruling focused on the key inquiry in consent cases, the reasonableness of the police conduct. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186-87, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990)

("[W]hat is at issue when a claim of apparent consent is raised is not whether the right to be free of searches has been waived, but whether the right to be free of unreasonable searches has been violated."). Even if a third party who consents to a search does not have common authority over, or the requisite relationship to, the premises, the warrantless search is still valid if the officers reasonably believed the third party had common authority or the requisite relationship. Trowbridge, 717 N.E.2d at 144; see Canaan v. State, 683 N.E.2d 227, 231-32 (Ind.1997); Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 179,

110 S.Ct. 2793; Perry v. State, 638 N.E.2d 1236, 1241 (Ind.1994). "As with other factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure, determination of consent to enter must `be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment ... warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the consenting party had authority over the premises." Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188,

110 S.Ct. 2793 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

The record in this case supports the conclusion that the officers reasonably relied on Cunegin's consent. When police sought Cunegin's consent to search the home, she told them that she rented and lived in the home with her son and that Logan was staying with her until he found another place to live. Cunegin's statement came after police had seen her emerge from one of the home's two bedrooms upon their entry into the home in the early morning hours following the shooting. The room over which Logan contends he had exclusive control was a living room furnished in the manner one might expect to find such a room. It contained a couch, a television, stereo equipment, and other furniture. No bed or personal effects were in the room. Furthermore, from the front door of the house, officers had to pass through the living room to gain access to the rest of the home, and when police arrived, Cunegin's son was in the living room watching television. We...