Floyd v. Schweiker
Decision Date | 30 August 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 81 C 5905.,81 C 5905. |
Citation | 550 F. Supp. 863 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Parties | Ruby M. FLOYD, Plaintiff, v. Richard S. SCHWEIKER, Secretary of Health & Human Services, Defendant. |
Sheldon M. Gomberg, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.
Daniel K. Webb, U.S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., for defendant.
Ruby M. Floyd brings this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision of the Secretary of Health & Human Services denying her application for Social Security disability benefits and for Supplemental Securing Income (hereinafter collectively referred to as "disability benefits"). Cross motions for summary judgment have been filed asking this court to determine whether the Secretary's decision is supported by substantial evidence or, alternatively, whether the claim should be remanded to the Secretary and another hearing held with counsel present. For the reasons set forth below, the motion to remand is granted.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) defines disability as "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medical impairment that can be expected to last for over twelve months." More specifically, disability means not only inability to do the previous type of work but also the incapacity to do any other kind of work which exists in the national economy, "considering opportunities that exist either in the claimant's region or in the several regions of the country." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). See Spencer v. Schweiker, 678 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1982), Hogan v. Schweiker, 532 F.Supp. 639 (D.Colo.1982).
To be eligible for disability benefits a claimant must make a prima facie showing of an impairment sufficiently severe to preclude a return to his or her previous employment. Decker v. Harris, 647 F.2d 291, 293 (2d Cir.1981). Once this is established the burden shifts to the Secretary to present evidence showing that there exists in the national economy substantial gainful work which claimant, considering his or her age, education, experience and training, is able to perform. Spencer v. Schweiker, supra; Stark v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir.1974).
In response to criticism over disparate treatment of seemingly similar claims, the Social Security Administration recently promulgated new and detailed regulations which establish an orderly sequence of adjudication for Social Security disability claims. Kirk, et al. v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 667 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1981). The Seventh Circuit described the "sequential evaluation for adjudication of disability claims as follows:
Cannon v. Harris, 651 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1981). See also Cummins v. Schweiker, 670 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.1982), Hogan v. Schweiker, supra, at 643. These regulations necessarily require a detailed factual analysis of plaintiff's background and medical condition.
Ms. Floyd was born on April 12, 1924, has an eleventh grade education and has minimal additional training as a nurse's aid. With the exception of a two-year stint as a cook's helper, plaintiff's primary work experience between 1962 and 1979 was as a nurse's aid, a job that requires a significant amount of standing, bending and lifting. Plaintiff maintains that she is incapable of performing her prior work or pursuing any other type of employment because she suffers from high blood pressure, depression, and arthritis in various joints. Such ailments, of undeterminate dates of origin, evidently worsened over time and ultimately caused her to quit her work as a nurse's aid in May of 1979. One year later Ms. Floyd filed a claim for disability benefits with the Social Security Administration. That claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Exercising her right to an independent de novo review of the matter, plaintiff appeared without counsel at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on April 8, 1981.
Because of these ailments Ms. Floyd visits a doctor once a month. Dr. J. Niazir has been her treating physician at least since 1978. Her prescribed medications include Clinoril, 20 milligrams twice a day, presumably for arthritis; Valium, 5 milligrams twice a day, and Tylenol #3 which plaintiff says she takes twice a day to alleviate pain.
With regard to her daily activities Ms. Floyd testified that she cooks, washes dishes and cares for her personal needs, although experiencing some difficulties. In exchange for free rent plaintiff cleans the kitchen and halls, collects the rent and moves empty garbage cans. Finally, while she used to visit friends and relatives frequently, she rarely does so now except for attending church on Sunday.
In addition to plaintiff's testimony, information secured from Dr. Niazir was admitted into evidence. Submitted evidence included both the records kept by the doctor of Ms. Floyd's visits, and reports filled out at the behest of the Social Security Administration. Unfortunately, the monthly notations of plaintiff's condition are virtually illegible. What can be discerned is a significant weight gain of thirty pounds over the course of a year and, conversely, a steadily decreasing blood pressure. In a report dated July 12, 1980, Dr. Niazir described his patient's conditions as hypertension, depression and osteoarthritis of the lower back. He indicated that there was no end organ damage as a result of the high blood pressure, no symptoms of heart disease, nor any evidence of chest pain. Dr. Dilts, of the Social Security Administration, reviewed the medical evidence and concurred with Dr. Niazir's conclusions: "There is no anatomical deformity, bony destruction or bony hypertrophy in the spine, with no atrophy or local inflammatory or systemic signs. There is no weakness, and no loss of range of motion. Ambulation is normal.
After considering such evidence, the ALJ found Ms. Floyd ineligible for disability benefits. In so doing, the ALJ made the following findings of fact:
Plaintiff lodges two arguments against the findings and conclusion of the ALJ: first, plaintiff was denied a full and fair hearing because she was not represented by counsel and therefore the cause should be remanded so that an adequate hearing can be conducted; second, the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence, and thus his findings should be reversed and disability benefits awarded.
While Ms. Floyd had a statutory right to counsel at her Social Security hearing, see Hankerson v. Harris, 636 F.2d 893, 895 (2d Cir.198...
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...have criticized the application of the non-severe impairment regulation while not deciding the validity question. Floyd v. Schweiker, 550 F.Supp. 863, 868 (N.D.Ill.1982); Deuter v. Schweiker, 568 F.Supp. 568 (N.D.Ill.1983); Hundrieser v. Heckler, 582 F.Supp. 1231 (N.D.Ill.1984). In Hundries......
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