Floyd v. State

• Decision Date: 24 October 1956
• Parties: John Paul FLOYD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 105

90 So.2d 105

John Paul FLOYD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida, En Banc.

Oct. 24, 1956.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 3, 1956.

Carr & O'Quin and Paul L. E. Helliwell, Miami, for appellant.

Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and David U. Tumin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

O'CONNELL, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of the appellant, defendant below, John Paul Floyd, rendered by the Criminal Court of Record, Dade County, in a trial without jury. Defendant was charged with a crime under the provisions of Section 800.01, F.S.A.

Defendant contends that the trial judge abused his discretion in that defendant's motion to withdraw a waiver of jury trial was refused, that he was denied a fair and impartial trial and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction.

The record reflects that defendant, under advice of counsel, waived his constitutional right to trial by jury, that the counsel who first served defendant withdrew, and other counsel was obtained by defendant. The latter counsel moved the court to withdraw the waiver of jury trial. The trial court denied the motion for withdrawal of waiver, but continued the case one week, in order to allow the latter counsel to prepare for trial. Thereafter the cause proceeded to trial without a jury and under circumstances set out hereinbelow the defendant was found to be guilty of the crime with which he was charged and judgment was entered against him.

The right of an accused to trial by jury is one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed by our system of government. The Declaration of Rights, Constitution of the State of Florida, Section 3, F.S.A., reads 'The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate for-ever'. Section 11, provides that an accused shall have a trial '* * * by an impartial jury * * *.'

It is true that the right to jury trial may be waived in all cases, except where the penalty provided for the crime is death. 912.01 F.S. And the general rule is that once validly made a waiver of jury trial may be withdrawn only in the discretion of the trial court. 50 C.J.S., Juries, § 111, p. 825. But the discretion to be exercised by the court in granting or denying such withdrawal is not an unbridled one. It should, in all cases, be exercised liberally in favor of granting to an accused the right to trial by jury.

It would appear to us that the fundamental and cherished right of trial by jury will best be protected and be caused to 'remain inviolate' if the withdrawal of the waiver to such a trial is refused by a court only when it is not seasonably made in good faith, or is made to obtain a delay, or it appears that some real harm will be done to the public, i. e., the State, such as unreasonable delay or interruption of the administration of justice, real inconvenience to the court and the State, or that additional expense to the State will be occasioned thereby. Nor should the fact that a trial by jury is more costly to the State than a trial without jury be considered as ground for refusing the withdrawal of the waiver, for the guarantee of trial by jury under our Declaration of Rights includes the obligation on the State to bear such expense. State v. Rankin, 102 Conn. 46, 127 A. 916; Wilson v. State, 60 Ga.App. 641, 4 S.E.2d 688; People v. Melton, 125 Cal.App.2d Supp. 901, 271 P.2d 962, 46 A.L.R.2d 914; Newton v. State, 211 Miss. 644, 52 So.2d 488.

In the case before us the defendant, while represented by counsel who later withdrew, was arraigned on November 16, 1954 at which time he waived trial by jury. On November 26, 1954 his first counsel filed his notice of withdrawal as counsel for defendant. The case was set for trial on December 14, 1954 on which date defendant and his second counsel appeared, the latter counsel announced that he was representing the defendant and moved to be allowed to withdraw the waiver. The trial court denied the motion, but continued the trial for one week to allow defendant's new counsel to prepare for trial.

In denying the motion to withdraw the waiver, the court stated that since the defendant was, at the time of arraignment, represented by counsel the waiver of trial by jury would not be set aside. There was nothing to show that the State or the court would be inconvenienced in any way, or that any valid ground, within the rule we have adopted above, existed for denying the motion. It was not shown that justice would have been delayed or impeded. As a matter of fact while the trial started on December 21, 1954 it was never completed in an orderly procedure but was brought to a close by the summary action of the trial court on March 9, 1955.

We think the denial of the motion to withdraw the waiver was an abuse of discretion under the facts and circumstances of this case.

The defendant also urges that he was denied a fair trial in that the judge adjudicated him guilty before he rested his case.

We have searched the record before us and nowhere does it appear that defendant had rested his case, or that he either personally or through his attorney was allowed to argue his case, or that such argument was waived.

The record reflects the Clerk's minutes. These minutes show that the case commenced on December 21, 1954, that various persons, including the defendant, testified and that the trial was continued. The...