Floyd v. State, SC03-865.

• Decision Date: 24 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. SC03-865.,SC03-865.
• Citation: 902 So.2d 775
• Parties: James FLOYD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

902 So.2d 775

James FLOYD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. SC03-865.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 24, 2005.

Rehearing Denied May 13, 2005.

Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-South, Martin J. McClain, Special Assistant CCRC and John P. Abatecola, Assistant CCRC, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Appellant.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL and Carol M. Dittmar, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

James Floyd, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the trial court's denial, after an evidentiary hearing, of postconviction relief. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Because the record demonstrates without contradiction that the State withheld substantial exculpatory evidence from Floyd, we reverse the order denying Floyd's motion for postconviction relief on the authority of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and remand this case to the circuit court with directions that the conviction be vacated and a new trial conducted.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS TO DATE

The evidence relied upon to convict Floyd was previously summarized by this Court as follows:

The victim was found dead in one of the bedrooms of her home on the evening of Tuesday, January 17, 1984. She was last seen alive on the afternoon of January 16, 1984, when she cashed a check at her bank. According to the testimony of the medical examiner, she had been killed sometime that afternoon or evening by a stab wound to her chest. When the police arrived at the victim's home on January 17, 1984, the back door was unlocked, and there were no signs of a forced entry. In the room in which they found the victim, there were fresh "pry marks" beneath the window, indicating that someone had attempted to exit from that window.

On the afternoon of the victim's death (Monday, January 16), Floyd had cashed a check for $500 from the victim's account. He was arrested after attempting to flee from the police when he tried to cash a second check for $700 on the same account two days later (Wednesday, January 18). When questioned by the police, Floyd admitted forging the $700 check, explaining that he had found the checkbook on Tuesday near a dumpster. He subsequently revised his story when confronted with the police knowledge that he had cashed the $500 check on Monday. In addition, he admitted owning a brown jacket that was found outside the bank where he was arrested. A sock soaked with blood of the victim's blood type (which was not the defendant's blood type) was found in one of the jacket pockets.

Floyd v. State, 497 So.2d 1211, 1212-13 (Fla.1986). Based upon this evidence, and the testimony of a jailhouse informant, this Court affirmed Floyd's conviction, but set aside his death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing proceeding. Upon resentencing, the jury recommended a death sentence by a vote of eight to four, and the trial court again sentenced Floyd to death. Floyd v. State, 569 So.2d 1225 (Fla.1990).

Subsequently, Floyd moved for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, and the trial court summarily denied all claims. On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on Floyd's claims that the State had failed to disclose evidence favorable to Floyd's defense, including evidence of other suspects as well as evidence impeaching the credibility of the jailhouse informant¹ and on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Floyd v. State, 808 So.2d 175, 187 (Fla.2002)

.² On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and denied these claims as well as Floyd's claim that he is mentally retarded.

Floyd now appeals the trial court's denial of his claims and the trial judge's refusal to recuse himself, and he raises a claim under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). Because we find Floyd's claim that the State wrongfully withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady to be dispositive, we do not reach a decision with respect to Floyd's remaining claims.

ANALYSIS

Brady v. Maryland Claim

In Rogers v. State, 782 So.2d 373 (Fla. 2001), this Court went to some lengths to explain the State's constitutional obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Brady. We believe that explanation is equally pertinent to our analysis here:

In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that the "suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused ... violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. In Kyles, the Court wrote:

[United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985),

] held that regardless of request [by defendant], favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 473 U.S., at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); id., at 685, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433-34, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (emphasis added). Recently, in Young v. State, 739 So.2d 553 (Fla.1999), we recognized this emphasis placed on the materiality prong and stated:

[Although] defendants have the right to pretrial discovery under our Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus there is an obligation upon defendant to exercise due diligence pretrial to obtain information ... the focus in postconviction Brady—Bagley analysis is ultimately the nature and weight of undisclosed information. The ultimate test in backward-looking postconviction analysis is whether information which the State possessed and did not reveal to the defendant and which information was thereby unavailable to the defendant for trial, is of such a nature and weight that confidence in the outcome of the trial is undermined to the extent that there is a reasonable probability that had the information been disclosed to the defendant, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Young, 739 So.2d at 559. One week after our decision in Young, the United States Supreme Court decided Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), confirming its analysis in Kyles. In Strickler, the court stated again the rules which must be applied to this case:

In Brady this Court held "that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. We have since held that the duty to disclose such evidence is applicable even though there has been no request by the accused, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), and that the duty encompasses impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). Such evidence is material "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)

. Moreover, the rule encompasses evidence "known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor." Id. at 438, 115 S.Ct. 1555. In order to comply with Brady, therefore, "the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in this case, including the police." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437,

115 S.Ct. 1555.

These cases, together with earlier cases condemning the knowing use of perjured testimony, illustrate the special role played by the American prosecutor in the search for truth in criminal trials. Within the federal system, for example, we have said that the United States Attorney is "the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935).

Rogers, 782 So.2d at 377-78. In Rogers, we ultimately determined that there was a Brady violation and the defendant was entitled to a new trial because of the violation.

Application of Brady

This Court has stated that the determination of whether a Brady violation has occurred is subject to independent appellate review. See Cardona v. State, 826 So.2d 968, 973 (Fla.2002)

; Way v. State, 760 So.2d 903, 913 (Fla.2000) ("Although reviewing courts must give deference to the trial court's findings of historical fact, the ultimate question of whether evidence was material resulting in a due process violation is a mixed question of law and fact subject to independent appellate review.").

In order to establish a Brady violation, a defendant must prove:

[1] The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; [2] that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and [3] prejudice must have ensued.

Carroll v. State, 815 So.2d 601, 619 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)). In applying these three elements, the evidence must be considered in the context of the entire record. Carroll, 815 So.2d at 619 (citing State v. Riechmann, 777 So.2d 342, 362 (Fla.2000); Sireci v. State, 773 So.2d 34 (Fla.2000); ...