Sireci v. State

• Decision Date: 07 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. SC95116.,SC95116.
• Citation: 773 So.2d 34
• Parties: Henry Perry SIRECI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

773 So.2d 34

Henry Perry SIRECI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. SC95116.

Supreme Court of Florida.

September 7, 2000.

Rehearing Denied November 14, 2000.

Julius J. Aulisio, Assistant CCRC, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel—Middle, Tampa, Florida, for Appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Scott A. Browne, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Henry Perry Sireci appeals the trial court's summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.¹ We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons detailed below, we affirm the trial court's order denying postconviction relief.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In October 1976, Sireci was convicted and sentenced to death for the first-degree murder of Howard Poteet. The underlying facts and the evidence presented at trial are set forth in great detail in Sireci v. State, 399 So.2d 964 (Fla.1981), cert. denied 456 U.S. 984, 102 S.Ct. 2257, 72 L.Ed.2d 862 (1982), wherein we affirmed both his conviction and sentence.² Thereafter, Sireci filed his first motion for postconviction relief pursuant to rule 3.850.³ The motion was denied. Upon review, we affirmed the denial of that motion. See Sireci v. State, 469 So.2d 119 (Fla.1985),

cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3308, 92 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986). On September 19, 1986, the governor signed a death warrant. Sireci then filed a second 3.850 motion. The circuit court entered an order granting Sireci's request for an evidentiary hearing and application for stay of execution. The State unsuccessfully appealed. See State v. Sireci, 502 So.2d 1221 (Fla.1987).⁴ After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court ordered a new sentencing hearing on the ground that two court-appointed psychiatrists had conducted inadequate mental health evaluations at the time of the original guilt and penalty phase proceedings. That order was affirmed by this Court. See State v. Sireci, 536 So.2d 231 (Fla.1988).

Upon resentencing, the jury again recommended,⁵ and the circuit court imposed, the death penalty.⁶ Sireci filed a direct appeal of the newly imposed death sentence.⁷ We, once again, affirmed the imposition of the death penalty. See Sireci v. State, 587 So.2d 450 (Fla.1991),

cert. denied, 503 U.S. 946, 112 S.Ct. 1500, 117 L.Ed.2d 639 (1992).

In June 1993, Sireci filed the instant 3.850 motion for postconviction relief. On January 21, 1999, after several amended versions of the motion had been filed, the trial judge conducted a Huff⁸ hearing, and upon finding no basis to conduct an evidentiary hearing, he summarily denied all of the thirty-three claims raised in Sireci's 3.850 motion. Sireci now seeks review of the summary denial of twenty-nine of those claims.⁹

ANALYSIS

At the outset, we dispose of several claims because they are procedurally barred,¹⁰ facially or legally insufficient,¹¹ not cognizable in postconviction proceedings,¹² or without merit.¹³ We now turn to address the remainder of the claims.¹⁴

Brady Violations¹⁵

Sireci alleges that the State, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), withheld the following evidence: (1) a property receipt for a denim jacket recovered from his girlfriend, Barbara Perkins, by the Las Vegas Police Department; (2) evidence which would have been used to impeach Perkins; and (3) evidence which would have been used to impeach Harvey Woodall, a cellmate.

The United States Supreme Court, in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-282, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999), recently announced the three requirements that a defendant must establish in order to successfully assert a Brady violation:

The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.

The Court further explained that prejudice is measured by determining "whether `the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.'" Id. at 290, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)). In applying these elements, the evidence must be considered in the context of the entire record. See State v. Riechmann, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S163, ___ So.2d ___, 2000 WL 205094 (Fla. Feb. 24, 2000); Haliburton v. Singletary, 691 So.2d 466, 470 (Fla.1997).

1. Property Receipt

The State argued at trial that Sireci owned two identical denim jackets. According to the State, one of these jackets was stained with the victim's blood and was recovered in an abandoned motel room near the scene of the crime. The second jacket, the State suggested, was seized by the Las Vegas Police Department from Barbara Perkins when she was arrested in Nevada. Both of these jackets were introduced at trial.

Sireci now claims that the State withheld a property receipt, dated February 12, 1976, from the Orange County Sheriffs Department. According to Sireci, the property receipt demonstrates that both of his jackets were seized from Perkins at the time she was arrested in Las Vegas and, therefore, neither could have been the one found in the motel room. Contrary to Sireci's assertions, however, the property receipt only indicates that "one blue denim jacket" was transferred from the Las Vegas Police Department to the Orange County Sheriff's Office. The receipt in no way demonstrates that two jackets were seized from Barbara Perkins. in Las Vegas. Thus, we find that Sireci's claim as to the property receipt fails to establish a Brady violation.

2. Impeachment of Barbara Perkins

Sireci also alleges that the State withheld evidence that, contrary to Perkins' testimony at the resentencing that Sireci stole only $30 from a convenience store several days before the Poteet murder, he in fact stole $400, cigarettes, and wine. This contradiction, he argues, shows that her testimony lacked credibility.

First, we clarify that Perkins did not testify that Sireci took $30 from the convenience store. Her testimony at the resentencing was that "it seemed like a lot, about fifty or sixty, or more." Second, and of greater importance, even assuming that this evidence would have been used to impeach Perkins, we cannot logically conclude that showing a lack of credibility in her testimony at the resentencing on an entirely unrelated crime can undermine confidence in the verdict of guilt entered at his trial for Mr. Poteet's murder.

3. Impeachment of Harvey Woodall

Sireci argues that the State withheld information contained in a statement by Woodall given to the police which would have been used to impeach Woodall's testimony at trial. In this statement, Woodall states that Sireci told him he was wearing a green sweatshirt at the time of the murder, thus undermining the State's theory that he wore a denim jacket. The jacket found in the nearby abandoned motel played an important role in the guilt phase. However, it seems somewhat of a stretch to refer to it, as appellant does, as the "centerpiece" of the State's case.

Specifically, and as pointed out by the trial court below, at least four different people testified at trial to conversations with Sireci in which he confessed to the murder and robbery of Mr. Poteet. An independent review of the record indicates that, in total, seven different people testified that appellant confessed to them that he had murdered Howard Poteet.¹⁶ Those confessions were all consistent, detailed accounts of the murder. Thus, we find that there is no reasonable probability that this evidence could "put [this] whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict." Strickler (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435,115 S.Ct. 1555).

Sireci also maintains that the State provided favors to Woodall in exchange for his testimony. Namely, Sireci suggests the possibility that the state attorney responsible for the guilt phase of the proceedings paid the hotel bill for the accommodations used by Woodall during trial, which included charges for alcoholic beverages. This claim is entirely without merit. Appellant argues that "[i]f the State Attorney paid this bill for Mr. Woodall, this information would have undermined his credibility as a witness." (Emphasis supplied.) Appellant is, however, unable to tie this allegation to any evidence. Moreover, even if this allegation were true, which appellant does not suggest given his use of the word "if," and even if Woodall's entire credibility would have been diminished by this fact, the State still introduced six other confessions. Thus, we again find no reasonable probability that this information, if in fact accurate, would undermine our confidence in the verdict.

Newly Discovered Evidence¹⁷

Sireci argues that DNA testing would be able to provide better identification with regard to hairs found in the towels at the motel which had a role in the proceedings. This, according to Sireci, would demonstrate that the involvement of Barbara Perkins in Mr. Poteet's murder was more than she led the jury to believe.¹⁸

This Court has held that to obtain relief based on a newly discovered evidence claim a defendant must satisfy the following two requirements:

First, in order to be considered newly discovered, the evidence "must have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or by counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that defendant or his counsel could not have known [of it] by use of due diligence."

Second, the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial....

In considering the second prong, the trial court should initially consider whether the evidence would have been admissible at trial or whether there would have been any evidentiary bars to

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