Foley v. Argosy Gaming Co., 03-1793.
Decision Date | 06 October 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 03-1793.,03-1793. |
Citation | 688 N.W.2d 244 |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Parties | John C. FOLEY, Individually, and Interim Holdings, L.L.C., Plaintiffs, v. ARGOSY GAMING COMPANY, Defendant. |
Maurice B. Nieland and Matthew T.E. Early of Rawlings, Nieland, Probasco, Killinger, Ellwanger, Jacobs & Mohrhauser, LLP, Sioux City, and David B. Johnson and Emily A. Mily of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for defendant.
Theodore Boecker and James D. Sherrets of Sherrets & Boecker, L.L.C., Omaha, Nebraska, for plaintiffs.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa has certified four questions to us concerning the law of malicious prosecution. After summarizing the facts and prior proceedings of the underlying dispute, we answer the federal court's questions.
We restrict our discussion to the facts provided with the certified question.1 Willow Tree Invs., Inc. v. Wilhelm, 465 N.W.2d 849, 849 (Iowa 1991); Foster v. City of Council Bluffs, 456 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Iowa 1990); cf. Iowa Code § 684A.3 (2003). In 2001, John Foley and Interim Holdings (Foley) sued Argosy Gaming Company in the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County for malicious prosecution. Foley claimed Argosy had wrongfully sued him in federal court in Illinois for alleged false statements Foley had made about Argosy. Argosy had voluntarily dismissed the Illinois suit before it came to trial.
Foley claimed that, as a result of the Illinois suit, Interim's insurance carrier declined to renew its policies and Foley lost financing on a real estate deal in Sioux City. Foley also maintained the lawsuit caused him stress, exacerbating preexisting neck and back pain. Foley did not see a doctor, however; instead he resorted to some painkillers he owned.
On Argosy's motion the case was removed to federal court based on that court's diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Argosy moved for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Argosy argued Foley's complaint failed to show he suffered a "special injury." To prove malicious prosecution in Iowa, a plaintiff must show arrest of person, seizure of property, or other special injury. See, e.g., Whalen v. Connelly, 621 N.W.2d 681, 688 (Iowa 2000)
. We have defined special injury generally as an "injury that would not ordinarily result in all similar cases involving such a claim." Id. (citation omitted).
Instead of ruling, the federal court on its own motion stayed the federal proceedings and certified four questions to us. The four questions are:
Pursuant to our certification statute and in the exercise of our discretion, we now choose to answer these four certified questions. See Iowa Code § 684A.1 ( ). But see Eley v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 500 N.W.2d 61, 63-64 (Iowa 1993)
(. )
66 N.W.2d at 122-24 ( ); see also Royce, 423 N.W.2d at 201-02 ( ).
Following in the footsteps of those in preceding generations, Foley argues the special-injury rule is outdated and now should be abandoned. As phrased, the certified question expressly permits Foley to run this well-trod course. In our judicial system, of course, one may always question whether a precedent is controlling by asking whether it remains the law; it is manifest that we are free to overrule precedents when circumstances warrant. We do not "atavistically cling ... to distinctions which can have no practical significance but to interpose ancient formalities in the path of justice." Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, Address Before the N.Y. City Bar Ass'n (Nov. 17, 1921), in 3 Lectures on Legal Topics 89, 93 (1926) [hereinafter Hand Lecture] (quoted in Engel v. C.B.S., Inc., 93 N.Y.2d 195, 689 N.Y.S.2d 411, 711 N.E.2d 626, 630 (1999)); see, e.g., Barreca v. Nickolas, 683 N.W.2d 111, 121-23 (Iowa 2004)
(. )
711 N.E.2d at 629-31 ( ). We also note that generally reconsideration of stare decisis is not a matter for us to decide via certified question. See, e.g., Cavalli v. McMahon, 174 Conn. 212, 384 A.2d 374, 376-77 (1978); Cowan v. Ford Motor Co., 437 So.2d 46, 47 (Miss.1983); Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 232, 677 N.Y.S.2d 764, 700 N.E.2d 303, 309 (1998); W. Helicopter Servs., Inc. v. Rogerson Aircraft Corp., 311 Or. 361, 811 P.2d 627, 631 (1991); Concerned Dunes W. Residents, Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 349 S.C. 251, 562 S.E.2d 633, 639 (2002); cf. Tarr v. Manchester Ins. Corp., 544 F.2d 14, 15 (1st Cir.1976) (). But see Hartford-Carlisle Sav. Bank v. Shivers, 566 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Iowa 1997) ( ).
Having answered the first certified question in the affirmative, we now turn to the three remaining questions. For the sake of simplicity, we rephrase and combine them into a single question. Shaw v. Agri-Mark, Inc., 663 A.2d 464, 465 n. 1 (Del.1995).
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