Hansen v. Seabee Corp.

• Citation: 688 N.W.2d 234
• Decision Date: 06 October 2004
• Docket Number: No. 02-2071.,02-2071.
• Parties: Tim HANSEN, Appellee, v. SEABEE CORPORATION, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

688 N.W.2d 234

Tim HANSEN, Appellee, v. SEABEE CORPORATION, Appellant.

No. 02-2071.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

October 6, 2004.

Rehearing Denied November 2, 2004.

Margaret C. Callahan, Mark McCormick, James R. Swanger, and Michael R. Reck of Belin Lamson McCormick Zumbach Flynn, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas M. Werner, Des Moines, for appellee.

CADY, Justice.

This appeal requires us to delve once more into the murky landscape that is the law of disability discrimination. A worker claimed he was disabled, and protected under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), because his sore back limited his ability to lift and to perform some jobs he had done earlier in his life. The district court awarded Hansen damages on his claim under the ADA. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the district court judgment.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Tim Hansen left high school in 1974, obtained a general equivalency degree, and enlisted in the United States Army. He served in the army for two years and worked as a mechanic. After his honorable discharge, he worked for the next twenty years in the construction industry, building Astro buildings, painting water towers, and pouring concrete for new home construction.

Seabee Corporation hired Hansen on May 4, 1998. He was forty years old at the time. Seabee manufactures hydraulic cylinders used in heavy-duty equipment, and Hansen was trained to operate a straightening machine in the grinding department of its plant located in Hampton. He was a good employee who received favorable job evaluations, had no history of disciplinary problems, and received regular pay increases.

On April 12, 2000, Hansen noticed he had a sore back and some tingling and numbness in his leg. He surmised that his ailments were caused by bending over his straightening machine. The following day, he was examined by a doctor, who diagnosed him with a "right sacroiliac lesion with flexion and inflammation." Hansen promptly informed Seabee of his injury.

After Hansen reported his injury, he felt "his supervisors' attitudes towards him deteriorated." On June 6, 2000, Hansen's doctor recommended that Seabee elevate Hansen's worktable six inches. Yet, instead of promptly raising the table, Seabee transferred Hansen to a light-duty position in the plant washing rods.

On June 27, 2000, Seabee informed Hansen he was being laid off, explaining that production was down. Hansen observed that no other employees were laid off that day and that Seabee even retained a less senior straightening machine operator. The next day, Seabee called Hansen and offered him a job in the honing department. Seabee told him he would keep the seniority he had accumulated as a straightener for purposes of benefits, as well as the wage he had previously earned. However, he was apparently required to start as the least senior employee in the honing department. Hansen accepted the offer and returned to work on June 29, 2000.

Hansen eventually filed a petition against Seabee in district court on February 2, 2001. He alleged disability discrimination in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Iowa Code chapter 216 (2001), and retaliatory discharge. The lay-off on June 27 was the adverse employment action upon which Hansen's disability discrimination claim was based. On April 17, he amended his petition to add a claim of disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).

Hansen continued working at Seabee until October 5, 2001, when he was again laid off as part of a mass reduction in personnel. Hansen did not believe the lay-off was discriminatory, but felt he would have acquired sufficient seniority to avoid the lay-off if he had not been laid off on June 27.

The district court, in its pretrial conference order, directed the parties to exchange witness and exhibit lists by September 15, 2002. On October 15, 2002, the trial date, Seabee still had not provided Hansen with its witness and exhibit lists. Hansen filed a "Motion to Exclude All Witnesses and Exhibits of Defendant." The court granted the motion, and a jury trial commenced. Hansen was the only witness who testified. Seabee's evidence was limited to reading Hansen's answers to various requests for admissions into the record. Seabee then moved for a directed verdict on all three claims.

The district court granted Seabee's motion with respect to the retaliatory discharge claim. It concluded the claim was filed beyond a 180-day limitation contained in Hansen's employment contract. The court also granted a directed verdict on the ICRA claim, finding that Hansen presented insufficient evidence regarding the existence of a disability. However, the district court denied the motion on the ADA claim. It found Hansen had introduced sufficient evidence to support a claim of disability discrimination under that statute.

Following the trial, the court entered judgment in favor of Hansen. In its written findings, the court observed:

Tim testified that he could still perform his straightener job which did not require heavy lifting as the rods or cylinders would be lifted onto the straightener by an overhead hoist but that his back limitations would not allow him to perform other heavy lifting or bending jobs such as concrete work or painting with which he has had considerable experience in the past. There was no evidence Tim was severely restricted with respect to household chore activities which he routinely did not perform. In his work comp claim, Tim made no application for temporary or permanent disability nor was he ever seen by an orthopedic surgeon with respect to his back and hip condition.

From this, the court concluded that Hansen

was disabled under the definition of the ADA by having a physical impairment that substantially limited his working as a major life activity by reason of his inability to perform the certain class of jobs for which he previously had experience, i.e. concrete construction and painting.

Further, the court found that Hansen's June 27 lay-off constituted disability discrimination in violation of the ADA and awarded him (1) $17,106.66 in back pay, (2) $34,000 in front pay, (3) $50,000 in emotional distress damages, (4) $20,000 in punitive damages, and (5) attorney fees.

Seabee appealed.¹ It alleged a variety of errors, including the proposition that Hansen failed to establish he was disabled under the ADA. Hansen did not cross-appeal or otherwise rely upon his state claims to support the district court judgment. Consequently, our review is limited to the federal ADA claim.

II. Standard of Review

When reviewing the judgment of a district court after a bench trial, "our review is for correction of errors at law." Arnevik v. Univ. of Minn. Bd. of Regents, 642 N.W.2d 315, 318 (Iowa 2002) (citing Equity Control Assocs., Ltd. v. Root, 638 N.W.2d 664, 670 (Iowa 2001)); Iowa R.App. P. 6.4. "`"The trial court's findings have the effect of a special verdict and are binding if supported by substantial evidence."' `Evidence is substantial when a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach a conclusion.'" Arnevik, 642 N.W.2d at 318 (citations omitted). In contrast, the trial court's legal conclusions are not binding, but we will construe them "broadly in favor of upholding the judgment." Id. (citing Root, 638 N.W.2d at 670).

III. Disability Under the ADA

To establish a claim of disability discrimination, Hansen was required to prove (1) he had a disability under the ADA, (2) he was qualified to perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability. Kincaid v. City of Omaha, 378 F.3d 799, 804 (8th Cir.2004) (citing Christopher v. Adam's Mark Hotels, 137 F.3d 1069, 1072 (8th Cir.1998)). Thus, our first inquiry is whether Hansen had a disability as defined by the ADA.

The ADA's definition of disability contains three prongs. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). An individual has a disability if he or she has "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) be[en] regarded as having such an impairment." Id. Hansen claimed in the district court he was both "actually disabled" under the first prong and "regarded as disabled" under the third prong. The district court found only that Hansen was actually disabled due to a limitation on working. Nevertheless, we will consider both theories because "we may still affirm if there is an alternative ground, raised in the district court and urged on appeal, that can support the courts decision." Fencl v. City of Harpers Ferry, 620 N.W.2d 808, 811-12 (Iowa 2000) (citing Israel v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Assn., 339 N.W.2d 143, 146 (Iowa 1983)).

On appeal, Hansen claims he is disabled due to limitations on his ability to lift and work. With respect to lifting, the regarded as and actually disabled theories follow the same analysis because in either case, Hansens impairment must substantially limit him in lifting, either in reality or due to the attitudes of others. See 42 U.S.C. 12102(2). Similarly, when based on an alleged substantial limitation on working, both theories require the same analysis because both require a showing that the plaintiff either actually is precluded from a broad class of jobs, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2151, 144 L.Ed.2d 450, 468 (1999), or that the defendant regards him or her as precluded from a broad class of jobs, Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 525, 119 S.Ct. 2133, 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 484, 492 (1999). Accordingly, Hansens claims under the regarded as and actually disabled theories will be discussed together.

A. Physical Impairment

In order to have a disability under the ADA, an individual must have a physical or mental...