Fontaine v. City of Amsterdam

• Decision Date: 09 May 2019
• Docket Number: 527418
• Citation: 100 N.Y.S.3d 394,172 A.D.3d 1602
• Parties: Lisa FONTAINE, Respondent, v. CITY OF AMSTERDAM, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

172 A.D.3d 1602

100 N.Y.S.3d 394

Lisa FONTAINE, Respondent,

v.CITY OF AMSTERDAM, Appellant.

527418

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: March 19, 2019

Decided and Entered: May 9, 2019

Johnson & Laws, LLC, Clifton Park (April J. Laws of counsel), for appellant.

Englert & Coffey, LLP, Schenectady (J. David Burke of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Lynch, J.P., Clark, Mulvey, Aarons and Rumsey, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Clark, J.Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (J. Sise, J.), entered December 11, 2017 in Montgomery County, which denied defendant's motion for, among other things, summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

On August 25, 2015, after appearing in Amsterdam City Court on a charge of harassment in the second degree, plaintiff reported – at the court's direction – to the Amsterdam Police Department for processing. Plaintiff was subsequently brought by police to a holding area, where her right wrist was handcuffed to a ring attached to the wall. Plaintiff was released from police custody roughly one hour later. After serving defendant with a notice of claim in October 2015, plaintiff commenced this action asserting causes of action for false arrest, false imprisonment, battery, excessive use of force and "intentional neglect of medical needs." Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that she had recently undergone surgery on her right wrist to address her carpal tunnel syndrome and that the manner in which she was handcuffed caused further injury to that wrist. Following joinder of issue and discovery, defendant moved, pursuant to CPLR 3211 and 3212, for dismissal of the complaint. Supreme Court denied defendant's motion, prompting this appeal.

Defendant argues that plaintiff's claims for false imprisonment, false arrest, battery and intentional neglect of medical needs should have been dismissed because they were not specifically identified in plaintiff's notice of claim. Pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50–e (2), a notice of claim must set forth the name and address of the claimant and his or her attorney, "the nature of the claim," "the time when, the place where and the manner in which the claim arose" and "the items of damage or injuries claimed to have been sustained." "The test of the notice's sufficiency is whether it includes information sufficient to enable the [municipality] to investigate the claim" ( O'Brien v. City of Syracuse , 54 N.Y.2d 353, 358, 445 N.Y.S.2d 687, 429 N.E.2d 1158 [1981] ; see Rosenbaum v. City of New York , 8 N.Y.3d 1, 10, 828 N.Y.S.2d 228, 861 N.E.2d 43 [2006] ). Further, "in determining compliance with the requirements of General Municipal Law § 50–e, courts should focus on the purpose served by a[n]otice of [c]laim: whether[,] based on the claimant's description[,] municipal authorities can locate the place, fix the time and understand the nature of the [incident]" ( Brown v. City of New York , 95 N.Y.2d 389, 393, 718 N.Y.S.2d 4, 740 N.E.2d 1078 [2000] ; see Rosenbaum v. City of New York , 8 N.Y.3d at 10–11, 828 N.Y.S.2d 228, 861 N.E.2d 43 ).

Here, although plaintiff's notice of claim did not specifically list claims for false imprisonment, false arrest, battery or "intentional neglect of medical needs," it clearly identified possible culpable conduct by defendant on a specific date and at a specific location. In particular, plaintiff alleged, among other things, that on August 25, 2015, while at the Amsterdam "Police Headquarters," she sustained personal injuries, pain and suffering and emotional distress as a result of an incident during which she "was forcibly restrained by excessive force." In addition, plaintiff alleged that defendant's negligence arose out of the inadequate supervision and training of its employees, as well as its employees' use of "excessive and unwarranted force." Such allegations, coupled with plaintiff's testimony at the General Municipal Law § 50–h hearing (see Vallejo–Bayas v. New York City Tr. Auth. , 103 A.D.3d 881, 883, 962 N.Y.S.2d 203 [2013] ; Gagnon v. City of Saratoga Springs , 14 A.D.3d 845, 847, 788 N.Y.S.2d 249 [2005] ), provided sufficient information to alert defendant that plaintiff had potential causes of action for false arrest, false imprisonment, battery and intentional neglect of medical needs and, thereby, afforded defendant an ample opportunity to investigate the incident giving rise to plaintiff's claims (see Hone v. City of Oneonta , 157 A.D.3d 1030, 1032–1033, 69 N.Y.S.3d 136 [2018] ; Barone v. Town of New Scotland , 145 A.D.3d 1416, 1417–1418, 44 N.Y.S.3d 267 [2016] ; Baker v. Town of Niskayuna , 69 A.D.3d 1016, 1017–1018, 891 N.Y.S.2d 749 [2010] ). Accordingly, Supreme Court properly concluded that dismissal of plaintiff's claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, battery and "intentional neglect of medical needs" was not warranted under General Municipal Law § 50–e.

Defendant further argues that it was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint. "[T]he proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact" ( Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp. , 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923, 501 N.E.2d 572 [1986] ; accord Stonehill Capital Mgt. LLC v. Bank of the W. , 28 N.Y.3d 439, 448, 68 N.E.3d 683 [2016] ). If the proponent of the motion satisfies its prima facie burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party "to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the...