Fontaine v. Clermont County Bd. of Com'Rs
| Decision Date | 06 September 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:05-CV-00335.,1:05-CV-00335. |
| Citation | 633 F.Supp.2d 530 |
| Parties | Bryan FONTAINE, Plaintiff, v. CLERMONT COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Elizabeth S. Loring, Randolph Harry Freking, Freking & Betz, Cincinnati, OH, for Plaintiff.
Helen E. Mason, Batavia, OH, for Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 19), Plaintiff's Response in Opposition (doc. 23), and Defendants' Reply (doc. 25). For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and DISMISSES this case from the Court's docket.
Plaintiff Bryan Fontaine, formerly a maintenance worker for the Clermont County, Ohio, Sewer District ("Sewer District"), a department of Defendant Clermont County Board of Commissioners ("Board"), alleges the Board administered a constitutionally unreasonable search when they required him to undergo drug testing in 2003 (doc. 1). After Plaintiff failed the drug test, Defendants terminated his employment on September 9, 2003 (Id.). Plaintiff subsequently brought this lawsuit, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking, among other relief, lost pay and benefits, compensatory damages, reinstatement, and promotion (Id.). While the lawsuit was pending, Plaintiff learned of two job postings with the Board, for which he was qualified, and for which he applied in 2006 (Id.). Plaintiff interviewed, submitted to drug testing and physical examination, and avers that Defendants' Personnel Department told him he could start on February 27, 2006 (doc. 12). On March 1, 2006, Defendants voted not to appoint Plaintiff to either of the two positions (Id.). Defendants chose instead to appoint two then-current employees who were accepting demotion to the positions (doc. 19). Plaintiff thereafter amended his Complaint to include new claims1 for first amendment retaliation and for breach of Ohio public policy, under the theory that Defendants refused to hire him because of his pending lawsuit challenging the 2003 drug test (doc. 12).
On September 19, 2006, Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that no material issues of fact exist with regard to Plaintiff's claims (doc. 19). Defendants argue they were within their rights to conduct the 2003 drug testing and to choose not to hire Plaintiff in 2006, there is no official or individual capacity liability, and therefore they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law (Id.). Plaintiff filed his Response, arguing the Board subjected him to unnecessary and suspicionless drug testing to which he did not consent (Id.). He further argues they denied him the due process of a predisciplinary hearing, and their inconsistent statements regarding their failure to hire him establish a genuine issue as to whether his lawsuit motivated their refusal to hire him (Id.). Defendants filed their Reply, and this matter is ripe for the Court's review.
Although a grant of summary judgment is not a substitute for trial, it is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; see also, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962); LaPointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 378 (6th Cir.1993); Osborn v. Ashland County Bd. of Alcohol, Drug Addiction and Mental Health Servs., 979 F.2d 1131, 1133 (6th Cir.1992) (per curiam). In reviewing the instant motion, "this Court must determine whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Patton v. Bearden, 8 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir.1993), quoting in part Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The process of moving for and evaluating a motion for summary judgment and the respective burdens it imposes upon the movant and the non-movant are well settled. First, "a party seeking summary judgment . . . bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact [.]" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also LaPointe, 8 F.3d at 378; Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 405 (6th Cir.1992); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989). The movant may do so by merely identifying that the non-moving party lacks evidence to support an essential element of its case. See Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co., L.P.A., 12 F.3d 1382, 1389 (6th Cir.1993).
Faced with such a motion, the nonmovant, after completion of sufficient discovery, must submit evidence in support of any material element of a claim or defense at issue in the motion on which it would bear the burden of proof at trial, even if the moving party has not submitted evidence to negate the existence of that material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). As the "requirement [of the Rule] is that there be no genuine issue of material fact," an "alleged factual dispute between the parties" as to some ancillary matter "will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis added); see generally Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., Inc., 879 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir.1989). Furthermore, "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Gregory v. Hunt, 24 F.3d 781, 784 (6th Cir.1994). Accordingly, the non-movant must present "significant probative evidence" demonstrating that "there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts" to survive summary judgment and proceed to trial on the merits. Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 339-340 (6th Cir.1993); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Guarino, 980 F.2d at 405.
Although the non-movant need not cite specific page numbers of the record in support of its claims or defenses, "the designated portions of the record must be presented with enough specificity that the district court can readily identify the facts upon which the non-moving party relies." Guarino, 980 F.2d at 405, quoting InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir.1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast, mere conclusory allegations are patently insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See McDonald v. Union Camp Corp., 898 F.2d 1155, 1162 (6th Cir.1990). The Court must view all submitted evidence, facts, and reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). Furthermore, the district court may not weigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses in deciding the motion. See Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 378 (6th Cir.1994).
Ultimately, the movant bears the burden of demonstrating that no material facts are in dispute. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. The fact that the non-moving party fails to respond to the motion does not lessen the burden on either the moving party or the Court to demonstrate that summary judgment is appropriate. See Guarino, 980 F.2d at 410; Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 454-455 (6th Cir.1991).
As an initial matter, the Court notes that the parties devote considerable argument to the legal question of Plaintiff's status as a public or private employee, based in part on the history of the Board's management of the sewer district, which included three years, from 2000 to 2003, when the Board contracted out the operation of the sewer district to a private contractor, Earth Tech, Inc., ("Earth Tech"). The Court rejects Plaintiff's contention in his Response, (doc. 23), that he remained a public employee from 2000 to 2003, which he premises on public employment retirement provisions ("PERS") in Ohio Revised Code § 145 that provide "public employee" means:
A person who is a member of the public employees retirement system and who continues to perform the same or similar duties under the direction of a contractor who has contracted to take over what before the date of the contract was a publicly operated function. The governmental unit with which the contract has been made shall be deemed the employer for the purposes of administering this chapter.
Ohio Revised Code § 145.01(A)(2). Clearly this provision applies to Plaintiff, and for the "purposes of administering" PERS, he is considered a public employee during the time he worked for Earth Tech. However, neither the Ohio Revised Code, nor the cited opinion from the Ohio Attorney General, 72 Op. Att'y Gen. Ohio 55 (1972), in any way broaden the status of this class of employees beyond the scope of the retirement system provisions. Defendant proffers evidence showing it terminated Plaintiff, along with numerous other sewer district employees, paying them for accumulated vacation and unused...
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