Ford Motor Co. v. Maddox Motor Co.
| Decision Date | 19 June 1934 |
| Docket Number | No. 1776-6267.,1776-6267. |
| Citation | 73 S.W.2d 517 |
| Parties | FORD MOTOR CO. v. MADDOX MOTOR CO. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Suit by the Maddox Motor Company against the Ford Motor Company. A judgment of the district court for plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals and the defendant brings error.
Judgments of the district court and Court of Civil Appeals reversed, and judgment rendered for defendant.
Black & Graves, of Austin, and Allen & Allen and Leon C. Huvelle, all of Dallas, for plaintiff in error.
S. P. Jones and Franklin Jones, both of Marshall, and King, Mahaffey, Wheeler & Bryson, of Texarkana, for defendant in error.
CRITZ, Commissioner.
This is the second appeal of this case. Our opinion in the former appeal is reported at 23 S.W.(2d) 333. We refer to that opinion for a statement of the contents of that record, and our rulings thereon. At the former trial Maddox Motor Company recovered a judgment against Ford Motor Company for $23,500. That judgment was reversed and the cause remanded to the Court of Civil Appeals. 3 S.W.(2d) 911. That judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals was affirmed by this court. The judgment in the present appeal is for Maddox Motor Company for $24,000. This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. 48 S.W.(2d) 735. Ford Motor Company brings error.
This suit was originally filed in the district court of Camp county, Tex., by Maddox Motor Company, a partnership composed of F. W. Maddox and J. H. Mitchell, against Ford Motor Company, a corporation, to recover damages for the breach of an alleged six-year oral contract. In the former appeal we held that, if the evidence on the part of Maddox Motor Company was sufficient to show an oral contract at all, it showed one which either party had the right to cancel or terminate at will. We then held that such a contract could not form the basis of a suit in damages for its breach by termination by Ford Motor Company. For a full statement of our rulings in this record on the former appeal we refer to our former opinion.
At the present trial F. W. Maddox was again sworn as a witness and testified to the making of the oral contract by himself on behalf of the Maddox Motor Company and by one K. W. Brown on behalf of Ford Motor Company. At the present trial F. W. Maddox testified, in substance, that it was expressly agreed in the oral contract that neither party should have the right to cancel it except for legal cause. We mention this matter to explain why that question is not decisive of this appeal.
The present trial was had on the second amended original petition of Maddox Motor Company. This pleading comprises some twenty-seven pages of the transcript. It is not possible, within a reasonable space, to make a detailed statement of all of its allegations. It is sufficient for this opinion to say that it seeks recovery on the theory that Maddox Motor Company and Ford Motor Company entered into an oral contract in March, 1924, by the terms of which Ford Motor Company constituted Maddox Motor Company its dealers to sell Ford and Lincoln products at Pittsburg, Tex., for a term of six years. It is alleged that Ford Motor Company breached this contract prior to its expiration by refusing to sell its products to Maddox Motor Company. Maddox Motor Company seek to recover damages measured by the profits they would have made had Ford Motor Company carried out the alleged oral contract and sold them such of its products as their trade needs would have required. Maddox Motor Company recovered a judgment for $24,000, based on the above theories.
It is shown by the present record that on January 2, 1924, Ford Motor Company and Maddox Motor Company entered into a written contract. By the terms of this contract Maddox Motor Company were constituted dealers to sell Ford and Lincoln products at Pittsburg, Tex., subject to the terms and conditions of such contract. This contract is very long and contains many details. This written contract, by its express terms, operated for no definite time, but could be canceled or terminated at will by either party. It appears that after this contract was entered into there was some friction between the parties, and Ford Motor Company was threatening to cancel it. In this condition of affairs, F. W. Maddox, in March, 1924, went to Dallas, Tex., for a conference with the officials of the Ford Motor Company. Maddox Motor Company contend that the six-year oral contract here sued on was consummated on its behalf by F. W. Maddox while he was in Dallas on this trip.
F. W. Maddox was sworn as a witness for Maddox Motor Company. He is the only witness who gives any evidence to support the making of the six-year...
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