Ford Motor Co. v. Aguiniga

• Decision Date: 03 November 1999
• Docket Number: No. 04-97-01018-CV,04-97-01018-CV
• Citation: 9 S.W.3d 252
• Parties: (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999) FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Appellant v. Jorge AGUINIGA and Estehla Aguiniga, individually and as representatives of the Estates of Claudia Vanessa Aguiniga, deceased, Andrea Cristal Aguiniga, deceased, and Jorge Ricardo Aguiniga, deceased, and for and on behalf of all persons entitled to bring suit as a result of the wrongful death of Claudia Vanessa Aguiniga, deceased, Andrea Cristal Aguiniga, deceased, and Jorge Ricardo Aguiniga, deceased; Alfredo Plata, individually, Alejandro Plata, individually, Carlos Plata, individually, Jose Plata Flores, individually, Maria Esthela Aguiniga, as representative of the Estates of Enedina Flores Plata, deceased, and Desidiro Plata, deceased, and for and on behalf of all those entitled to bring suit as a result of the wrongful death of Enedina Flores Plata, deceased, and Desidiro Plata, deceased; Alfonso Ibarra Ponce, individually and as representative of the Estates of Dora Leticia Ponce, deceased, Rocio Ponce, deceased, Alfonso Ponce, deceased, and for and on behalf of all persons entitled to bring suit as a result of the wrongful death of Dora Leticia Ponce, deceased, Rocio Ponce, deceased, and Alfonso Ponce, deceased; Appellees
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 252

9 S.W.3d 252 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999)

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Appellant v. Jorge AGUINIGA and Estehla Aguiniga, individually and as representatives of the Estates of Claudia Vanessa Aguiniga, deceased, Andrea Cristal Aguiniga, deceased, and Jorge Ricardo Aguiniga, deceased, and for and on behalf of all persons entitled to bring suit as a result of the wrongful death of Claudia Vanessa Aguiniga, deceased, Andrea Cristal Aguiniga, deceased, and Jorge Ricardo Aguiniga, deceased; Alfredo Plata, individually, Alejandro Plata, individually, Carlos Plata, individually, Jose Plata Flores, individually, Maria Esthela Aguiniga, as representative of the Estates of Enedina Flores Plata, deceased, and Desidiro Plata, deceased, and for and on behalf of all those entitled to bring suit as a result of the wrongful death of Enedina Flores Plata, deceased, and Desidiro Plata, deceased; Alfonso Ibarra Ponce, individually and as representative of the Estates of Dora Leticia Ponce, deceased, Rocio Ponce, deceased, Alfonso Ponce, deceased, and for and on behalf of all persons entitled to bring suit as a result of the wrongful death of Dora Leticia Ponce, deceased, Rocio Ponce, deceased, and Alfonso Ponce, deceased; Appellees

No. 04-97-01018-CV

In the Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio

November 3, 1999

From the 381st Judicial District Court, Starr County, Texas

Trial Court No. DC-95-11

Honorable John Pope, III, Judge Presiding

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Sitting: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice; Alma L.Lopez, Justice; Paul W. Green, Justice

Opinion by: Alma L. Lopez, Justice

This is an appeal from a jury verdict finding appellant, Ford Motor Company (Ford), liable on strict liability claims of product defect and negligence. The jury subsequently awarded appellees a total of $16,000,000 in actual damages. On appeal, Ford raises the following: (1) there was no evidence that there was any defect or negligence by Ford; (2) the expert opinion was not founded on any reasonable scientific basis; (3) venue was improper in Starr County; (4) appellees failed to plead and prove standing to assert a claim on behalf of the decedents' estates; (5) the trial court erroneously applied the law of Texas; and (6) the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over claims by Mexican nationals because no treaty exists between the U.S. and Mexico granting these nationals equal access to American courts. Because we find that Ford's issues are without merit, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

In February 1994, Jorge Aguiniga operated a car business in Houston. He purchased a 1991 Ford Aerostar van at an auction in Louisiana. At the auction, Aguiniga personally inspected the vehicle before purchasing it. In addition, the vehicle was inspected a second time by his mechanic in Houston. It was inspected a third time by a Texas-licensed vehicle inspector to have the van registered and licensed in Texas. Nothing out of the ordinary was discovered as a result of these inspections.

In July 1994, Jorge's wife, Estehla, embarked on a family vacation to San Antonio and Mexico with their children, Vanessa, Cristal, and Jorge, Jr. On July 18, 1994, she and the children left Houston with a family friend, Marta Velazquez, and her son, Moises. Desidiro and Enedine Plata, Estehla's parents were also on the trip. The group stayed in San Antonio for two days. On July 20, 1994, they left San Antonio for Mexico. Marta and Estehla shared the driving. They traveled to Monterrey where they stayed with Estehla's sister, Leticia Ponce. During this part of the trip, the group did not experience a problem with the van.

On July 21, 1994, the group, accompanied by Leticia Ponce and her two children, Rocio and Alfonso, left for a day in the mountains around Monterrey. They spent the day at the Cola de Caballo tourist center. The group left the center around 3:00 p.m. with Marta driving. On their descent down the mountain, they noticed a burning smell. Marta stopped the van, and, along with Estehla and Desidiro, proceeded to check under the hood. They checked the oil, water, power steering fluid, and tires. There was nothing to indicate that there was a problem. The group waited about thirty minutes before they decided to re-enter the van and proceed down the mountain. A few moments after resuming their trip, Marta experienced trouble in braking and steering the van. Estehla attempted to help Marta steer the van, however, both women were unable to move the steering wheel. Thereafter, Estehla pulled on the parking brake to no avail. Neither Marta nor Estehla was able to control the movement and speed of the van. The van ran off the road at the edge of the mountain and tumbled into a ravine. All but Estehla were killed as a result of the accident.

Appellees¹ brought suit against Ford alleging that a fuel pump relay switch near the motor failed to operate properly. The fuel pump relay is responsible for transmitting an electrical output to the fuel pump for the purpose of providing fuel to the engine. In their petition, appellees alleged the defective design and manufacturing of the fuel pump relay. Appellees also alleged negligence. Suit was also brought against Miguel Velazquez, Elda Velazquez, and Geissi Velazquez (Velazquez) as representatives of the estate of Marta Velazquez on the basis of negligence. Velazquez then cross-claimed against Ford. Prior to trial, Ford filed a motion to transfer venue, a plea to the jurisdiction, a motion to apply the substantive law of Mexico, and a motion to dismiss in which it asserted the lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

During the trial, the jury heard testimony regarding the mini-relay system in the 1991 Aerostar van owned by Aguiniga. Testimony established that three relays, the wide-open throttle relay (WOT), electronic engine control relay (EEC), and fuel pump relay were housed in a protective housing known as a "doghouse." Each relay was designed with a plastic base, an internal iron, and a plastic snap that would snap the relay into place. Evidence regarding the testing of the EEC and fuel pump relays was introduced, as well as results gleaned from an examination of the Aguiniga van. In addition, a Ford exemplar van was also tested.

Evidence at trial included expert testimony for both sides. Dr. Rex McLellan, a professor of metallurgy, and Bob Swint, an electrical engineer, testified on behalf of the Aguinigas, the Ponces, and the Platas. McLellan's testimony addressed whether the engine in the Aguiniga van was operating at the time of the crash. He also testified regarding the physical condition of the relays. Swint also testified as to the condition and operation of the relays in the Aguiniga van. Ultimately, both experts opined that the fuel pump relay had become corroded before the accident, malfunctioned, failed to deliver the necessary electrical output to the fuel pump, and subsequently prevented the transmission of power to the engine. They testified that the lack of power stalled the engine, which in turn, immobilized the power brakes and steering. Ford submitted their own expert opinions asserting the opposite. Internal Ford documents regarding the relays were also admitted. Other evidence included the testimony of Estehla Aguiniga who testified as to what she recalled about the day of the accident. In addition, the videotaped deposition testimony of Mexican authorities who initially investigated the accident was also admitted.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, finding Ford liable for product defect and negligence. No liability was incurred by the Estate of Marta Velazquez. A judgment was entered by the trial court awarding plaintiffs actual damages.

Venue

In its third issue, Ford contends that venue in Starr County was improper on the basis that it was fabricated on a feigned claim against co-defendant Marta Velazquez's estate. Appellees assert that venue was proper because Elda Velazquez, the estate's administrator, lived in Starr County. Consequently, because venue was proper for Velazquez's estate, it was also proper for Ford.

When a trial court's ruling on venue is challenged on appeal, we review the entire record, including the reporter's record from the venue hearing and from the trial on the merits. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 15.064(b) (Vernon 1986). Wilson v. Texas Parks & Wildlife Dept., 886 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex. 1994); Bleeker v. Villareal, 941 S.W.2d 163, 167 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1996, writ dism'd). As the reviewing court, we undertake an independent review of the record to determine whether venue was proper in the ultimate county of suit. Wilson, 886 S.W.2d at 261. Where there is probative evidence to support the trial court's determination, even if the preponderance of the evidence is contrary, we defer to the trial court's determination. Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465, 471 (Tex. 1995); Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tex. 1993). Thus we review the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, but do not defer to application of the law. Ruiz, 868 S.W.2d at 758.

Ford properly filed a motion for change of venue in the present case. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 86(1). In its written motion and on appeal, Ford contends that the claim against Velazquez was an attempt to manufacture venue in Starr County. Ford bases its argument on the following:

1. After the accident, Marta Velazquez's daughter moved from Houston to Rio Grande City in Starr County. There she obtained an order from the county court at law as temporary administratrix of the estate².

2. The Aguinigas and Ponces never served discovery requests on the estate, did not designate experts to give opinions that Marta Velazquez was at fault, and established that they were not seeking a claim against Velazquez's estate during jury voir dire.

3. Estehla Aguiniga testified at trial that she did not think Marta did...