Ford v. Barcus
Decision Date | 09 January 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 52507,52507 |
Citation | 261 Iowa 616,155 N.W.2d 507 |
Parties | Axtell FORD, Individually, and as representing all persons composing the class of members of the IADA Workmen's Compensation Group, Appellees, v. Donald Wayne BARCUS, Appellant. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Davis, Huebner, Johnson & Burt, Des Moines, for appellant.
Korf, Diehl, Clayton & Cleverley, Newton, for appellees.
This is an action commenced in equity by an employer and his workmen's compensation insurance carrier against a former employee to set aside a memorandum of agreement as to workmen's compensation and for restitution of funds paid thereunder on the ground they were fraudulently procured. Defendant's special appearance asserting the trial court was without jurisdiction and the controversy belonged exclusively before the industrial commissioner was overruled. Following trial, judgment was entered for plaintiffs. Defendant has appealed. We affirm.
Defendant relies on three propositions for reversal, (1) the trial court erred in overruling his special appearance, (2) having set aside the memorandum of agreement the trial court should have remanded further proceedings to the industrial commissioner for his determination and (3) the evidence was insufficient to establish certain essential elements of the charge of fraud.
I. Our review of this equity case is de novo. Rule 334, Rules of Civil Procedure. In such a case, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, we give weight to fact findings of the trial court but are not bound by them. Authorities need not be cited. Rule 344(f)7, R.C.P.
We have carefully read and considered the testimony of the witnesses before the trial court together with the written statements given the insurance carrier by defendant and his fellow employee Robert Perry. These statements fail to reveal and carefully conceal the cause of defendant's injury as established by the great weight of the other evidence.
Our study of the entire record causes us to agree with these findings of fact by the trial court:
II. On April 3, 1964 which was several months after the last compensation payment, Barcus filed a petition with the industrial commissioner for review-reopening against Axtell Ford and its insurer alleging his condition was such as would warrant additional compensation.
April 17, 1964 plaintiffs filed an answer denying the claim for additional compensation and affirmatively alleged the memorandum of agreement was fraudulently procured, was void and that Barcus was the aggressor in horseplay which made his injury noncompensable. Barcus' reply denied these affirmative allegations.
Plaintiff's petition in equity was filed in May 1964 in the district court alleging the memorandum of agreement of August 12, 1963 was procured by fraud and was therefore void. Plaintiffs alleged substantially the same facts regarding horseplay as stated in the answer filed with the commissioner and further alleged Barcus' injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment.
The prayer of plaintiffs' petition asked the memorandum of agreement and the industrial commissioner's approval thereof be declared null and void and that they be vacated and set aside . It further asked the payments made thereunder be cancelled, set aside and plaintiffs have judgment for the amount thereof.
Defendant, Barcus, filed a special appearance challenging the jurisdiction of the district court to hear plaintiffs' petition. He therein asserted, (1) the industrial commissioner had jurisdiction of all matters arising out of injuries sustained during employment, including equitable matters, (2) if jurisdiction is found concurrent, the commissioner had already taken jurisdiction and the district court should not intervene and (3) where remedy before an administrative agency is provided, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts will act.
The trial court, then, Judge Harold J. Fleck, overruled defendant's special appearance. His conclusions of law include:
'1. Doyle vs. Dugan, 229 Iowa 724, 295 NW 128 holds:
"The Industrial Commissioner does not have jurisdiction to entertain an action to set aside a fraudulently induced compensation agreement approved by him, such matter lies within the realm of the equity jurisdiction of the District Court.' This case still stands as the law of Iowa.
In Comingore v. Shenandoah Act. Ice, etc., Co., 208 Iowa 430, 226 N.W. 124, where a widow, after her undisclosed remarriage, continued to take weekly compensation to which she was not entitled under the statute, we held on the employer's application before the commission he could correct any mistake in his order approving a memorandum of agreement of settlement which was contrary to statute. At pages 441, 442, 208 Iowa, pages 129, 130, 226 N.W. we say:
In Doyle v. Dugan, 229 Iowa 724, 295 N.W. 128, an action for damages was brought for injuries received by plaintiff's ward arising out of and in the course of his employment with defendant. The answer alleged the ward had elected to accept workmen's compensation and the payment thereof constituted an accord and satisfaction. In reply plaintiff asserted the agreement in reference to workmen's compensation was void because procured by fraud. Plaintiff alleged the employer had fraudulently represented he had complied with the requirements for coverage under the workmen's compensation statutes.
Like the case at bar the first assignment of error in Doyle v. Dugan raises the question of the district court's jurisdiction to determine the question of fraud practiced in securing the memorandum of agreement and the industrial commissioner's approval thereof.
After recognizing the well established principles that equity always stands ready to defeat fraudulent purposes, and to restore claimants to rights of which they have been deprived through fraud and that courts of equity have jurisdiction to grant such relief we say in Doyle v. Dugan, at pages 731, 732, 229 Iowa, pages 131, 132, 295 N.W.: ...
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