Ford v. Rigidply Rafters, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 April 1998
• Docket Number: No. Y-96-1699.,Y-96-1699.
• Citation: 999 F.Supp. 647
• Parties: James F. FORD v. RIGIDPLY RAFTERS, INC., et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

Page 647

999 F.Supp. 647

James F. FORD v. RIGIDPLY RAFTERS, INC., et al.

No. Y-96-1699.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

April 1, 1998.

Paul F. Evelius, Baltimore, MD, for Plaintiff.

Gorman E. Getty, III, Cumberland, MD, Jeffrey S. Getty, Cumberland, MD, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOSEPH H. YOUNG, Senior District Judge.

I.

This Title VII same-sex sexual harassment case is before the Court on Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) or for new trial, and on Plaintiff's motion for attorney fees. The case was tried to a jury in June 1997. Although the jury determined that Rigidply employee Leonard Orendorf did not sexually harass Plaintiff, the jury did find that Rigidply retaliated against Plaintiff, thereby violating Title VII, and that Rigidply was liable for Plaintiff's termination. The jury also found that Defendants did not retaliate against Plaintiff for filing a workers compensation claim, but that they did retaliate for filing the claim and this lawsuit. The jury awarded Plaintiff $15,000 in compensatory damages, and the Court, on Plaintiff's motion, entered judgment against Defendants in the amount of $72,280.01, which included the jury's $15,000 damages award and $57,280.01 in back pay, interest, and front pay by reported Opinion and Order dated November 24, 1997. Ford v. Rigidply Rafters, Inc., 984 F.Supp. 386 (D.Md.1997).

II.

Defendants advance a two-pronged attack on the jury's verdict, contending that Plaintiff failed to prove that Defendants retaliated against him because he has no claim of same-sex sexual harassment under Fourth Circuit case law, and that Plaintiff cannot prevail on his state law wrongful discharge claims because Title VII cannot serve as a basis for such a claim under Maryland law, and because the jury found that Rigidply did not retaliate against Plaintiff solely because he filed a workers compensation claim.

JMOL is proper when, without weighing the credibility of the evidence, only one reasonable conclusion as to the proper judgment exists. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a); Singer v. Dungan, 45 F.3d 823, 826 (4th Cir.1995). The movant is entitled to JMOL if the non-movant failed to prove an essential element of his case. Singer, 45 F.3d at 827. The evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Id. When an alternative motion for new trial is made, the Court may, in its discretion, order a new trial instead of granting JMOL. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b)(1); Cone v. West Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 215-16, 67 S.Ct. 752, 91 L.Ed. 849 (1947). In determining whether to grant a new trial, the Court may weigh the evidence and consider credibility, and the Court has wide discretion in making its determination. Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank, 895 F.2d 159, 162 (4th Cir.1990). Additionally, the proper remedy for an inconsistent verdict is to grant a new trial; however, the Court must determine whether the jury's verdict can be sustained or reconciled on any reasonable theory. Atlas Food Sys. & Serv., Inc. v. Crane Nat'l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587, 598-99 (4th Cir.1996).

A.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff did not establish a reasonable belief necessary to sustain his retaliation claim because Plaintiff did not have a viable discrimination claim under Fourth Circuit law. Defendants base this argument on the Fourth Circuit's holding that a Title VII claim for same-sex hostile work environment sexual harassment lies only where the alleged harasser is homosexual, see Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 144 (4th Cir.1996); McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 72, 136 L.Ed.2d 32 (1996), and that Plaintiff failed to prove his claim.

This argument is without merit. First, it is well-settled in the Fourth Circuit that a Title VII plaintiff alleging unlawful Title VII retaliation need not prove the underlying claim of sexual harassment to prevail upon the retaliation claim. Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 754 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 70, 136 L.Ed.2d 30 (1996). If the plaintiff proves his reasonable belief that sexual harassment occurred, he may maintain his retaliation claim. Kralowec v. Prince George's County, 503 F.Supp. 985, 1008 (D.Md.1980), aff'd, 679 F.2d 883 (4th Cir. 1982). Reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Ford, the presence of evidence that Plaintiff's supervisor, Leonard Orendorf, repeatedly touched private parts of Plaintiff's body, performed simulated sodomy on Plaintiff, and that an attorney had advised Plaintiff of a possible sexual harassment claim, would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Plaintiff had a reasonable belief that sexual harassment occurred. Further, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998), the Supreme Court rejected McWilliams and Wrightson, holding that a hostile work environment claim will lie based on same sex sexual harassment. Id. at 1002-03. Although Oncale was decided after the trial of this case, the decision undercuts Defendants' argument based on McWilliams and Wrightson.

Accordingly, the jury's verdict finding Defendants liable for unlawful retaliation under Title VII is supported by the evidence, and the Court will deny the motion for JMOL or a new trial as to that claim.

B.

Defendants contend the state law wrongful discharge claim must be set aside because of the jury's inconsistent verdict. The jury, in its special verdict form, found that Defendants had not discharged Plaintiff solely for filing a workers compensation claim, but also found that Defendants had discharged Plaintiff both for filing a claim, and in retaliation for opposing sexual harassment. Defendants argue that JMOL is appropriate because under Maryland law, a Title VII violation cannot serve as a basis for wrongful discharge liability, and because the jury did not find, as it must under Maryland law, that Defendants discharged Plaintiff solely because of the workers compensation claim. Plaintiff responds that such a result would permit an employer to escape liability for wrongfully firing an employee if the employer had two wrongful motives for doing so, rather than one wrongful motive.

Defendants correctly note that under Maryland law, an employer may not discharge an employee solely because the employee files a workers compensation claim. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-1105(a). To prevail on a wrongful discharge claim premised upon a violation of § 9-1105(a), the employee must, under the terms of the statute, prove that the sole reason for the discharge was the employee's filing of a workers compensation claim. Kern v. South Baltimore Gen. Hosp., 66 Md.App. 441, 447-48, 504 A.2d 1154 (1986). The Kern court relied upon the plain language of this statute to conclude that the plaintiff could not prevail upon her wrongful discharge theory where the record demonstrated that the plaintiff was fired for filing a workers compensation claim and for absenteeism. Id. at 448, 452, 504 A.2d 1154.

Moreover, Defendants also contend that in Maryland, a wrongful discharge claim does not lie for discharge based on sex discrimination violative of Title VII. Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 626, 561 A.2d 179 (1989). The Makovi court based its decision on the general principle that the tort of wrongful discharge is limited to remedying only those discharges which violate public policy, but for which no other civil remedy exists. Id. In this case, Plaintiff could not, had he premised his wrongful discharge claim solely upon a retaliation theory, prevail on his wrongful discharge claim because Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for that violation under Makovi.

In sum, this case presents the unique situation where Plaintiff has been discharged for two wrongful reasons—filing a workers compensation claim, and for pursuing a Title VII claim. A literal reading of § 9-1105(a) eviscerates Plaintiff's right to recover because the filing of a workers compensation claim is not the sole reason for Plaintiff's termination. However, the alternative wrongful motive will not, standing alone, support a claim for wrongful discharge under Maryland law. Thus, Defendants' argument would, if accepted, permit an employer to avoid liability in this unusual situation by terminating an employee solely for wrongful reasons.

The Court rejects the Defendants' arguments, and finds that neither JMOL nor a new trial is appropriate as to the wrongful discharge claim. It is well-settled in Maryland that where a statute is clear and unambiguous, and does not lead to an absurd result, a reviewing Court need look no further than the language of the statute to resolve the issue before it. State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 92, 581 A.2d 9 (1990); United States ex rel. Joslin v. Community Home Health of Md., Inc., 984 F.Supp. 374, 381 (D.Md.1997). Defendants' reading of § 9-1105(a) would permit an employer to avoid liability for discharging an employee for two wrongful reasons, one of which, standing alone, would support liability. The Court declines to interpret the statute in this anomalous manner.

Moreover, Kern is distinguishable because it involved two reasons for the employee's discharge—one legitimate, and the other (for filing a workers compensation claim) wrongful. Thus, this Court reads Kern simply as holding that under § 9-1105(a), an employer who has mixed motives for discharging an employee may avoid liability provided one motive is legitimate. See also Ayers v. ARA Health Serv., Inc., 918 F.Supp. 143, 149 (D.Md.1995) (granting summary judgment for employer where employer had legitimate reason for firing employee, but also emphasizing that plaintiff must establish discharge solely because of filing a workers compensation claim). However, this case does not concern mixed legitimate and wrongful motives, but solely concerns termination...