Kern v. South Baltimore General Hosp., 766

• Decision Date: 01 September 1985
• Docket Number: No. 766,766
• Parties: Jeanette M. KERN v. SOUTH BALTIMORE GENERAL HOSPITAL. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 441

66 Md.App. 441

504 A.2d 1154

Jeanette M. KERN v. SOUTH BALTIMORE GENERAL HOSPITAL.

No. 766, Sept. Term, 1985.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Feb. 14, 1986.

Andre' R. Weitzman, Baltimore, for appellant.

Jeanne Phelan (Russell H. Gardner and Wolf, Pokempner & Hillman, on brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Argued before WILNER, ROSALYN B. BELL and WENNER, JJ.

ROSALYN B. BELL, Judge.

Jeanette Kern filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against South Baltimore General Hospital (SBGH) alleging wrongful discharge. SBGH's motion for summary judgment was granted on the ground that Kern had failed to state a cause of action.

In this appeal she poses two questions for our consideration:

1. "Did the Trial Court err in granting the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment in this wrongful discharge action where the admissible evidence demonstrates that the Appellant was terminated for excessive absenteeism while receiving workmen's compensation 2. "Did the Trial Court err in denying the Appellant's Motion to Strike or Revise the Judgment entered by the Court on December 13, 1984, where Counsel had agreed to extend the time for filing a response to the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment, and where apart from the agreed upon extension, the Appellant's Response to the Motion was not yet due at the time judgment was entered?"

benefits and where the evidence also demonstrates that but for the absences occasioned by periods of temporary total disability she would not have been terminated?"

Mrs. Kern was employed by SBGH as an operating room technician for over thirteen years until her discharge in October 1980. In the course of her employment she injured her thumb on May 21, 1979, and filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits on June 9, 1979. Benefits for temporary total disability were granted in the latter part of July.

Due to this injury, Mrs. Kern alleges she was absent from her employment for the following periods: May 21, 1979 to July 21, 1979 ¹; October 16, 1979 through May 19, 1980 ² and; September 10, 1980 through January 30, 1981. ³

Mrs. Kern was discharged effective October 5, 1980 for the stated reason of excessive absenteeism. The letter of discharge noted that she was not on duty 104 days in 1979 In her suit against SBGH for wrongful discharge, Mrs. Kern sought compensatory and punitive damages, based on her inability to find comparable work, her loss of salary and pension, and mental anguish.

                and 145 days from January to October, 1980. 4  She states that of the number of days cited in the letter, all but 11 of the 104 days missed in 1979 were as a consequence of her work-related injury, and of the 145 days identified in 1980, all but 24 days were as a result of her injury. 5
                

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Appellant asserts that the court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment, in effect, for failure to state a cognizable cause of action for wrongful discharge. She presents two arguments in support of her contention.

Cognizable Cause of Action

Appellee's argument in support of its motion for summary judgment was premised on the assertion that appellant's declaration failed to state a viable cause of action under Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981). Appellant disagrees.

In Adler, supra, the Court of Appeals modified the common law terminable "at will" doctrine. That doctrine provided that an employment contract of indefinite duration could be legally terminated at the pleasure of either party. Adler, supra, altered this by recognizing a cause of action for wrongful discharge where a discharge contravenes "some clear mandate of public policy." Adler, supra at 43 Appellant posits that her declaration complied with the Adler, supra requirement. In that declaration she stated her discharge was:

                47, 432 A.2d 464. 6  Accordingly, Adler, supra, [504 A.2d 1156] requires a plaintiff both to plead and show that the alleged conduct violated a specific statutory provision or an existing rule of law to maintain a cause of action.   Id. at 46, 432 A.2d 464. 7
                

"... brought about and motivated by a desire to punish and penalize the [appellant] for having availed herself of the statutory right to claim Workmen's Compensation benefits, said acts of the [appellee] being in violation of the laws of this State, including, but not limited to Maryland Annotated Code Art. 101 § 39A, and in contravention of the clear public policy of this State to protect employees from abusive and wrongful discharge as a result of claiming their statutorily mandated benefits."

She points to two sources of public policy to sustain her claim: (1) Md.Code Ann. Art. 101, § 39A (1957, 1979 Repl.Vol.) and (2) "public policy ... to protect employees from abusive ... discharge." We will consider each source separately Prior to the adoption of employee protection laws, accidental injuries in the course of employment created hardships for both the employer and the employee. Pressman, Workmen's Compensation in Maryland, § 1-1 (1970). The workers' compensation laws precluded workers from suing employers under common law tort and substituted a system of compensation without regard to fault. Id. In 1914, Maryland enacted such a law with the object of providing an expedient and inexpensive method for payment of compensation to injured employees, and fairly distributing the financial burden of supporting injured workers and their families. Act of April 16, 1914, ch. 800 Preamble, 1914 Laws of Maryland 1429; Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co. v. Goslin, 163 Md. 74, 80, 160 A. 804 (1932). The Act is to be interpreted as broadly and liberally in favor of the worker as its provisions will permit, in furtherance of the benevolent purpose which prompted its enactment. Wiley Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 280 Md. 200, 217, 373 A.2d 613 (1977); Howard County Assoc. for Retarded Citizens Inc. v. Walls, 288 Md. 526, 530, 418 A.2d 1210 (1980). Although the Act is to be liberally construed, a court is not at liberty to disregard its clear meaning. Lockerman v. Prince George's County, 281 Md. 195, 202, n. 5, 377 A.2d 1177 (1977); see Crowner v. Baltimore United Butchers Assoc., 226 Md. 606, 175 A.2d 7 (1961).

                and in so doing, determine whether appellant's discharge violated "a clear mandate of public policy."   We turn to the workers' compensation law for guidance
                

1. Section 39A

Section 39A of the Act provides:

"Discharge from employment for filing claim.

(a) An employee entitled to benefits under this article may not be discharged from employment solely because he files a claim for compensation under this article.

(b) Any person violating this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than 12 months,

or both, in the discretion of the court." (Emphasis supplied)

Although appellant's declaration states that her discharge was "brought about and motivated by a desire to punish and penalize [her for claiming] Workmen's Compensation benefits," in that declaration and on appeal she concedes that this was not the sole reason for her discharge. She suggests to this Court that the word "solely" in subsection (a) cannot be limited to its literal meaning. She argues that Adler, supra must not be read so narrowly in a workers' compensation case as to require that an employee demonstrate that filing a claim was the sole reason for discharge. She argues that if so read, any "clever employer could easily escape liability, or rely on competent counsel to construct a defense after the fact."

Appellant's premise is contrary to the clear language of § 39A. A cardinal principle of statutory construction provides that where the meaning of a provision is unambiguous, the court need look no further for explication. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Kennedy, 296 Md. 528, 535, 463 A.2d 850 (1983). Webster's Dictionary defines the word "solely" as "without another" or "to the exclusion of all else." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1122 (1985). Appellant admitted in her declaration, deposition and argument on appeal that she was discharged for absenteeism as well as for claiming benefits.

In her declaration, appellant states she was fired for availing herself of the right to claim compensation benefits in violation of § 39A and public policy. As we will explain infra, the only public policy she refers us to is the policy against terminating employees who are absent due to compensable injuries. By asserting these policy grounds, appellant fatally conceded her termination was based upon a ground in addition to filing a claim. Similarly, in her deposition she recounted that she was discharged for "miss[ing] too much time.... That's why I think they terminated me." Finally, before us appellant frames the The Legislature in enacting § 39A expressed the public policy of this State--an employee may not be discharged for filing a compensation claim. This language does not imply that an employee may not be discharged for excessive absenteeism due to a compensable injury. The narrow language of § 39A precludes the broad reading urged by appellant.

                issue presented as whether the court erred "where the admissible evidence demonstrates that the appellant was terminated for excessive absenteeism while receiving workmen's compensation benefits ... and but for the absences ... she would not have been terminated."   Since appellant herself alleges that she was not discharged solely for filing a claim, she has not stated a cause of action based on a violation of § 39A.   The language embodied in § 39A clearly states that the filing of a claim is the crucial and only violation triggering the statute's protection
                

Appellant relies upon two New York cases in which employees were wrongfully discharged in factually similar situations to the case at bar. In Claim of Griffin, Eastman Kodak Co., Inc. v. Worker's Compensation Board, 80 A.D.2d 689, 436 N.Y.S.2d 441 (N.Y.A...