Ford v. Robinson
| Decision Date | 24 May 1968 |
| Parties | William F. FORD et al., Appellants, v. Kerney L. ROBINSON, Sr., Adm'r, etc., Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Joe H. Taylor, Hogan, Taylor, Denzer & Bennett, Louisville, for appellants.
H. Solomon Horen, Durward W. Maynard, Louisville, for appellee.
Kerney L. Robinson, Sr., as the administrator of the estate of Kerney L. Robinson, Jr., his son, recovered judgment of $25,000 for his death against William F. Ford and his son, Joe S. Ford. The Fords have appealed and urge that the court erroneously instructed the jury. It is contended that the court erred in refusing to impose upon the appellee's decedent the same duties that were imposed upon the driver of the Ford car, that an instruction under KRS 189.340(6)(a) should have been given in favor of appellants, and that no emergency instruction should have been given.
The accident occurred about 10 p.m. on February 14, 1964, on Dixie Highway (U.S. 31W) south of Louisville. The highway consisted of four traffic lanes, two northbound and two southbound, and a slightly elevated median strip, each twelve feet in width, with a rough shoulder on each side of the highway. The night speed limit was 50 miles per hour. The impact area was near where Stephen Drive joins the southbound side of Dixie and forms with it a 'T' intersection.
Kerney Robinson, Jr., was driving his father's car and had two passengers. Joe Ford was operating his father's car and had as a passenger George Krebs. All were about sixteen years of age and were classmates at Valley High School, where they had just attended a basketball game. Both vehicles were proceeding northwardly on Dixie. The accident occurred about two miles from the high school.
The cars passed each other between one and three times on their way to the accident area. The Ford car had been driven in the inner northbound lane for about two miles. Joe Ford admitted that just prior to the accident he was driving his car about fifty-five miles per hour.
Joe testified that he saw the Robinson car approaching from the rear in the outside traffic lane. When the Robinson car was within thirty to forty feet of the Ford car, Ford turned his car to the right and toward the outside traffic lane without giving any signal, although his turn indicator was in operating condition. With his car astraddle the dividing line between the northbound traffic lanes, Ford took his foot off the accelerator, thus slowing the speed of his car. Two witnesses testified that the Robinson car had been in the left northbound lane and that both cars turned from the left toward the right northbound lane at about the same time. When Ford heard gravel from the shoulder of the highway hitting against his car as the Robinson car was attempting to pass, he turned his car back to the left, or inner, traffic lane. Appellee contends that the Ford car forced the Robinson car off the highway as the Robinson car was attempting to pass it.
The evidence is that the...
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Burns v. Level
...four lane highways; therefore, there is no reason for excluding the same rationale for traffic on interstate roadways. See Ford v. Robinson, Ky., 428 S.W.2d 772 (1968) and City of Louisville v. Maresz, Ky.App., 835 S.W.2d 889 (1992). Moreover, KRS Chapter 189, and in particular KRS 189.390(......
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Commonwealth v. Fowler, 2011–CA–001581–MR.
...course included movement to the left or right. McCoy v. Carter, 323 S.W.2d 210, 217 (Ky.App.1959). According [to] Ford v. Robinson, 428 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Ky.App.1968), the 1960 amendment appears to have included a signal requirement before initiating a lane change because it expressly includ......
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Commonwealth v. Fowler
...course included movement to the left or right. McCoy v. Carter, 323 S.W.2d 210, 217 (Ky. App. 1959). According [to] Ford v. Robinson, 428 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Ky. App. 1968), the 1960 amendment appears to have included a signal requirement before initiating a lane change because it expressly in......