Forrest Industries, Inc. v. LOCAL U. NO. 3-436 INT. WOODWORKERS, Civ. No. 65-37.

• Decision Date: 15 August 1966
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 65-37.
• Parties: FORREST INDUSTRIES, INC., a corporation, Plaintiff, v. LOCAL UNION NO. 3-436 INTERNATIONAL WOODWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, a Labor Organization, and Western States Regional Council No. 111, International Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO, a Labor Organization, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Oregon

266 F. Supp. 265

FORREST INDUSTRIES, INC., a corporation, Plaintiff, v. LOCAL UNION NO. 3-436 INTERNATIONAL WOODWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, a Labor Organization, and Western States Regional Council No. 111, International Woodworkers of America, AFL-CIO, a Labor Organization, Defendants.

Civ. No. 65-37.

United States District Court D. Oregon.

August 15, 1966.

Norman J. Wiener, King, Miller, Anderson, Nash & Yerke, Portland, Or., for plaintiff.

William M. Dale, Jr., Hicks, Tongue, Dale & Strader, Portland, Or., for defendants.

OPINION

KILKENNY, District Judge:

Forrest Industries, Inc. (Company) charges Local Union No. 3-436 (Local Union) and Western States Regional Council No. 111 (Regional Council) with a violation of the working agreement between the Company and the Local Union.

Local Union at all times represented the employees of Company, and Regional Council is composed of numerous locals within an eight state area, one of which is Local Union. Federal jurisdiction is present due to the fact the action is brought under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185.

In the fall of 1964, Company concluded that economy and efficiency necessitated a curtailment in its work force, and that the job classification of "floorman" on both the swing and graveyard shifts was to be eliminated, with the two men holding the job classifications of "stock rustler" and "glue mixer" performing substantially all the work previously assigned the "floorman." This decision by Company was unilateral.

The Shop Steward, upon notification of Company's plans, stated to Company officials that Local Union would have objections. Following a series of meetings, at which no agreement was reached, a strike meeting was called by Local Union, and a vote in favor of a strike resulted. An attempt by the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to avert a work stoppage was unsuccessful, and a strike began January 25, 1965. The contract between Local Union and Company recited that no strike would take place until after compliance with all procedural steps¹ for grievance settlement, as set out in the Working Agreement. The Company contends that Local Union was obligated not to strike during the terms of the contract unless: (a) a grievance arose under the terms of the contract, and (b) the grievance procedure provided for in the contract was followed. It insists that the curtailment in its work force was not a "grievance" (or a matter subject to grievance procedure), but was a prerogative of management not subject to negotiation. The Company concludes that the strike was unlawful and a breach of contract, and that defendants Local Union and Regional Council intentionally caused the breach. As separate causes of action, Company alleges that two of its divisions have been damaged in substantial sums.

Local Union and Regional Council contend that the change instituted by Company affected the employment conditions of not only those directly involved, but of many other employees as well. They also insist that the change involved conditions of employment and that it, therefore, constituted a grievance or subject of grievance within the meaning of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Local Union and Regional Council argue that the procedures provided for grievances were fully complied with, and that the strike was, therefore, in accordance with the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

ISSUES

A. Did the change effectuated by Company constitute a grievance or a subject of grievance, within the meaning of the Collective Bargaining Agreement?

B. Was the grievance procedure, as set out by the Collective Bargaining Agreement, fully complied with?

A. Since the solution to the first issue revolves around the meaning of the word "grievance," we must turn to the legal definition of that term. It is generally held that the word is not a term of art, and has no connotation different from its meaning in ordinary use. Butte Miners' Union No. 1, etc. v. Anaconda Co., 159 F.Supp. 431, 435 (D.Mont.1958); Petition of Labor Mediation Board, 365 Mich. 645, 114 N.W.2d 183, 187 (1962); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 161 F.2d 949, 955 (6th Cir. 1947).

There are varying interpretations of what actually constitutes a "grievance." Some seem to infer that the term refers to collective rather than individual or group complaints, or to major demands relative to wages, hours and working conditions. NLRB v. Associated Machines, 219 F.2d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 1955); Pittsburgh City Fire Fighters, etc. v. Barr, 408 Pa. 325, 184 A.2d 588 (1962). However, other cases indicate that minor matters or secondary disputes (in contrast to broad issues such as wages, hours and working conditions) constitute a "grievance." West Texas Utilities Co. v. NLRB, 92 U.S.App.D.C. 224, 206 F.2d 442, 446 (1953); NLRB v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 237 F.2d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 1956).

Here, by the terminology used by the parties in their working agreement, it seems quite clear that they intended the term "grievance" to encompass, not only major demands relative to wages, hours and working conditions, but also individual and group complaints. Subsection c. of Article II of the "Working Agreement" between Company and Local Union states:

"The Shop Steward may present the grievance of the member or members, under his jurisdiction, to the foreman or superintendent for adjustment. * * *" (Emphasis supplied.)

Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 1959) defines grievance as follows:

"Suffering, or its infliction; affliction. Aggrieved state; anger. A cause of uneasiness and complaint; a wrong."

As above delineated, Company decided to eliminate the job of "floorman" on both its swing and graveyard shifts, for reasons of economy. Because of this the workmen permanently assigned to the job classification of "stock rustler" were required to assume the duties previously performed by the floorman. In addition, the "glue mixer" on each of these shifts was required to assume duties formerly performed by the stock rustler. As a result, the duties and job content of the "stock rustler" and "glue mixer" classifications were substantially altered, which increased their work load and job performance. Another repercussion of the change was that, as a result of the "bumping down" procedure within the seniority system, one man at the bottom of the seniority list was eventually discharged. Manifestly, the worker eventually discharged because of this reclassification and job abolishment "suffered." Moreover, one would be hard put to deny that the workers who lost their regular positions, or those whose duties were substantially altered, had a reasonable and logical "cause of uneasiness and complaint." It appears quite clear, from the fact that several of the employees complained almost immediately after learning of these changes, that they considered themselves to be "afflicted," "aggrieved" and "wronged." Clearly, several of Company's employees has a legitimate "grievance," at least according to the common and ordinary meaning of the term.

Conceding, as I must, that those in charge of management have a right to "improve, control and direct production," it does not necessarily follow that a company's employees will not be "wronged" by certain changes, even if the employees have no voice in the changes before they are made. Within the last decade, many substantial inroads have been made into what were formerly known as "traditional prerogatives of business." Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Chicago & Northwestern R.R., 362 U.S. 330, 80 S.Ct. 761 (1960); Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington, 380 U.S. 263, 85 S.Ct. 994, 13 L.Ed.2d 827 (1965); Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 85 S.Ct. 398, 13 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964).

While these cases are not precisely in point, they present certain guidelines which, I believe, stand for the principle that employers may not, with impunity, act unilaterally in such a way as to directly affect their employees, simply because business efficiency or economy may so dictate....