Forsythe v. Leydon
Decision Date | 23 November 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 04-308.,04-308. |
Citation | 102 P.3d 25,2004 MT 327,324 Mont. 121 |
Parties | Robyn FORSYTHE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ariadne LEYDON, Defendant and Appellant. |
Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: Lyman H. Bennett, III, Bozeman, Montana.
For Respondent: Geoffrey C. Angel, Angel Law Firm, Bozeman, Montana.
¶ 1 Ariadne Leydon appeals from the District Court's grant of a new trial to Robyn Forsythe. We reverse.
¶ 2 We restate the issue on appeal as follows:
¶ 3 Did the District Court lack jurisdiction to grant Forsythe's motion for a new trial outside of the 60-day deadline mandated by Rule 59(d), M.R.Civ.P.?
¶ 4 Forsythe brought this action against Leydon for injuries arising out of a car accident. After a jury trial and special verdict allocating negligence 50/50, Forsythe moved for the District Court to grant her a new trial. Forsythe withdrew her initial motion, but then renewed it on December 19, 2003. A hearing was held on the issue on February 10, 2004, and the District Court granted Forsythe a new trial on March 3, 2004. Leydon then brought her appeal to this Court, arguing that once the 60-day limit mandated by Rule 59(d), M.R.Civ.P., had expired, the District Court was without jurisdiction to grant a new trial. In response, Forsythe accepts that Rule 59(d) mandates a 60-day limit, and that the District Court's ruling exceeded that limit. However, she argues that the 60-day limit of Rule 59(d) is unconstitutional.
¶ 5 A district court's jurisdiction is a question of law that we review by asking whether the court had the authority to act. Richards v. Richards, 2001 MT 183, ¶ 5, 306 Mont. 212, ¶ 5, 31 P.3d 1002, ¶ 5. Constitutional issues of due process involve matters of law and our review is plenary. In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 2001 MT 140, ¶ 17, 306 Mont. 1, ¶ 17, 29 P.3d 485, ¶ 17.
¶ 6 Did the District Court lack jurisdiction to grant Forsythe's motion for a new trial outside of the 60-day deadline mandated by Rule 59(d), M.R.Civ.P.?
¶ 7 Rule 59(d), M.R.Civ.P., states, "If the court shall fail to rule on a motion for new trial within 60 days from the time the motion is filed, the motion shall, at the expiration of said period, be deemed denied." March 3, 2004, is unarguably more than 60 days after December 19, 2003. Therefore, as a matter of law and notwithstanding the District Court's March 3 order, Forsythe's motion for a new trial was deemed denied.
¶ 8 We have upheld this requirement before and have repeatedly emphasized the need for strict adherence to the rule. In a previous appeal where a respondent argued that an exception be made to the 60-day limit of Rule 59, we stated:
Richards, ¶¶ 10-11 (citations omitted). We have upheld the time limits of Rule 59 on several other occasions. See, e.g., Associated Press v. Crofts, 2004 MT 120, ¶ 37, 321 Mont. 193, ¶ 37, 89 P.3d 971, ¶ 37; Johnson v. Eagles Lodge Aerie 3913 (1997), 284 Mont. 474, 479, 945 P.2d 62, 64-65
.
¶ 9 Forsythe argues that the temporal limitations of Rule 59(d) are unconstitutional because they deprive her of procedural due process. She cites no instance of a court, state or federal, striking down a similar time limit on due process grounds. She asserts that the 60-day requirement is arbitrary, but, as we concluded in Richards, just because a rule is arbitrary does not mean it should not be favored. Insisting on a firm time-limit advances the cause of justice by bringing predictability to our process. As we said in Kelly v. Sell & Sell Paint...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Green v. Gerber
...enforced this deadline. The time limits provided in these rules are mandatory and are strictly enforced.” Wellnitz, ¶ 13. ¶ 26 In Forsythe, we rejected Forsythe's argument that the temporal limitations contained in Rule 59(d) (the “deemed denied” provision similar to that contained in Rule ......
-
Bnsf Ry. Co. v. Cringle
...who properly raises a procedural time bar may expect the time bar to be applied “regularly and consistently.” Redcrow, ¶ 34; Forsythe v. Leydon, 2004 MT 327, ¶ 9, 324 Mont. 121, 102 P.3d 25 (stating that “a firm time-limit advances the cause of justice by bringing predictability to our proc......
-
In re T.W., 04-064.
...a notice of appeal. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶ 11 Our review of the constitutional issue of due process, a matter of law, is plenary. Forsythe v. Leydon, 2004 MT 327, ¶ 5, 324 Mont. 121, ¶ 5, 102 P.3d 25, ¶ 5. "A party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must prove the statute unconsti......
- Tabile v. State